Pakistan’s 27th Amendment Bill is a massive deal. It’s set to create a new supreme military commander and a new constitutional court.
What this session covered
This session examined the proposed 27th amendment to the Constitution of Pakistan. It took the form of a moderated discussion: a host set out the background and put questions to two contributors, one addressing the military provisions and the other the judicial provisions. The discussion treated the amendment as having two distinct components and worked through them in turn, together with the implications for Pakistan's institutions and for the wider region.
On the military side, the discussion covered the proposal to give constitutional recognition to the rank of field marshal, carrying lifelong privileges including salary and immunity from legal proceedings; the creation of a post of Chief of Defence Forces bringing the army, navy, air force and paramilitary forces under a single office; and the abolition of the office of chairman of the joint chiefs of staff committee. One speaker argued that the amendment had been brought forward without the extended deliberation such changes normally attract, and linked its timing to the aftermath of Operation Sindoor. Referring to a report of earlier disquiet among some officers, the same speaker suggested that the abolition of the chairman's post removed a potential internal check. The discussion also noted the proposed power to approve appointments to the body dealing with nuclear command arrangements, which one speaker argued would bring that structure indirectly within the same office's ambit. Asked about the effect on India, one speaker initially suggested limited direct impact given the absence of political or military interaction beyond contact at the level of the Directors General of Military Operations, but accepted, when the host pressed the point, that a unified command would allow Pakistan's forces and resources to be applied in a more concentrated way and that Indian planning would have to account for this.
On the judicial side, the discussion recalled that the 26th amendment had already removed the Supreme Court's power to act of its own motion, and described the further step of establishing a separate federal constitutional court whose judges would be chosen by the government, with constitutional questions removed from the Supreme Court's jurisdiction. It was also noted that the proposals would roll back powers devolved to the provinces under the 18th amendment, particularly in relation to financial resources and federal control over certain ministries. One speaker argued that the changes would encourage militant activity directed at India and would make it harder for outside actors to press for a return to civilian rule, and that the position would be difficult to reverse once written into the constitution. One contributor cited critical comments from a legal adviser to an international body of jurists; another responded that outside opinion was immaterial so long as the amendment was carried by the parliamentary majority the constitution requires, a threshold which, it was noted, had historically been met by narrow margins. The session closed on the view that the amendment's significance lay in converting an existing de facto position of military primacy into one codified in law, a change described by critics as amounting to a coup effected through constitutional means.
Key points raised
- The discussion treated the proposed 27th amendment as having two separable components, one military and one judicial, and examined each in turn.
- The military provisions discussed included constitutional recognition of the rank of field marshal with lifelong privileges and immunity from legal proceedings, a new Chief of Defence Forces post covering all three services and the paramilitary forces, and abolition of the office of chairman of the joint chiefs of staff committee.
- One speaker argued that a proposed power to approve appointments to the body dealing with nuclear command arrangements would bring that structure indirectly under the same office.
- The judicial provisions discussed included the creation of a separate federal constitutional court with government-appointed judges, following the earlier removal of the Supreme Court's power to act of its own motion under the 26th amendment.
- The discussion noted proposals to roll back powers devolved to the provinces under the 18th amendment, particularly concerning financial resources and federal control over certain ministries.
- On implications for India, views ranged from limited direct effect, given minimal existing interaction, to a concern that a single unified command and a codified military primacy would have far-reaching consequences for regional security.
Session transcript
This transcript is auto-generated from the session recording and lightly edited for punctuation and readability; it may contain transcription errors. The video remains the authoritative record.
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Good morning, good afternoon and good evening, ladies and gentlemen. On behalf of NISSMAT, today we are going to be discussing the 27th constitutional amendment, or the proposed 27th constitutional amendment, in Pakistan. Before I start, I'd like to introduce the speakers who'd be there today, who would be offering their expert advice and comments: Major General Deepak Ma on military affairs, and Mr. Sepal Singh, who will be talking about the judicial aspect of the proposed amendment.
A constitutional amendment in Pakistan is a formal change to its supreme legal document, the constitution. These amendments have historically been pivotal, often reflecting the ongoing power struggles between democratic and military institutions. They shape the very nature of the state, its judiciary and the balance of power between the federal government and its provinces. As of November 25, Pakistan is experiencing intense political debate and nationwide protests over a proposed 27th constitutional amendment. This amendment is widely seen as one of the most consequential in the country's history, with critics arguing it fundamentally restructures the state to legally centralize and expand the power of the military establishment.
Basically, the amendment has two portions to it. One is the military aspect and the other is the judicial aspect. To talk about the military aspect, I will ask General Ba to give his comments on the same. Over to you, gentleman.
