Terrorism is bleeding India—not only in lives lost, but also in social, emotional and economic aspects.
What this session covered
This session took the form of a conversation between the host and a single guest, a financial-services professional with a longstanding interest in the economic implications of security, on what terrorism has cost India. In his opening remarks the host surveyed the scale of the burden: direct and indirect counter-terrorism spending once estimated at about four lakh crore rupees annually, the separate funding requirements of central agencies, the strain on the budgets of insurgency-affected states, indirect losses through disrupted tourism and trade, the cost of protecting critical infrastructure and of new-age measures such as anti-drone defences, and the social and emotional toll that sits alongside the fiscal one.
The speaker drew on a research study covering a twenty-year period ending in 2013 which, as he presented it, counted 6,024 terror attacks in India — a tally excluding Naxalite and Maoist violence and the Punjab militancy of the 1980s — which he characterised as amounting to one attack a day, spread across cities in every part of the country. The same study, he said, estimated that a single large attack took away almost 1% of GDP and 2% of investment growth in the year it occurred, and he suggested that without this drag the economy, now at four trillion dollars, might already have reached five or 5.5 trillion. He contrasted this with the period from 2014 onwards, putting the number of attacks at roughly 580 and observing that recent attacks had been confined to a narrow area of South Kashmir, alongside improved investment and economic indicators. He described a new security doctrine under which an act of terror is treated as an act of war, arguing that this has raised costs for India but has also raised them for the states sponsoring terrorism.
The host pressed the speaker on whether counter-terrorism budgets had risen in step with the decline in attacks, on the terror risk premium that international investors attach to doing business in India, and — drawing on his own operational experience — on the pattern whereby terrorism subsides when forces are concentrated and revives when they are thinned out. He also raised concerns about social harmony, citing reports of attacks on hostels housing Kashmiri students after a recent terror attack. The speaker responded with reference to expanded intelligence capability, naval and air force modernisation, and growing export interest in Indian defence systems, while acknowledging unresolved problems such as interoperability between air platforms. The host closed by stressing that terror financing through fake charities, narcotics and hawala channels must be tackled, and that terrorism should be fought at its root causes, which he identified as poverty, unemployment and radicalisation.
Key points raised
- A study cited by the speaker counted 6,024 terror attacks in India over a twenty-year period ending in 2013, excluding Naxalite and Maoist violence and the Punjab militancy of the 1980s.
- The same study, as the speaker presented it, estimated that one large attack took away almost 1% of GDP and 2% of investment growth in the year it occurred.
- The speaker put the number of attacks since 2014 at roughly 580 and said recent attacks had been confined to a narrow area of South Kashmir.
- The speaker described a new doctrine treating a terror attack as an act of war, arguing it raises costs for India but also for the states sponsoring terrorism.
- The host, drawing on his own counter-terrorism experience, noted that terrorism subsides when forces are concentrated and revives when they are thinned out, and cautioned that operations must not damage social harmony.
- The session closed on the need to tackle terror financing through fake charities, narcotics and hawala channels, and to address root causes identified as poverty, unemployment and radicalisation.
Session transcript
This transcript is auto-generated from the session recording and lightly edited for punctuation and readability; it may contain transcription errors. The video remains the authoritative record.
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Hello, we... Very good evening to all of you, wherever you are. I am C. Paul Singh, former Inspector General of Police and ex-chief of Rapid Action Force, Government of India. I am with you this evening in my capacity as President of NISSMAT. NISSMAT is a think tank organization and conducts discussions, deliberations and seminars with scholars and reputed social and political personalities through various webinars, through various interactive sessions and podcasts which are propagated by NISSMAT to a large audience.
Before I proceed further, let me introduce to you the speaker of today's evening. Shri Karan Dut is a reputed and recognized financial service advisor who has contributed in a big way to the growth of some very well-known global and domestic organizations like Franklin Templeton and Axis Mutual Funds, for example. In addition to his financial acumen, he has a deep interest in geopolitical matters and their economic implications. He continues to make very, very significant contributions to both the financial and broader other broader realms. Today we shall discuss with him and he'll elaborate on the subject: cost of terrorism on India, or to India.
