Indo-China Relationship II An Informative Podcast II NISSMAT

Very good evening to all viewers. I am S. Paul Singh, former Inspector General of Police Punjab and ex-Chief Rapid Action Force, Government of India. Today evening I am with you as president of NISSMAT. NISSMAT started as a training institution, but with the passage of time it has become a think tank organization and it conducts discussions, debates, deliberations with scholars and reputed social and political personalities through webinars, interactive sessions, protocols, and these are propagated to a large audience.

Today we have with us two speakers. One is the moderator, the other is the speaker. I'll first of all introduce the speaker, Shri Karan Duta. Shri Karan Duta is a reputed and recognized financial services advisor who has contributed in a big way to the growth of some well-known global and domestic organizations like Franklin Templeton and Axis Mutual Funds. In addition to his financial acumen, he has deep interest in geopolitical matters and the economic implications of geopolitical matters. He continues to make significant contribution to both the financial and geopolitical realms.

The other gentleman on the dais with us is Major General Deepak Mahhata, retired, who will moderate this session. Major General Deepak Mahhata is a third generation officer in the army. He is a postgraduate in defense studies from Madras University. He has seen active operations in J&K, both in counter insurgency operations and along the line of control. General Mahhata commanded an infantry brigade during ops per karma and a mountain. Subsequently, he is the first officer who raised the information warfare cell in the army as a pilot project and has instructional appointments in the premier training institutes and establishment of the Army War College and the Military Academy. He'll moderate this session.

Before I request our eminent speakers to elaborate on the subject of today's discussion, that is India China relationship, let me give a brief about the subject. India and China, the two major powers, have a share of complex relationship. Somehow or the other, these complex relationships are shared by the ancient history, geography and also strategic interests. Despite deep rooted cultural ties, tension persists between the two countries due to unresolved border disputes. The line of actual control remains the most contentious issue, and the 1962 war, as we vividly remember still, and the Galwan Valley clash of 2020 continue to cast a very long shadow on the relationship between the two countries.

Economic relationship have also been mostly uneven. India faces a large trade deficit with China. Further, Beijing's road initiatives, particularly these projects in Pakistan occupied Kashmir, have heightened India security concerns. Then prolonged mistrust between the two countries have hampered regional stability, and to some extent, or rather to great extent, the diverse resources for our military operations or military preparedness, I would call it, above limits. However, restricts opportunities for giant global partnership, and there's a strategic rivalry somehow the other prevailing between the two countries. For India, balancing economic engagements with national security of the country remains a central challenge.

India China relationship: the ongoing tariff war, I'll come to recent war, the tariff war initiated by United States against China has opened new possibilities for India China trade cooperation. It has indeed opened new. Let's see how far we go. As the US restricts Chinese exports through high tariffs, Beijing is compelled probably to look for alternatives, markets and reliable parties. So is India. On the other hand, Indian exporters also, particularly in the pharmaceutical sector, in the IT services, in agriculture productions and textiles, they can gain a much deeper access to the Chinese market as China seeks to diversify its import. However, the challenges remain. Longstanding political and security frictions, as well as concerns about trade imbalance, could limit the extent of cooperation. It is up to Shri Karan Duta to explain at length as to what could be the ramification or what are the prevailing conflicts between India and China. I will now request General Deepak Mahhata to please take over the session and proceed further as a moderator of the session. Thank you.

Thank you sir. Karan, before we start, I think it'll be prudent to look into the historical aspects of India China relations. What I see of it is that it's a very complex sort of a relationship that we have. If you go historically, we had the silk route which was running to China. We also had this opium trade which is going on during the British rule.

That's correct.

So that was economics and trade going on together. I think the turnaround took place around 19 — of course we recognized China in 1950 and we had a very good relationship with them. It was Hindi Chini Bhai, and if you see the Chinese embassy in Delhi, it's one of the largest area it was holding.

Yes sir.

But the changes took place, turnaround took place in 1962 when the Chinese attacked, and I'll leave it at that. Now I'll request you to give us any more input that you have, the historical aspect of it.