Thank you. Do you see, personally, as far as this 27th amendment is concerned, this has come under criticism both by the opposition as well as the critics in Pakistan itself. This has come into being without any major discussion. Normally these constitutional amendments take a lot of time, a lot of discussions take place, but in this case it has not been done. I feel that this has happened because of the fact that after Operation Sindoor they wanted to project General Munir as a hero. Now a lot of shortcomings must have come up in their analysis of Sindoor, to cover them up.
You see, firstly is a consolidation of power. In this case what has happened is that the complete powers have been consolidated with Munir. He has now become the chief of defense forces; besides all the defense forces, he's also got the paramilitary forces under him. So he's a very powerful appointment. He has also done away with the appointment of joint chiefs of staff committee. There was some rumor going on that since Munir has been brought up much below from the ranks to become the chief by the political dispensations for their own advantage, there were a lot of dissensions within the armed forces itself, because if he becomes a field marshal and he's got the immunity for life, there are a large number of people in the armed forces who have been looked, who have been taken to one side, so there would be a certain amount of dissension. So he has become a very powerful person in Pakistan.
And as what has happened in the past, right from the time of Field Marshal Ayub Khan and beyond, the army has been the major player in the governance in Pakistan. They have been, and there is the feeling that all the people who have been selected in the chiefs and the hierarchy of the Pakistan army have sort of a tacit approval of the US, because for the last 30 years the US has been very closely associated with Pakistan because of the Afghanistan problem. So I think this constitutional amendment, where he becomes the sole leader of the army, air force and navy, is a major change in the structural factor in the Pakistan army per se.
Deep, I have a question in between. You see, all the powers of the army chief — the amendment aims to give constitutional recognition to the rank of field marshal.
Yes.
Granting the holder, which currently is General Munir, lifelong privileges such as salary, blanket immunity from all legal proceedings. So that means for any action of his he cannot be held responsible. The responsibility lies with the political dispensation, whereas the military has the power but actually no responsibility to the people that it governs.
That's right. And what is more surprising is that it is being vetted and passed by the current prime minister of Pakistan and the president, and they are siding with this amendment.
You see, you brought a very interesting point. The fact is that Imran Khan, who was the prime minister earlier, he was not pro-US as anyone else. This present political dispensation have brought up Munir to get into power; as a matter of fact, they are subservient to Munir for their own existence. So it is an interesting point, because as of now there's no democracy. It is the rule of the armed forces, and as the chief of defense forces he has the air force and the navy also under him, along with the paramilitary forces. So it has a different bearing on the democratic aspect of Pakistan.
So how does the restructuring within Pakistan impact India?
I don't think it's going to impact very much, because there is no interaction between us and the Pakistan, be it political or military, except for that DGMO level. So I don't think it's going to be very much. But yes, Munir apparently was earlier with the ISI; he could exacerbate problems in India by virtue of being the boss, and also the money which is coming either from America or China is actually being utilized very little by the political dispenser. Bulk of this goes to the armed forces itself. So I don't think it's going to have much of an impact on India.
Yeah. Unless — we have to be very careful, they may exacerbate problems in India.
No, Deep, my question was slightly different, you know. Now, let's say we go to war with Pakistan; now Pakistan then has to combine its army, navy and air force to sort of fight a unified sort of a war against India. Now, as it is, they have combined, and the resources would also be available in a more focused manner to Pakistan.
Yes, that I agree with you.
So to that extent, I think India's military dispensation has to take into account the changed positioning of Pakistan's armed forces and the capability that it has to fight against India.
Yes. Yes. As a matter of fact, you see, about a month or two back, Pakistan made a statement that if this Operation Sindoor carries on the way or goes beyond, we will have fire all over India. That means, you see, they have exhibited some sort of a capability of sleeper cells which are operating out here. But now our government is fully aware; after this incident of Red Fort, now they're going to be going hell for leather to catch hold of these sleeper cells.
Now switching over to the judiciary part of the amendment. You see, as part of the 26th amendment, the Supreme Court of Pakistan had been stripped of its rights to take suo moto action against any event that occurs. So now basically it was reduced to just taking care of civil and criminal cases. The constitutional amendment now is going to shift to the judiciary. Mr. Sepal Singh, who's the president of NISSMAT — what are your views on the change, or the proposed changes, of the judiciary in Pakistan?
Let me first of all tell you that this is a very, very clever move. Most of the democratic countries should be worried about it, particularly those which are against radicalism and terrorism, and people who are not in favor of any internal warfare between themselves also going on. So it's a very clever move, and as all of us know, it gave Munir opportunity that immediately after the Sindoor operation, somehow or other he managed to convince his people that he has also shot down some planes of India.
Absolutely.
War planes of India. Actually, the war planes would have been shot down by the air force, not by the army people. Yet he has taken the credit and overruled even the air force, and the air force also will be under him. Army also is of course under him, and navy and the paramilitary forces. Very clever move, that the credit which should have gone to the air force has been taken over by him.