However, before he elaborates the subject today, let me say a few words as an opening matter to the subject itself. Terrorism in India has remained a persistent challenge, impacting national security, impacting economic growth and social harmony. The financial burden of maintaining internal security and countering terrorism is indeed enormous and is steadily rising. At one time it was estimated that India spends about four lakh crores annually on direct and indirect counterterrorist measures. Further, special agencies of the police under Ministry of Home Affairs like National Investigation Agency, NSG and IB require continuous funding separately, and the states which are affected, for example Punjab or Northeast, are the most affected states. The states which are affected by insurgency also devote large portions of their state budgets to anti-terrorist operations.
Beyond direct expenditure involved, the country also suffers from economic losses from disrupted tourism, or sometimes disruption in trade, and other infrastructural damages. Thus, terrorism not only bleeds India through violence but also drains its financial and developmental resources. Key infrastructures securities, that is key infrastructure security, that is of airports, railways, nuclear plants etc., also involve thousands of crores yearly expenses. Then anti-drone defenses and electronic warfare against new and new a new age threats, I would call it, cost huge expenses annually.
It must be understood that countering extremism at its root is most cost effective than military operation. One should curb terrorism at the root because it is most cost effective than military operations alone. The new age terrorism is also a hybrid sort of thing, requiring agile and cost effective responses from the country which is affected by terrorism. The damage repair, that is post-terrorist attack, such as rebuilding the infrastructure or compensating the victims etc., also involve huge cost. India is also a victim of narco-terrorism, especially in the state of Punjab and northeast, which add to the law enforcement budgets and the burden on our financial resources.
It is said that the cost of terrorism is not just fiscal. It also cost the country in the social and emotional manner. That's important — not only financially, but in social and emotional manner also it cause. On this subject our speaker Mr. Karandat is going to elaborate on the fiscal problems and other investment. May I request Mr. Karanda to please take over and elaborate his learned views and share his learned views with our viewers. Thank you.
Thank you very much, sir, and thank you once again for the introduction and for inviting me to speak to audiences of NISSMAT, which is which is an extraordinary gathering of like-minded people. It's a kudos to you first of all and a big salute from our side for the service you rendered to the nation and for all the work that you've put in over the years. Obviously I can only speak about terrorism, but you would have seen it much, much closer. You would have obviously gotten a firsthand account.
We always need your input, sir.
So the background on this is that, like you mentioned, my own professional life has been in the business of managing money with various mutual funds etc. So our whole world is about managing money. But somewhere when I was growing up — my dad is a fighter pilot, so we were posted, sir, at various locations, one of which was Kashmir in my early formative years. We were in Srinagar and then we got posted to Punjab and then we finally came to Delhi etc. But one thing that was common in all of these locations was, and I so clearly remember, that at every location there were always terrorist attacks happening. And from then onwards I couldn't figure out, just as a young teenager, as to why is India having to suffer all of this, till the time I started studying this. And then it just suddenly dawned upon me, to the fact that you also just mentioned, that this is such an asymmetric war where four people enter and create havoc of such a large magnitude that a nation our size has to bear the brunt economically as well, and that is what led me to start studying as to why is it that this asymmetric war is hurting India so much. So that's a bit of a background as to what got me interested in this.
And then when I started reading and studying more about it, I realized that — and by the way, so this is based on research, so and I'm going to show some slides as well also on that — I realized that individually as a nation we are 140 crore people, and many times when I do this talk I ask the audience that are you a victim of terrorism, and most times the answer I get is yes, we are victims, but we are indirect victims. And my point to everyone who is listening to this call is, I think we don't realize that we are direct victims of terrorism.
Go ahead.