First of all, I'm deeply honored to be part of the second talk at NISSMAT. So really, really grateful that NISSMAT has, you know, requested me to come on and speak, and to be able to speak to such senior members of the armed forces and the ex-IG police. I'm truly honored, sir. Thank you for calling me. It's actually, sir, S. Paul explained it very beautifully when he spoke about the relationship, and it's one of those relationships where you are a friend and a foe at the very same time. And that pretty much, those two words simultaneously explain our this entire equation with China.

But coming back to just going back in history and talking about that and where all this is coming from. So you spoke about the opium trade etc. And actually, from the books that I've read in the past, whether it was history or whatever, some bits of research I've done, the Chinese have never forgiven Indians especially for the opium trade that has happened on them through the British.

Yeah, that's right, through the British.

Yes. So while the British were the ones who propagated the trade of opium, it was the Indians who were policing it.

That's right.

And until date, I don't think they've forgiven us for it, because as per Chinese history, one complete, maybe two generations were lost because of this. So there is a little bit of that friction that still exists. But I just wanted to also point out that it seems as if we've had a wonderful great relationship over, let's say, centuries. But the fact of the matter is that China was not even India's neighbor up until 1951. Because our neighbor has always been Tibet.

Yes.

And when the Chinese tanks rolled in to Tibet in 1951, that's when the Chinese became our neighbors.

That's right.

And from 1951 onwards, we've already had, well, if you include Galwan, if you include 62, and then you include one retaliatory attack by India, we've already fought three, maybe even four wars with them. So in less than six decades we've had four confrontations with them. I think the point I'm trying to make is that as long as we had our borders with Tibetans, for centuries there is no recorded history of conflict between Indian kingdoms and Tibetans.

Yes.

But that changed as soon as 51 came and 52 came. So I do think that it seems sometimes as if there's a bit of a, you know, we kind of get fixated on the fact that we had a great relationship with China, which actually I don't think that's been very, very true, because we never had access. It seems to have been blown out of proportion. But the one with the Tibetans has been wonderful, and that exchange has been with the monasteries and with the kingdoms, and as a natural extension we now believe that it was always with the Chinese, which is actually true.

As a matter of fact, what you're saying is right. I am generally quite aware of what happened in Tibet.

Yes sir. Yes sir.

My father-in-law was the resident commissioner in Lhasa.

Yes sir.

When the Chinese came in there.

Yes sir.

And the government was fully aware of the coming in.

Yes. Yes. Absolutely.

And we'll leave it at that. But over a period of time, you see, the basic problem which came into being, in my view, is the demarcation — there no demarcation of the border or the line of actual control.

Right?

Now there's a difference in perception, their perception and our perception, as far as the line of actual control is concerned. So that is a point of friction which is going on since time immemorial, and since 2013 — of course, there before that they've been claiming Arunachal.

Yes, absolutely.

Something, but in 1950 Arunachal became a part of India, and there's no doubt it is very much a state of India. But they have been claiming because they feel that Tawang was the taxpayer to Lhasa, but that's history. I mean, that has no meaning whatsoever. The zonpin in 1950 had given in writing that the complete area south of McMahon line, Arunachal, is part of India. So there, the border dispute is basically one of the basic problems between the Chinese. But since 2013, I feel they have been resorting to what we call salami slicing.

That's true sir.

For example, they did in Galwan in 2020. They tried in Doklam earlier. Actually called Doklam, but since I've been in that area, they known Dolam, but we'll call it Doklam.

Yes sir.

Had we not stopped them at Doklam in the Chumbi Valley, and had they gone on to the Jafari ridge, our complete defensive plan would have gone to the six. So it was a very good action by the formation commander there to stop these chaps from going into Japali village. Then they tried Yangtse in Tawang sector, but we got the information and we occupied the Yangtse ridge. But had they taken on Yangtse, they would have had a very deep observation right up to the SA.

Right.

Right. Then of course they came into Depsang plains.

Yes.

Very, about 80 odd kilometers inside, and that gave, it threatened the DBO airfield. So over a period of time, especially since 2013, they have been trying all sorts of things, you know, taking little pace here, a little bit there, but we have been on our guard and we have been, we are thwarting them.