A step further, a step further. The leeway and the attitude of USA after Operation Sindoor — embracing Munir at the White House and hosting a dinner in his favor — has given a fillip to his ego, that all right, I am here and nobody is now there, that I should somehow make use of it. And hence this constitutional amendment has been motivated and is going to go as it is, because the present puppet prime minister also is in favor. They let it go, because he himself already was nothing. It was already military by and large; it was military domination. So it is going to go in. What is going to happen?
Earlier you had field marshals, and twice some emergency was brought about, army rule was brought out somehow or the other. It was in the time of two earlier generals; they also did it. But the constitution being in place, this was brought back on the rails, because the constitutional amendment was not brought. They brought it under, you know, emergency rule under the army, but this was not a constitutional amendment earlier. Now it is a constitutional amendment, which is going to be a very difficult process. Supposing this —
Continue.
It's going to, because if a constitutional amendment has been done, that means to restore back the democracy, unless there is something like rebellion in the country or something like that, that's all — otherwise it is a very, very difficult process.
Now, in addition to this point, I'd like to emphasize upon you and the audience as such that it is going to have a lot of repercussions all over the countries which are around it. With reference to India in particular, please mark it that I am going to mention something which is a well-known fact, but yet people may not have realized. Jaish-e-Muhammad, which has been derecognized as far as the world is concerned — by Pakistan also it is a terrorist organization, and Pakistan also has not approved it — but yet it is basically functioning there, and all the pro-Islamic, pro-radical elements are being pampered by this field marshal.
In view of that, the repercussions in India can be that, all right, probably now there is one uniform command; there's no civil government, there's no army government, so we can have a direct contact with the field marshal and get our things done, negotiation done. B, that it can give fillip to the terrorist activities in India, because there is going to be a person who is absolutely, totally pro-Islamic and who is absolutely against Indian policy of any reconciliation which India has been trying to do. So it is going to have a far-reaching effect as far as India is concerned, and in view of the constitutional amendment, it will be very difficult for India to persuade other political leaders that you bring about back from, sort of, you know, military rule to the civil rule. So therefore this constitutional amendment has got a very far-reaching effect, not only for other countries around but also for India.
And somehow or the other, he is under the impression that USA is definitely going to support him. Unfortunately, the USA has always been supporting the army rule, army people, because it can easily manipulate some of the army officers. They'll give them, you know, how much land, how much money has poured in, which ultimately has not gone to Pakistan; the funds have gone to ISI.
That's right. These funds have been pouring in and going to ISI. Ninety percent of the funds were filtered away into ISI by these army generals.
So therefore I am of the view that in this case it may become a puppet in the hand of the western power like USA, with the result there may create problems. Secondly, as far as the democratic countries around are concerned, it will be a very anxious period. And as far as India is concerned, we have to be immediately on our borders; we have to watch out, our vigilance inside, we have to mount up, our internal forces should be tightened, because he may, after taking out to create a credibility for himself, try to do some mischief, try to get some mischief created in India. This is my submission as the judicial man.
So the judicial amendment means it is totally in his hand, unless the constitutional amendment comes back, because it is now in his hand. That is why this is a very, very dangerous move as far as the democratic countries, as far as peace-loving countries are concerned, because he is totally pro-Islamic, in the sense that he has been at one time associated with the Talibans.
The question that you raised about the judicial restructuring — you see, in the past the Supreme Court of Pakistan has given certain verdicts which were not palatable to the political dispensation, also to the army there. Now what they have done is they have curbed the powers of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court cannot deal with the constitutional aspects. They have raised a new federal constitutional court. Now, this new federal constitutional court — the government is going to find the judges for that.
Quite right, quite right.
You see, they will find their own people to give a judgment in their own favor. It's a very big change in the complete judicial system of Pakistan.
You see, also it weakens the provincial autonomy. The proposal also includes measures that would roll back some of the powers granted to the provinces under the 18th amendment of the constitution.
Correct.
Particularly concerning financial resources and federal control over certain ministries. So the judicial reforms are going to impact the livelihood of the people in Pakistan much more than anything else. And now the power is only going to get centered around the people that are nominated by the government or the military in power of the day.
Correct. Absolutely, absolutely. Now, you see this as the aspect of giving immunity. Immunity has been given to the field marshal and also to Asim Ali Zardari, who is the president, because he has to sign, he has to ratify the bill. So it is a joke which is going on, but I'm sure the people over a period of time will realize the folly, and hopefully things should get back to —
Time frame — such things, you know, don't last. You know, when Yahya took over, everyone was thinking that now there'll be absolutely an army regime; it was indirectly an army regime. But somehow or the other, the constitution was still intact. That is why it would come back. So my point is that in this case it will take much more time, because the constitutional review may not be possible. Ultimately it will be on the masses locally — how long and how much time it will take for masses to realize actually their democratic rights are being snatched, but how long it will take is a question mark. My point is that in this case the move is a very sinister move. It is a very difficult operation for us. We may have done the Sindoor operation; now if we go ahead and there's no constitution to bring him back, he'll go whole hog — he is that type of person.