And that is where, you know, my study shows how badly this has affected us as a nation. It's scarred us and it's also hurt us economically. And just to give some background, sir, also on this, what people don't also realize is that India is the largest importer of, largest and oldest importer of terrorism in the world. Now we have a 40-year track record of bearing up with terrorism. So not only are we the oldest, but we're also amongst the largest recipients of terrorism in the world. And that just basically goes to show that we've let this problem grow exponentially for a very long period of time.
So what I'm going to do, sir, now is I have some slides that I've prepared, and I'll request Natasha to help me out on that. I'll just use some of those slides to explain the point that I'm making and then we can open it up if there are some questions etc. So Natasha, if I can just request you to quickly open the slides. And so like I was saying, so India's number one security concern in my mind is terrorism, for the simple reason that we just spoke about. You so very beautifully alluded to the fact that it's almost like a four lakh crore bill annually, and not even talking about the kind of cost to bear with when it comes to the investigating agencies or what the NSG has to do etc. So this is just a separate cost, and not talking about tourism — you can imagine the cost. Natasha, if you just go to the next slide.
So this is something — so given my finance background, I do a lot of this, you know, this research. We kind of work with research firms etc. because I like to analyze balance sheets etc. So I started studying, okay, is there any research that has been done of the economic impact of terrorism on India? And I didn't know this, but Moody's had done a research and they picked up a very specific period, and you know, I'll just show that period also, sir. So they did this research on India — it's very interesting — and they picked up a period, sir, from 1993 to 2013. So this is a 20-year period. And very specifically, sir, this is only terrorism. This does not include insurgency and Naxalism and Maoism.
So it's very specific to terrorism only, as defined by what is terrorism, which is like violence with political motive. So Naxalism was out of this. And sir, you'll notice in this research there is a sentence on the fourth or fifth paragraph — that in 20 years, if you notice, there's this line out here which says India in those 20 years from 1994 to 2013 faced 6,024 terror attacks. Now just to, you know, explain this to the audiences out here who will be listening to us: 6,024 attacks in 20 years is equal to one terror attack a day. In this case what has happened is, when Moody's did the research, they first kind of identified what is terrorism, what is Naxalism, and they segregated the two, and they realized that we've had 6,024 terror attacks. Now 6,024 is one a day, if you just do the simple math.
And what is even more interesting is that 94 to 2013 does not include terrorism in Punjab, because that was a problem of the 80s.
The height.
Yes sir. The height of Punjab terrorism was in the 80s. So this is terror attacks exclusive of Punjab.
Oh my goodness.
Only exclusive of Punjab, exclusive of Naxalites, and only terrorism in terms of political.
Yes sir, political means as is defined, but what is terrorism. So this was too big a number, and honestly, so whenever I ask in the audiences, whenever I do this seminar — many times I do this — and I ask people that, and they start with 50, 60, and then I tell them, then at max they reach 500. Rarely have people said thousand. And when I tell them it's 6,000, then the penny drops and that moment becomes very difficult to digest.
Yeah, quite right.
So you know, we've had to bear up with staggering, sir, staggering, very staggering. So there's another staggering data which I must share with the audience out here. So when I started looking at this, then I realized that, jello, one per day is too big — obviously everything would be in Kashmir, and you know, because Bombay, Delhi, because of 26/11. Sir, you'll be surprised to know that there's not a single city in this country that has not come under a terror attack.
No.
Not one. And I've done this open challenge to everyone whoever listens to my talk, that you come from any city, it has come under attack. Suessa, it is so widespread. No state has been spared, no city has been spared. So there are two things that come out very clearly. Number one, the number of attacks, and the absolute depth of the attacks — like every small, large, big city. Obviously we remember the bigger ones — for example, we'll remember Mumbai train blast or Delhi or 26/11, but...
Spread out. But the spread out is all over the country.