Yeah, that's correct sir. And in fact, this is not just a phenomena happening with India. Now if you look at China and its neighborhood — I say this not very disrespectfully but with some bit of skepticism — the only friends that the Chinese seem to have are the Pakistanis and North Korea. So outside of those two nations, they are at loggerheads with everyone in the neighborhood.

Yeah.

So whether it's — of course they think Taiwan is part of their own system. Then they have these head-on collisions with the Philippines quite often, with Indonesia they're at loggerheads, South Korea they have serious issues with. You look at Japan — they're ready to attack Japan at any given point in time. So even in the neighborhood, their relationships within South China are pretty rough right now. And so it's not just about what's happening with India. In fact, the theory behind string of pearls, which has been going on now for about 20 years, is that you would probably have now naval presence, or you'll have, let's say, some sort of military presence across all of South China Sea. So about 15, 16 such islands have been converted into maritime — the seven dot line.

Yeah. What we call that? Yes.

Seven dash line, sir. Yes.

Seven dash line.

And then this whole putting their stamp across regions. So like I said, South China Sea's definitely, you know, pretty much come under a lot of Chinese influence, and now the IOR.

Yeah.

Whether there was Hambantota or Gwadar, the intent to start reaching out to the Indian Ocean region. So I think there's this — coming back to the original where we started from — that this relationship, you're friends and foe at the same time.

Add one more thing. You're saying that when the present dispensation in China came into being, they said we want greater China. Greater China meant all those areas which they had lost earlier. They even started claiming certain portions of Kyrgyzstan.

That's correct. I'm not sure if viewers on this may be aware of this or not, but they've actually gone to war with Russia as well over Vladivostok. And so that port at Vladivostok is a potential conflict zone between the Russians and the Chinese.

Yeah. The Amur River Valley, Amur. Yeah.

Right. And so even that is a conflict area which not too many —

Has been resolved. But they resolved a border issue with Russia. That Amur, there's a couple of islands there which are being claimed by both. That has been resolved. I mean, because that was a very big industrial base for the Russians.

For the Russians.

That thing has been, that's over. And now I think we have dealt adequately historically. What about the economic factor?

So you got to give it to them for having — I mean, it's called the miracle of the century. No one has done this in recorded history again, to pull up a nation from $1,500 per capita income to $13,000 per capita income in less than 40 years.

There was a time when the Indian per capita income and the Chinese per capita income in 1980s were exactly the same. They were at $1,500 and they were at about 1,200. We were at about $1,000. We were exactly neck to neck. Today we've reached about $3,000 and China is at about $13,000.

Absolutely.

Pulling out of poverty for an entire population has not happened ever in the history of mankind. So full credit where it's due, and like I said, it is nothing short of a miracle of what they've gone and done. And just one more statistic — even in India there has been, so even in India poverty alleviation has been a major attempt by the government of India, and there has been progress. But just to give you some numbers on this, the real poor people in China, like at poverty levels which is, let's say, defined by the World Bank, by statistics, let's say poverty-driven people in China, that number will now be about 2 crore people.

Okay.

But in India that number is still 20 crore, even after lifting people out of poverty.

Yeah. Yeah. Yeah.

So even on that metric, China has done some remarkable work. And I think one of the areas that — so we became the service provider to the world and they became the manufacturers to the world.

Absolutely. Absolutely.

That pretty much is how it was. But there were two reasons for it. So what had happened is that manufacturing shifted, let's say, to China. There were two very big reasons for it. One, at that point in time, let's say in the 80s, 90s and early 2000s, labor was very cheap. And it's not cheap at all now. It's very expensive now. It's very high-end labor. So it's become very expensive, but in those three decades labor was cheap in China. And what was also happening in Germany, what was happening is that all of energy, the cost of energy was falling, and so cost of energy was falling and they were able to — that's why they could outsource all of their production out to China.

Okay.

