“Operation Cactus – Recalled” with Col Thomas (Retd) -1988 Maldives Intervention NISSMAT Podcast

The bravery of those young soldiers, the unsung heroes, that is the true legacy of Operation Cactus.

Good morning, good afternoon, and good evening, ladies and gentlemen. On behalf of NISSMAT, I welcome everyone to today's podcast, a book review on a book called Operation Cactus Recalled. Today's episode is very special, one that is both a deep dive into military history and a personal honor for me. We are going to be discussing Operation Cactus, the 1988 Indian military intervention in the Maldives. It is an operation often celebrated as a swift clean success that served a neighboring nation's needs. Op Cactus was a master task in strategic speed and in the tri-services coordination.

36 years after the operation, a definitive critical account has been written by a man who was right there. I'm deeply privileged to welcome my guest today, the author of the book Operation Cactus Recalled, Colonel Kochapan Thomas. Colonel Thomas, the author of the book, was the commanding officer of seventh battalion, the Parachute Regiment, which was the second wave of the strike force into Maldives. This conversation is particularly meaningful to me as I had the distinct honor of serving under then Lieutenant Colonel Thomas for 11 years before I left the office.

Sir, your book is a compelling no holds barred analysis. You write about having a sense of remorse for 36 years of not speaking out about the operation in which seven Para took part. It's a courageous opening and it sets the stage for our discussion today where we will cover the operation from its planning to the incredible bravery of the men on the ground and the operation's legacy. Colonel Thomas sir, welcome to the show.

Thank you sir.

Sir, I will begin by asking you what took you so long in deciding that you must write this book?

First of all, thank you very much for giving this opportunity to voice my views on Operation Cactus and it's a great honor for me to be interviewed by a person like you. Before I answer any of your question, if you may permit me, it is necessary to make an assertion. May I?

Sure sir. Why not? Sure, please.

It is for those officers in our military fraternity who have certain points of contention with my views regarding the operation planning and execution. I must clarify that to them that in this particular book there's nothing, just nothing of mine except the seven Para operations, seven Para's action in Operation Cactus. Rest everything is taken from the articles, the podcasts, the interviews, the books of officers who had taken part in Operation Cactus, is all taken from them. Like General Vian Sharma, he was the chief of army staff then, from his article I have taken a lot of detail. General VP Malik, he was the DDGMO then. Brigadier FFC Bulsara, he was the Para brigade commander then. General Vinod Batya retired, he was the BM Para brigade, I have taken a lot of things from his article. Lieutenant General Ensu, para there, he commanded my battalion 7 Para too. He was a major commanding sweep Para company which was under six Para.

Then Major K Babaya of Bombay Sappers. He was commanding a field platoon of Bombay Sappers during Operation Cactus. Then comes Brigadier Svij Jooshi. He was the commanding officer of six Para group. Then his officer, the hero of Maldives, then Major RJS Dylan, now Brigadier Dylan retired. Then comes Group Captain AB, the air force officer who took us to Malé. He was the leader of that one or two aircrafts which took us to Malé. He has written a very candid, he has expressed very candidly in his article. Then there was another officer, now he's retired, Group Captain Akia, he has also written an article. Finally I have taken a lot of details from Dr. Gobin Sultana, an associated fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute of Defense Studies and Analysis, New Delhi.

And most of these officers have criticized decisively the plan made and the way it was executed during Operation Cactus and it is already known to the rest of the world. So I have just chronicled their views in a consolidated and sequential manner in my book. They have nothing of mine. And I must also say that the brigade commander who commanded the strike force, in his article Happy Odyssey, he said that look, I have committed blunder. I seek forgiveness from my men whom I commanded. I seek penance from the maroon berets and then maroon turbans whom I commanded. It's amazing. He revealed his professional integrity and propriety and of course it had given a credibility to my candid scrutiny which I have made in my Operation Cactus. I mean no personal incivility, neither I mean any general negativity. It is the deep-seated feeling of a commanding officer of a battalion who was put through the mill with this man during Operation Cactus. Now answer to your question.