Sir, not a single city left — from Patna to Pune to Lucknow to Kolkata. Obviously I'm not even getting into Punjab, so you know, that's a separate story. Ahmedabad, Surat, any city — Bangalore, Hyderabad, every city. So then Moody's started figuring out then what is the economic impact of this, because that is my area of understanding, because managing money also means that. So think of it like this: that then why would someone come to invest in our country?
Quite right. Quite right.
So then Moody's figured out that the number — so they said that they estimated, by putting exactly all the points you said, the cost of patrolling, the cost of let's say rapid action force being used, cost of securing let's say vital installations etc. When they added it all up, they realized that one large attack takes away almost 1% GDP in that year.
Oh goodness.
And it takes away 2% of investment growth in the year of the attack.
Oh goodness.
And so this is now — so 6,000 attacks, but not all attacks are large. They clearly said large attacks. So it's very obvious, sir, that we've had 6,000 attacks in 20 years; that means one large attack every year.
Alarming.
And I have all those slides to show that in every year we've had one large attack.
Alarming, alarming.
Alarming, and sir, we only lost one person, Rupin Katyal, but that has been the most damaging terror attack on our nation, which is the Kandahar hijacking.
Oh, I see.
So now when you compound the whole thing for 20 years, you've lost almost 1 to 1.25% GDP compounded for 20 years and 2% investment growth up till 2013. So this period is very specific, up till 2013. That basically means today, if we are a $4 trillion economy, we should have technically been five or 5.5 trillion already, if this had not happened.
If this had not happened. And sir, what is the other advantage we should have had? Per capita income is roughly dollar — we would have probably been $4,000 already. So our consumption would have improved, the poverty levels would have been reduced, the government would have been spending money on real things — I mean, on things that matter.
Now, so what has happened? So this was up till 2013. Now obviously, now look at it from an investor's point of view — like why would that investor even come to India, saying that, you know, I have so many options in the world which are safer. So think of it like as if you are the CEO of, let's say, BMW in Germany or Harley-Davidson in US, and you want to create a factory outside of your home country. So suddenly you have two choices: you have Gurgaon and Guangzhou. And you know, Gurgaon being India, and they look at all the studies and say, oh, you know what, India has come under too many terror attacks, looks a little unsafe, even though it's Gurgaon. And then the opposite — the other city that they will look at is Guangzhou, it's safe. So why don't we shift to Guangzhou?
Oh no, it needs serious concern. It needs serious concern. Serious.
So sir, now this is how patterns have shifted. Having said that, now, one of the — and I will try my best to make this conversation based on data and nothing else; if it gets a little political, then please excuse me, that is not my intention. But what has happened, sir, from 2014 up until 2025 — now it's an 11-year track record — the number of cases from 6,024 are now down to roughly 580.
So we've had almost a dramatic drop in number of terrorist cases. On top of it, not a single city outside of South Kashmir has come under a terror attack. So two things have shifted. One, the number of attacks have come down dramatically, and no other city barring a 100 kilometer radius of South Kashmir has come. Even Pahalgam, if you look at it, was a 100 kilometer radius of South Kashmir. So whether it is Pulwama, Pahalgam, all of it is now very narrow. It's no longer as deep as it used to be, and not a single attack on, let's say, Delhi, Bombay, no other city.
So the minute this has got reversed — now we have 11 years, now that has got reversed — so look at what it has done. People are coming to Make in India. There's Foxconn coming in. We've got capital markets all-time high. Security as a general — Indians feel a bit more secure, just on the matter of terrorism. You got highest GST collections, GDP all-time high, country is like the fourth largest etc. So if you look at the parameters of economic indicators, they have reversed in the last 10 to 12 years, and like I said, so this is not a political discussion, I'm just going purely by data. The minute this...
I will just intervene for a minute.
Yes sir.