So, you see, I have only a couple of more comments to add on this. One is that the constitutional amendment requires 75% of the assembly to concur, and they have always been sort of getting the votes by just one additional to the minimum that is required. So despite the bill being highly controversial and proposing two major changes to the country's power structure, I think the implications for the people of Pakistan and for the neighboring countries are very sinister. And the primary implication, I think, is the potential shift from a de facto hybrid system, where the military was wielding informal power, to a legally codified system where the military's dominant role in governance, security and law is enshrined in the constitution of Pakistan.
In a sense, this 27th amendment appears as the most sweeping structural change in the Pakistan constitution. Now, earlier, since 1973, actually the constitution itself has been tinkered with here and there, but at present it codifies what many critics say is the de facto state of affairs — that is, military dominance. At present the de facto state is there, there's a military dominance, but it codifies the military dominance; that is the difficulty.
There, no doubt.
And the thing, you see, we are talking about 27 amendments in Pakistan's constitution. You look at India — we've had 106 amendments to our constitution.
But it did not affect the democracy per se.
You see, the new constitutional post which has been created — chief of defense forces, with everything under it, which consolidates everything: army, navy, air force, other forces in the way. This is, I think, a very difficult abolition of the longstanding office of the chairman. Earlier there was a chairman of the joint chiefs; that has been abolished. You try to understand — that has been abolished under this.
Sir, you know why it has been abolished? Some time back, some officers of the Pakistan army — there's one report to that effect — they wanted him to be taken out, and they wanted the then chairman of the joint committee to take over the role of the chief of the army staff. What he has done is that he removed this appointment per se, so that no one comes and threatens him in the future.
Sir, another very dangerous move. Mr. P, another very dangerous move is granting the CDF powers to recommend appointments to the National Strategic Council Committee, which is dealing with nuclear structure. All appointments under the nuclear strategy of the country will come under the grant of his. He has to give the approval for appointment of this, which means that the nuclear command indirectly also comes under him, because he is the person who has to exercise unified oversight on all the services, and also particularly — I'm talking to you which you have not indicated earlier — that is the national strategic command, that is the nuclear command. That is a very difficult process, because he is saying that appointment will be done under his approval. It is indirectly the same thing: wherever you have some people appointed by a person, they'll come under his command indirectly. Though it is not direct command, they are being appointed, so it's approval of his. Therefore I am of the view that Pakistan's civil-military relations, which have long been strained — earlier civil and military relations in Pakistan have already had a lot of strain between them — but now the military has played a sort of role where this is a very dominant role, and the politics or politicians historically, I think, the judiciary and the politicians historically have gone to the background. This is another thing.
Traditionally the military has always held supreme power in Pakistan. The civilian authorities have always been subjugated to the role of the military, and all that is now — what was done informally has now become formalized, and it is law. Earlier on it was not law, but now it is law. And it is being termed by critics that this particular 27th amendment is also being termed as a constitutional coup — to get a major shift of power away from civilian institutions towards military is really a sort of coup which can be called a constitutional coup.
I have one point to say. All right, they have done the amendment, they have got the sanction, whatever it is, but there's a lot of dissension within the country itself. Like this one chap by the name of Rama Omar, who is a legal adviser in the International Commission of Jurists — it's a non-government organization based in Geneva — he has said that this is going to be a very counterproductive amendment. So even the jurists —
Deep, you know, I have an opinion on this. Any amendment of the constitution is done by the parliament.
Right.
And therefore everybody can have a difference of opinion. You can have an opinion; this particular gentleman sitting in Switzerland can have an opinion. It does not matter. What matters is whether you have the power to change the constitution in a legal manner that is set across. And today the legal manner is: you get 75% of the votes in the parliament, you'll be able to change the constitution.
That's right. No, I'm with you, I'm with you. And that is why today the critics, particularly who look after the powers of judicial, they say it is a step towards authoritarianism — constitutional authoritarianism. It is authoritarianism, but it is being termed as a constitutional authoritarianism.
And now I think it's time to conclude the session, sir. And I'd like to thank General Ma and the president of NISSMAT, Mr. Singh, for sharing their views on the 27th constitutional amendment of Pakistan. At least one thing is very clear now: I think India knows as to when they have to talk, whom do they talk to in Pakistan.
That's what I said.
So thank you very much, all of you.
Thanks. Thanks. Pleasure. Pleasure being with you all.
Wonderful conversation that we've had. Thank you very much.
Thank you.