And so these two things happened simultaneously. So cost of energy was falling and cost of labor was low. And so the world could push out orders to China. All of that is reversed now. Labor prices have gone up very sharply and cost of energy is also rising because of whatever is happening in the world, whether it's conflict etc. And because of the reversal, now you see that the Chinese have kind of settled down at a 2%, 3%, on a very high GDP base, but they settled down at 3% growth where they were galloping at 9 and 10 for, let's say, 25, 30 years. So after three decades and four decades of supernormal growth, they now started to look at 3%. But 3%, like I said, on a very large number.

Actually, I feel that there has been a change in 1988 when we had this revised bilateral trade and cultural relationship. That's the time, you know, the trade with China started building up. But the impetus to the trade was between 2008 and 2021. Now if you see last year's trading, it's over hundred billion dollars worth of trade has taken place between China and India, but to the advantage of China. We have exported only 16.45 billions worth of export to China and we imported 17.41 billion worth from China to India. And what you said was absolutely correct. We as a nation have been providing services, IT field. Now with the changing geopolitical scenario in the world, and we talk about Narbata, I think we need to now build up our own infrastructure for our own trade and increase our export potential. What do you feel of that?

No, absolutely right. And many things are happening on that front and we'll definitely speak on it, but I just want to come back to one aspect of China's manufacturing. And so many nations became dumping grounds for Chinese goods. So whether it was, you know, small gpaties during Diwali, or just the kite manga, on the kite also used to — now these are not things you would expect the Chinese to supply, but there was a period when we became dumping ground, because at that point in time focus on quality was also not there, and so anything cheap could be imported. And over time we just gave away space for manufacturing anything. Even today, sir, just as Atmanirbhar is starting to come and become important in our lives and manufacturing is starting to revive, for the first time toys are being manufactured in India — some as simple as toys.

Now if you look around in your home, or if I look around in my home, furniture that is also being used by all of us also comes from outside of India many times, whether it's coming through Thailand or it's coming — so I'm saying we've given up so much space on some very basic items that it became like, that deal was just not accretive for India. However, now that all of this is starting to shift, one area that is going to happen is we will not end up making the footballs and the garments etc., because that leap again we will take. And this is where I do believe that just like we as a nation, we did not focus on laptops and we went straight to mobiles, that's exactly what is going to happen on manufacturing in India as well. We're not going to do what the Chinese did, which is go through all the steps of manufacturing. I think India will be focused on high-end manufacturing.

Okay. Okay.

Is where the focus is. And so now the government's program on semiconductors — so just to give you an idea, today China imports semiconductors and that bill is bigger than their oil bill. That's how large the semiconductor import bill is for China, because they're obviously using semiconductors for everything.

Yeah, that's right.

And they're very, very sophisticated semiconductors. So they get it from Nvidia etc. etc. But there is one part of semiconductors which are important but not super sophisticated and not extremely tough to build. That is where India is focusing — on the 28nm chips, and that's where the government is putting in a lot of money. And I think the reason why I share that with everyone is that if we start becoming self-sufficient in manufacturing of semiconductors, it would mean a whole lot of, let's say, support system to the auto industry, to the manufacturing industry, because 28nm chips are extremely sophisticated but not like 3nm. 3nm is the most complex manufacturing process in the world and that only two companies can do, Nvidia and AMD. But if we get to 28nm, then our dependence starts to fall on Chinese imports. So a choke point which was, let's say — they refused to give us chips during COVID.

So we couldn't even make cars, because cars, you use chips to, let's say, even if you want to press the window down, to open, let's say, to get the window down, you have to press a button and then the window goes down.

That is chips. You want to use a toaster, that uses chips, etc. Now the other area where India will start to focus much more is rare earth materials. So there are two choke points, one is chips and rare earth, and both of them are being opened up by the government. I think there'll be a whole lot of focus on semiconductors and rare earth.

Right. Now you see, with what is happening in the world, now we had one dominant power which is putting tariff on anything and everything and all over the world. But I think, in my opinion, where India and China come together are two organizations, BRICS and SCO.

Sorry. BRICS.

BRICS and SCO.

SCO. Yes, sir. Yes, sir.

Yes, sir. All right. Now, as of now, there are 10 countries which are part of BRICS and 16 are members. That makes it a total of 26.

That's correct, sir.

And SCO has also got very large membership, where our prime minister will be attending very soon.