You have worked out indeed — I mean, irrespective of the fact which government was there, not a political — but I would like to know, I mean, if you have worked out on that, how much cost has been put in, what budget has been allocated during this year vis-a-vis what budget was for counterterrorist operation, what budget was being allocated in the earlier year when it was at height, 6,000, what is the budget being allocated now. If the budget as such, the financial resources, also have gone 600 times or something, then there is some justification, all right, because you had to incur expenditure which probably was not there. So I will — discussing about the impact, global impact, of course will be very good, I mean global impression I would call very good — and then now the terrorism has gone down, but what about the exchequer? If we had spent that much only on creating forces, then I mean, as far as your finances are concerned, I think you have also drained out in terms of employment of the people.
Yeah. No sir, I'll come to that, and that's a vital question, because this one question pretty much is the foundation of what happens to India over the next 20 years.
Yeah.
Because this is about where this nation is headed over the next 20, 30 years. I'll definitely answer that to the best of my ability. The reverse — what I was trying to tell you, sir, or explain to the audiences out here — was that once you demonstrate that you're attempting to become a safer and secure nation, then people tend to take you more seriously, and then they're willing to invest. Once they invest — factory, employment, you know, they will buy equipment — and that has a direct result in my world, which is capital markets. So suddenly, you know, the wheels have started to turn the other way around.
Good.
And this, just very quickly — so I was just showing whether we've really had 20 large attacks in like 20 years. This is obviously preceding that, 1993. This is Kanishka. This, even a decade before 9/11 happened, we had had our own Kanishka, which was blown out of the skies, which started from Canada. So if you go to the next slide, you can see that there's a series of these things that have happened, whether it's 93, or the next slide will show you about — Natasha, can go to the next slide — this is the one I was talking about. So Kandahar — you know, we've just lost one person, but like one of the most damaging attacks on our nation. Can we go to the next slide please? And then of course Bombay's clearly borne the brunt of this — in this terror attack we lost 293 individuals — and then of course there's 26/11, which you'll see on the next slide.
So I was in Bombay at that point in time. Strangely, we didn't have a TV during those days. I don't know why — we just didn't have a TV, we decided that we'll live without a TV for a few days. And I could literally hear the gunfire, because we weren't very, very far away from where this was taking place. So this played out in front of our homes, you know, pretty much everyone saw it. So Natasha, we can go to the next slide, but court and etc. etc. So yeah, just — if you just go to the next slide, Natasha, and the next. So I'll leave it, I'll just stop here, sir.
So to some extent, the question you asked me is that are the costs increasing because now the number of terror attacks have come down, is the exchequer's, you know, payout increasing — I'll answer that. But also, so a couple of things have happened, where if you look at the current government's intention, it's very, very clear that they don't want to be living in an era or supporting an era where terrorism is not answered in full. So to take your question — I think so the cost of terrorism has gone up, simply because the answer is now, in one sentence, that an act of terror is now an act of war.
So an asymmetrical act of terrorism will now be answered by what had happened during Operation Sindoor. Definitely that has increased the costs, no doubt, but it has also increased the cost for the state that is sponsoring the terrorism. So let me answer it in another way, sir, because that was a very, very important question you asked — that are the costs for India increasing because we are trying to decrease the number of terrorist attacks. Yes, the costs are increasing, but so are the costs for the state sponsors along with that.
So what has also happened is that the capability and the capacity for intelligence has gone up manyfold. So intelligence sharing, as you would have seen, sir, because you've been such an integral part of all of this — intelligence sharing with agencies has gone up manyfold. In fact, one of the, you know, unspoken heroes of Operation Sindoor were probably the intelligence agencies, because they would have coordinated to figure out what to attack, what not to attack. And so the moot point I'm just trying to make is that every time the prime minister has stepped out of the country, his number one agenda is to ensure that India is not hit by terrorism. And I think there we've seen some success — very early days.
Natasha, if you go to the next slide please. So this is where, I think, the whole structure comes into place. As I was saying, terrorism on the top right has cost us something like .75 to 1%. But if we get national security in order — I'm sorry for the typo, I think it's gone a little out of shape — if we get national security in order, we will prosper, simply because foreign investors will come, foreign direct investors will come, there will be an investor confidence, investments will start, and the nation will start to invite a lot of capital that is sitting on the sidelines but not coming because they're not very sure whether it's a safe nation or an unsafe nation.
And so if you just go to the next slide, Natasha, I'll just leave it there. So this is the new doctrine — that a terror attack on India will be seen as an act of war, there will be no more nuclear blackmail, and the state and the terrorist will not be segregated, they will be seen in the same light, and offensive defense is India's new security doctrine. To my mind, this has escalated the costs, but it has also ensured that India now starts to believe that we could probably be in a more safer environment, at least within batches of 5 years. I'm not saying, sir, terror attacks won't happen. What I'm simply saying is that hopefully we will get batches of five years where we can invest the money, grow the potential for this nation and make it a more prosperous country. So I'm going to stop here. Natasha, we can stop the slides, and anything that you suggest or any question that may come to you, I'm happy to answer.
No, I was only thinking that it is quite an anticipation in terms of what has been actually calculated in terms of finances spended and likely to get in, because when there's a peace, naturally the expenses — respected of expenses — there is much more growth and there are much more prosperity, a good hope. I mean, I will not be able to say anything, because the proxy war the rogue nations are trying to have — they are not concerned with expenses, as to what expenses are involved on their exchequer. They are concerned that one or two such terrorist acts should somehow or the other cause confusion. And I think that the more important point will come in after some time, when this sort of — if there's any criminal touch given to this sort of anti-terrorist operation — because the harmony in the country in the future will be much more important, because against one terrorist we — because there have been news, as it is, that when the Pahalgam attack took place, unfortunately some people in Punjab also, and other some of the states, they attacked some of the hostels where the Kashmir boys were staying. Yes, this is a cause of worry for future also.
So but as the statistics are concerned, I think very nicely worked out by you that the terrorist attacks as such have gone down. I mean, irrespective of fact, what is at the moment — the national solidarity is not disturbed much, but there should be this hope for future also. Anyway, proceed further. I — only very nicely worked up that we are concerned with the growth in terms of countries coming and investing in our country, investing in our country. Thank you very much, go ahead.
So now if you look at what is happening across the world, supply chains are under stress, and you can see — so in fact now in India my belief is that we are under nine different formats of warfare. Kinetic war is the last format of war, but we are under trade war, water wars, cyber war, narrative war, media war, semiconductors, and then there's this new weaponization of electromagnetic pulse etc. So there is a biological war where COVID was at the forefront. So if you look at it, there's a wide spectrum, and it's not as if India is isolated in any way. We are in the middle of them all, and we are in the middle of a kinetic war also.
The budgetary allocations to defense have gone up, so to that extent the exchequer's bill has gone up. But what is also extremely important to note out here is that if we do not demonstrate the ability to be a safe nation, then we have in the past lost very, very large parcels of land because we were unable to defend it ably, and we've seen that in Galwan as well, where we've lost 20 soldiers. After 1962, so we've not had any violence with the Chinese, but to, you know, be in direct confrontation.
So I think this is an era of the next 20 years, or the next 15 years, if this trend continues where the number of terror attacks come down and we start to look like a much more stronger, prosperous nation. Then my estimate is that the country's GDP would tend to grow higher, and our per capita income, from where we are today at $2,500 per annum, could start looking at something like $8,000, which is where China is. Today China is at $10,000.
Yeah.
Per annum. So over the next 20 years, if we get there — 18 or 15 years, 18 years, if we get there — then we start looking very, very strong and a serious contender in the power politics of the world. So hopefully that should work out well, and that has a direct impact in my world, which is capital markets. And as your presentation — you want something else to say, or...?
No sir. I'll then — let us interact now. In addition to the cost, as you say, worked out on counterterrorist measures, as you said, and what could be the indirect cost also, like reduction, as you say, in tourism also — cost reduction in tourism and disruption in supply chain involved and delivery of essential commodities in Asia. So this is also going to have a lot of adverse public image as far as other countries are concerned before their investment, and it is also understood that the international investors often assign a sort of terror risk premium.