Yeah.

Now you see, these two organizations where India and China are together constitute nearly half the population of the world.

That's correct.

And with the threat of tariffs and sanctions which is coming all over the world, if these two organizations join hand, it'll not be a unipolar world, it'll be a multipolar world. What do you feel of it?

I think what is happening is the pace at which geopolitical changes are taking place is unprecedented. Till about 3 months, exactly till about 3 months ago, the Americans were going to, you know, help India become China plus one. And 3 months later we're talking about a situation where the Chinese, the Russians and the Indians come together to form a union against the United States. So in three months things have changed.

And so are we headed into a multipolar world from a unipolar world? For sure. There is absolutely no doubt about that. And this is nothing to do with the Americans, the Russians or the Chinese or the Indians. The fact is, what is Trump saying to his electorate? What is Trump saying? That I will help make America great again. Three things — he won the election on three things. He said I will make America great again, I will get jobs back in America, and I will stop illegal immigration. Those are the three things he said. And this is the United States at $50,000 per capita income, the richest nation in the world. And what does Prime Minister Modi say to his electorate when he comes to power in 2024? I will make in India, I will get jobs done, and I will stop illegal immigration. And we are a $3,000 per capita income, one of the poorest in the world. So the richest country in the world and the poorest country in the world, when the elections are being won, are being won on the same plank.

Same platform. Yes. Absolutely.

Exactly the same platform. Trump didn't say anything that Modi didn't say, and vice versa. Which gets me to the point that obviously both the countries are facing the same problem. We face the same problem, whether it's illegal immigration, job losses, etc. You know, creation of jobs and making domestic items. In all of this, what is happening is that the Russians then are saying we will do whatever it takes to protect our nation, hence we will attack Ukraine. And the Chinese are saying that it is our time under the sun. So by definition, we are already into a multipolar world.

It is absolutely.

Because now everyone is staking a claim. So that, I think the point I was trying to make is, this is not about who we work with. It is about what our intentions are — intentions for the nation. But all the nations look for the goodness of the —

Yes.

That I think, sir, is a very big change from what at least we've seen in, let's say, the previous two decades.

Yes.

Where it was still, it had become a world which became connected because of trade. Now you're saying we're going to deconnect and all of trade will happen in my own borders, and hence by definition, all the nations will become important in their own capacity.

Now, why come to my mind is, if these 26 countries of BRICS and the other members of SCO, they started trade, they start trading within themselves —

Yeah.

US is in trouble.

So I think the point I was trying to make is, if you look at it from India's perspective, the whole concept, the big shift has been from the word non-alignment to strategic alignment. I think that's a huge shift and I'll try and explain what I mean out here. What I'm trying to say is that look at the construct of foreign policy right now. We work with the Israelis and we're also very close to the Iranians. We've been obviously very close to the Russians, until 3 months ago extremely close to the Americans as well.

Yes.

And the prime minister of India has been getting all these prestigious civilian awards from almost all the Middle Eastern countries.

Correct.

And so the point again I was trying to make is that this whole concept of strategic alignment means we will go after everything that tick boxes our interests.

That's right. Absolutely.

And if that means that we need to be part of BRICS, SCO, or have an FTA with the UK or an FTA with Australia, so be it. I don't think this is about anti-US as much as it is being about pro-India.

Yeah. Yeah.

I think that's the point I was trying to make.

Now you see, some time back the foreign minister of China, Wang Yi, had come over to India.

Yes sir.

And that is a big change in the dynamics per se, in a sense that a lot of points which came into being during his visit, a lot of things are thrust out. What is, in my opinion, what is important was that both the countries said that they are making an effort to address our problems or concerns which both the countries have. That's a very major, major statement. We have certain concerns, China has certain concerns, and if they're prepared to talk on these, I think it's a very good thing. Then they had put in a freeze for certain trade. During the foreign minister's time they have opened up fertilizer, so rare earth minerals.

Yes.

And also the tunnel machines to make tunnels.

Yes sir.

Then they wanted to open the trade from the three areas: Shipki La, Lipulekh and Nathu La. Nathu La is an old trade route. But —

Hello. Yes sir.

But the Nepalese are saying sorry, not Lipulekh, because it's a contentious area. So I think if we start getting the rare earth minerals — our requirement of these magnets for our industry that we have, both civil and military, is about 80 to 85%.

That's correct.

It will be a very big change. Very big change.

That's correct. Right and wrong, actually. That is, and that's where the predicament of this relationship is: friends and foe simultaneously. Operation Sindoor was a classic case where we didn't take on the Pakistanis — you will be the best judge of that. We took on the Turkish and we took on the Chinese and we took on the Pakistanis simultaneously. So this is the oddity of the relationship, that you just finished fighting a war literally against Chinese —

Technology. Chinese technology.

I would think all of China's equipment was available, whether it was satellite, space, cyber, in fact even narrative war, something that you started for the army, or the information war. So I won't take this on its face value of what's going on. This also comes across as very transactional, at least for now, that just because there is common — the common enemy is now the US because of trade tariffs being put on us and the Chinese — it just seems very natural for the two to come together. But given what is happening in the world, to say that this is now going to be lasting peace and this is now going to be the start of a new bonhomie, I would be very skeptical on that, for now at least.

I'll touch upon that a little later when you talk about the border issue. But you know, certain things will come in, like for example agreement for the direct flights between China and India.

Opening out for the Chinese visitors out here.

That's true.

Two important things which came into being. One was two groups being made: one group to look into the delimitation of the border, and the second is for peace and tranquility of the border. There are two very major issues because a contentious issue is the LAC.

Yes, sir.

And the second aspect, so the peace and tranquility, they said, and now it has to be addressed by generals in the eastern and the central sector.

So they've upped the game.

They have. So there have been very major changes which have come into being. We were very concerned about this dam which is coming along —

Tsangpo.

And they agreed to give us the information, or the hydrological information, during the emergency. Again, we were very concerned about it, that if you make a dam, it is going to affect the lower riparian states.

So some very good points have come into being.

No doubt. But sir, I mean, of course there are flights etc., but we are the only country in the world which has still banned TikTok. Whether it goes away etc. I don't know, but then even the US could not do that. I guess the point I'm trying to just highlight out here is that in a very, very fast-moving, fast-paced, racy geopolitical world, India has taken a position of doing whatever it thinks is right for its people. If that means having a relationship with the Chinese on any front, then so be it.

But there is something I must speak about, sir, and I very specifically spoke about this: that what happened in the last 3 months, that this relationship has nose dived so seriously between the Americans and the Indians. It could not be the oil. It cannot be the fact that we're importing oil. That just seems extremely lame, and to anyone that would sound as if it's an excuse. And I'm just going to put forward my theory on that, and I think you would be the best person to answer that.

Ego. Ego.

No, I don't know about ego. I think there has something happened in Operation Sindoor where assets would certainly have got damaged. Now whether there were personnel also involved or not, I'm not sure, but I would hazard a guess that even personnel may have been involved, apart from American interests and assets. Because the way this relationship has turned on its head, you can literally time it to post Ops Sindoor, not pre Ops Sindoor. And I do think that the fact that Akash systems — I was on a call the other day with the creator of the Akash missile system. He's a Padma Shri award winner, and he was explaining what that missile system has done, or for that matter what BrahMos has done, and that along with what S400 has done. So if you look at Akash, S400 and BrahMos, if you look at the —

Absolutely.

And then if you look at the devastation that it's wreaked on Pakistan, I do believe — and ideally, sir, I'd like to stay away from conspiracy theories — but I do think American interests have been damaged, and probably that's the reason for this whole relationship kind of curving down.

Yes, I think you're right. We'll leave it at that, because that we have discussed in the past on the phone.

Yeah, sure.

Yes, I also feel what you're saying. I also feel the same way, but we'll leave it at this point.

Coming on, just to complete — so the reason why I brought it up is that would not mean that suddenly we become the closest friends with the Chinese. I think those are baby steps. It's just going to be baby steps, because even they have seen the response of what has happened during Ops Sindoor.