Yes sir.
On doing business in India.
Yes.
The terror risk premium which is added — actually it will raise the cost of the capital investment.
Absolutely.
And what are your views, how do you view that? Because in any case, I agree that so long terrorism remains — let's say we are able to completely contain it, which is of course your hope, but I'm saying if it continues — then what are your views that the terrorist premium on doing business in India, raising the cost of the capital investment in India — how it takes what circle? As a financial expert, how do you say, how will it increase the cost tremendously?
No, actually sir, what studies are now showing — now it's a decent 11-year period, it's not a short, it's not a 2-year period, you know, it's a decade — so it's safe to say, at least it's safe to say that we are on the right path. I'm not for a minute saying that now we're in the clear. What I'm simply saying is it seems as if this path seems to be correct, where now you have defined that every act of terrorism will be responded to with military action, and that is not a small step, because we reached here after a lot of effort. It's not been an easy decision. Also sir, I haven't spoken much about Indus Water Treaty, which actually is weaponization of water as well from India's point of view, you know. So we're trying our best to do whatever it takes to make sure that this nation is more secure, safer, and that is why I think the states sponsoring terrorism are also now going to figure out that should this be the business model they should follow for the future.
So my assessment, sir, is that given what has happened, I think nations are beginning to appreciate what the action has been taken. They're also beginning to appreciate India's indigenous, let's say, defense production capability, which is why you're seeing BrahMos now being looked at as a weapon where at least four nations are now asking for it. And we have our own problems to solve. For example, I think one of the things that probably didn't work out in Operation Sindoor was something like interoperability between systems as far as, let's say, the air assets are concerned. Probably the Russian aircraft and the French aircraft are still not linked — what is known as data links — still early stages, but all of those are investments that are going on.
You look at it the other way, sir — that we saw how missiles were flying and drones were flying across skies, and we always thought that the Israelis had the best system, whether it is the Patriots or the Iron Dome, but who knew that Akashteer will be, you know, protecting Punjab, protecting Jammu and all of that. So the point I'm also trying to make is, in this whole structure, we're also coming across as a nation which is capable of handling ourselves, and by definition also then providing this kind of, let's say, weapons for exports in the future — so which could be a revenue generator in decades to come.
I agree with you. I'll just like to have one more question, and that also — I worked for some time along with the Institute of Conflict Management, Dr. Sahni.
Yes sir.
Because I have been in counterterrorist operation for a pretty long time, right in the northeast as well in Punjab, as was in Kashmir and all.
Yes sir.
So we worked out that as and when the forces are more, naturally terrorism in Kashmir has gone down at that time. No sooner the forces are thinned out, the terrorism erupts. So it only shows that you have to concentrate the forces. For example, in Punjab at one stage, we had to withdraw more than 800 companies from various states and also all central organizations — central like SSB, ITBP. I had to take CISF, which are meant for some other things.
Yes.
I had to call all of them in Punjab, and Mr. Gill wanted to give that thrust. That thrust was there.
Yes sir.
See, the ramifications was that there was end game of Punjab in terrorism concern, but the impact on the social harmony as well — I mean in Punjab I'm saying — as well as the impact on the minds of some other people who were pro-terrorist, you may call, or pro-Khalistanis, was different. So I am of this view — I mean, I would like you to elaborate on that — that do you think that, for example, we withdraw — ultimately you can't — you had the army; now let's say Pahalgam attack, you put the entire army into operation, while you may have to withdraw army from the Indo-China borders at some time, you know, strategically speaking.
Right sir.