So the point I was trying to make is, I think there is a new respect for India and its defense equipment, and probably that realization that we probably have it in us to stand up to the big boys is something that's going to hold us in good stead.

We have to be very careful. We can't let our guard down.

Not at all.

You see, along the LAC — the LAC is around 3,488 kilometers long.

Yes.

As I mentioned earlier, there's a difference in perception of the LAC. We say the LAC runs around this — because I've been on ground, so I'm telling you on it. There's a difference of perception. And secondly, there is a trust deficit between the troops which are deployed — the PLA deployed in so-called Tibet and our own troops. There's definitely a —

Trust deficit.

Trust deficit in these two. Now you see, we have got this patrolling boundary which has come into being. There's a what you call buffer zone. I don't know for what reason — must be some very good reasons. The buffer zone is from 3 kilometers deep to 10 kilometers deep, and this buffer zone is towards our side. We are now taking up a case for permitting patrolling north of Pangong Tso and Kailash range. You see, Kailash range is important because if you go to Kailash range, you are looking into Moldo, which is their headquarters, and also denying the Spanggur gap. So you know, we have to be very, very careful on the LAC aspect. But with these two groups which have come into being, one for the delimitation and second for the peace and tranquility along the LAC — but I think it's going to take some time. It is not going to be that simple, and that I will discuss with you separately.

Yes sir. Yes sir.

Now coming down to our concerns. What do you feel is our concerns with China? What are our concerns with China?

Just a couple of things where we'll give the audience an idea of, let's say, what our concerns are. Like, they've not allowed designated terrorists to be called so in the United Nations. Now when you don't even allow Masood to be a designated terrorist, and you use your United Nations veto power to disallow it, and not just once, multiple times —

Then it just shows that not only are you protecting terrorists, perhaps you're also breeding them. I think that's the number one concern, because I do study a lot the cost of terrorism on India. And that, I think, to my mind, at least as someone who studies this, I think that just shows your intent of being a supporter of terrorism rather than someone who opposes terrorism. And all of this is documented proof. There's nothing I'm speaking which is not available for the public to see. I think it starts from that in terms of concerns. Even during Pahalgam, the equipment that has been used — now they figure out that satellite phones were used etc. etc. And there's a long history. You've been part of that. You're so much better informed than I am. But insurgency, northeast etc. So all of those concerns don't vanish. In fact, they stay. But the best one can do is to hope for a more stable relationship given the circumstances. None of this is going to go away, that's for sure. And the point you were making is absolutely valid. India has to be so much more careful on both its front, and half a front within the nation.

I'll qualify my statement for that. You see, there's a very heavy development along the LAC, and especially in Ladakh sector, from them, the PLA, as well as our own troops. Yes, certain brigades of PLA have moved back about 150 kilometers into —

Peace time barracks.

Yeah. Peace time. But the infrastructure is so good —

They could — Yes. Yes.

They could come in 3 to four hours, right? There's a deployment differential. So it goes to prove that we have to build up our own resource, infrastructure, to match up with them.

Yeah.

That is one. And secondly, what I feel is the tango of China and Pakistan. We are claiming Azad Kashmir, we call it Pakistan occupied — Gilgit and Baltistan area — but they have already constructed the CPEC through this area.

Yeah, absolutely. Absolutely.

So that's a very major concern, in the sense that we have been claiming that area but they are already there.

Yeah. Yeah. That's true. That is part of the study that I've done, in terms of — so the start and end of CPEC is both disputed. It starts in Gwadar, which is Baluchistan, and ends in Gilgit Baltistan, which is in, you know, Pakistan occupied Kashmir. And the home minister in parliament has said that India will take back — now when that happens etc., that is —

That's the million dollar —

That is not part of this conversation. I think, as the home minister, he's made an official statement that we will take back Gilgit Baltistan.

A political statement.

Yes.

To be saying that also, which it would mean for the Chinese that their infrastructure investment goes for a toss. And also, sir, they also continue to have access — I mean, they own Shaksgam Valley, the Karakoram etc., because that was given over by the Pakistanis to China in 63. So my own theory, sir, is that the Galwan, that night at Galwan, was not for land, it was for water. Because it's the access to water that the Chinese want. And the theory behind that is that you need fresh sources of water and you need large amounts of desert land if you're to become a superpower in terms of manufacturing semiconductors.