A very good idea to counter terrorism in terms of these operations which are called military operation. Basically you call it by armed forces, you may call it police, you may call it by intelligence agencies — I mean basically you can come under military and paramilitary operations or some IB operations. But how long and to what extent you can go on adding to these resources? And how do you think — but I am of the view that basically the structure is to bring about that harmony. I mean, it's a very vicious circle. I'm not going to deny your point of view — so of sometime there's not terrorism, naturally economy grows, but otherwise also, supposing economy does not grow, where do we land up? Right. So this is why I would like you to explain — what's your view about it?
Let's start with the questions on the forces that are required for, you know, making sure that the state — in this case Kashmir — is more secure, and you took the example of how Mr. Gill would have done that in Punjab. And this is exactly what the issue is, because terrorism is so asymmetrical, it just raises the cost dramatically. Like for example, just four people can make sure that 200,000 troops are tied down in Kashmir, whereas they could have probably been on the eastern front.
Yeah.
And so whenever strategists are looking at warfare, it's now very common knowledge that they're not looking at just two fronts. Now we're forever looking at two and a half fronts, because half a front is basically within as well. So I think we've forever factored in the numbers that 150,000 soldiers will always be tied down in Kashmir because of its sensitivity. Otherwise we would have had a mountain brigade coming in way earlier — we would have had a mountain brigade in the east way ahead of time. Having said that, that mountain brigade is now operational — it's now already operational and ready.
So also look at what's happening on the sea, because everything right now I'm talking about and we are discussing is land, but the Indian Navy is getting also very well equipped, because the sea is where all the protection is required in terms of trade — 70% of all trade passes through the Indian Ocean region, and China is obviously trying to, you know, kind of make sure that the South China Sea etc., or Hambantota port. So the Indian Navy is also getting tremendous amount of support. The Indian Air Force is now trying to replace all its MiGs with the Tejas. The Indian Army is getting all its equipment coming in.
So I think the broad point I'm trying to make is, it seems as if in this current environment there will be no — the word I think I'm looking for — there will be no compromise with the security of the nation, and which is why the defense stocks are flying. So many stocks are at multi-level, multi-year highs — multiple times they've gone up. In fact, I sometimes worry that they've gone up too much.
Too much, yeah.
Yeah, so you can see that the order book is going up etc., and like I said, exports is — I think the basic point I'm trying to make is, if we do not invest in our security, then what's the point of having a nation? For example, Ukrainians have found out that if you're not a safe and secure nation, you could be under attack at any point in time. The Chinese have done that to Tibet. The Chinese have, you know, bulldozed their way, making sure that Taiwan is forever, you know, under attack. Japan is not spared. The South Koreans don't feel safe. Indonesians and the Philippines — the fishermen are always at, you know, loggerheads with the Chinese. I think in an environment like that, this is not an investment which will go waste.
Okay. Then I'll conclude with a few words. As I will term it, the direct cause of countering terrorism are of course quite staggering also.
Yes sir.
But measured in losses of human life etc., probably it was required, and great confidence in the other countries. As India is moving towards so-called 5 trillion dollar economy, then of course terrorism must not be allowed to derail our progress. We should also remember that terrorist funding through fake charities, narco and hawala terrorism also needs to be covered before we are able to have an absolutely peaceful environment in our country — and at least peaceful to the extent that it attracts investment. The effort, however, should be to fight terrorism and address its root causes. That's what I feel.
Yes.
The root causes continue to be — I mean, irrespective of the fact what is being fed from outside, otherwise root causes continue to be the poverty, the unemployment, and of course radicalization. During terrorist alert, you know, it further deteriorates the condition — they've come more unemployment again. And I am sure, I'm sure, as India aspires to be a global power and global economy, terrorism in India must of course be contained, as a major reputational liability — I will call it a very major reputational liability for our country, and we have to do away with it. And I thank Shri Karandat for his very, very well researched and very nicely elaborated on the cost of terrorism and how we stand today. Thank you very much. We are pleased. We are very pleased to have you. Hope we'll have you further in our next programs. Thank you.
Yes, sir. Thank you very much. Bye.