Correct.

So that's Xinjiang area, and then all of Galwan has the river tributaries, and that is what they're after. And because India is busy building infrastructure against it, that's what led to the conflict.

Yeah. And one more concern which I also feel very strongly is about the Chinese so-called string of pearls.

Yes. Yes.

You see, we call ourselves so-called regional power.

Right sir.

Now the Chinese, if you see, they have got these bases in Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and the string of pearls. They are very active in the Indian Ocean. In Djibouti now they have a naval base.

Maldives. Maldives also.

Now, second aspect of concern is, I feel that besides Pakistan, who is supposed to be the strategic brother, Bangladesh is also coming into play now. We have to be careful of these. We always consider Nepal as a buffer state, but Chinese are going in for infrastructure development in Nepal. So these are the concerns which coming to my mind. Any other point you have on this?

Sir, I want to just address a lot of this. So for example, it seems always as if the neighborhood seems to be flaring up against India. That happens quite often, but let's say the flare up happens, but then after 6 to 8 months things tend to go back to normal. And I'll give you two examples of that. As the Americans were leaving Afghanistan, it was very clear that Taliban will come. Obviously, Taliban came over, and then the whole view was that this will be a very anti-India government. But that's not what is happening in reality. The same thing happened with President Muizzu when he came into power in Maldives. His t-shirt said India out. Today it's the same president whose ties with India and Prime Minister Modi are coming back. And Nepal — nine prime ministers, nine years. They've also had a very tough history in the last 10 years. They've had these cartography wars with us, changing the map etc. Even that is starting — Hambantota port, suddenly the Sri Lankans, the biggest aid to the Sri Lankans are coming from India. I think the point I was trying to make is, back in the subcontinent, things tend to look very difficult, but they tend to come back to normalcy, barring Pakistan.

As far as string of pearls is concerned, you're absolutely right. I mean, officially I think the term string of pearls was never acknowledged by the Chinese. I think it's a western —

You see, they have Coco island.

Yes.

Coco island is electronic base.

Yes, that's correct. And, but sir, on that, what is also happening — because this I think is a change I've noticed from 2014 onwards, from the present government, and I think it's credit due to the government that they've noticed all of this and they've taken active action, for example, against the string of pearls. Now the India doctrine is necklace of diamonds. So we've been busy signing agreements with all of these nations, whether with Mauritius, with Maldives as well, with Mongolia, with Indonesia. So it's a reverse to the string of pearls, and so there is another way to counter all of the influence, and now we've kind of started to put our own maritime resources through necklace of diamonds.

Yes. Karan, I think we have covered a lot of ground.

Yes sir.

And all I could say to sum up is that there's a good start with the foreign minister of China having come. A lot of things have been thrashed out, but we have to be very careful. As what you very correctly said, these alliances, or you know, the problems which come up between the nations, they're shortlived. It depends on the interest of the nation at that point in time.

At that point in time.

Yes. So I think we should maintain an even keel.

Yes sir.

Rather than jump into one aspect and the other. Maintain an even keel, what we are doing right now. And I think we have to be careful, but it's a good start with China.

Yes.

And hopefully it should improve in times to come.

That's right sir. Same point. So I would agree with that, and the good news in all of this is, look at how we are now getting hyphenated in the world. All through '70s, '80s, '90s, early 2000s, India Pakistan, India Pakistan — the hyphenation was always India Pakistan. Today the hyphenation is India is taking on the US: India China, India US, India China. I think personally I'm very happy with the hyphenation now. And this conversation that we are also having is with China, and definitely not a word we spoke about Pakistan. So that's the good news. Even though we are $3,000 per capita, yet we are trying to compete with the big boys. For me, that's the biggest takeaway.

That's right. That's right. And Karan, thank you very much indeed for making us find so much of time to spend with us.

My pleasure.

I have learned a lot. I have gained a lot with your views. Thank you very much indeed. Very kind of you, and keep in touch.

Thank you, sir. Bye. Bye.