Yeah. Thank you so much. Thank you so much for this preamble to whatever you're going to be saying. You know, it's a great feeling for an author when he's been a part of an operation to write this and you know, I'm sure that whatever you're going to be speaking is absolutely from your heart and you know my question was why did it take you 36 years to write this book precisely?

See, immediately after my command, after the Operation Cactus, I was posted to Sri Lanka. There the situation was so volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous. We didn't have the time to even breathe. Indian army went there for something and did something else. It was quite a nasty tenure for me and I didn't have the time to think of Operation Cactus at all. We were fully involved with it. Then I was posted to many places and the last posting was to an island. There too, typical of May, I got endlessly purred within a so-called fragmented command of the Andaman and Nicobar islands. Recently only we got to know that integrated command for Andaman and Nicobar islands. These are all, I have fully committed with my some of this command unit tenure. So I didn't have the time to think of Cactus.

After retirement, I was trying to find myself my own great reference to the societal map. It took time for them. Lastly, I was not introduced to this digital technology. Only recently I got a laptop and all the thing, you know it is very necessary to be aware of, you know, well tuned up to the digital technology to write a book like that. So that is why it took 36 years for me to write this book, and then there was the reason for it for me to write it. It was the cause for the delay but there was definitely a reason for it.

Firstly, my seven Para officers, both serving and retired. I was surprised that they don't have any clue about Operation Cactus. They don't know that their battalion was a part of the strike force which went to Maldives in its second wave and it was the successful overseas airborne operation carried out by our nation. Whole world was celebrating it and unfortunately they don't have any clue. It is not their fault. Perhaps you know that world media and then Indian media, that subdued all the things except six Para and 17 Para. This thing, they glorifying it, they didn't mention anything about rest of the battalion, rest of the unit, so they were not aware of it. And none of any records maintained in any units or brigade court and all that thing didn't have other units like seven Para commitment and all in Operation Cactus. So it is not their fault and I wanted to make them know that is the perilous plan which was made during Operation Cactus.

Why I wanted the seven Para officers to know? Because they are the future planners of the Indian army. So it was a perilous plan and secondly the asymmetrical use of forces which was sort of utilized there, exaggerated sort of comparison with the airborne operations of Estonia, like unseen guns in Maldives and all that thing, that it's all asymmetrical force. All this is the unnecessarily sort of that burden to the government extra. So I wanted my officers of seven Para and the rest of the political fraternity know all the detail. That were the reason for me to write it and that was the delay for writing this book after 36 years. Over to you sir.

Sir, in your book, you know, you make a very important point that the military was given the freedom to plan and execute without any political meddling. But isn't it true for all operations? Why do you mention this, that this was special? I think for any operation, for any military operation to be successful, you require something that there is no political interference in what you're doing. Why is it so special to your Operation Cactus?

I must say that unlike the political meddling in Sino-Indian war of 1962, the subsequent operation carried by the Indian military enjoyed a perfect blend of political military symbiosis. During Operation Cactus, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, he gave full freedom to General Vian Sharma to execute the way you like to do. So there was absolutely a perfect blend of political military sort of symbiosis. We did have a robust political symbiosis which is necessary for the nation's security, the political stability and the good governance. Op Cactus really demonstrated an ideal fusion of military unity and the politics. Yes.

In your book you also mentioned that General Vian Sharma stated in an article that India did not have a quick reaction army units. You sort of disagree with that. Can you give us some insights into why you say this and what did the general at that time mean by saying that army had no quick reaction units?

Yes sir. I didn't mean to prove anything against my then chief of power. I will narrate that the following aspects made me to believe that the nation had the required wherewithal and the political military will. I will just elucidate that. Well, I must say that it is true, generally is true that we didn't have a standing quick reaction force at that particular time. Yes. But then we had troops like one Para commando, 10 Para commando, nine Para commando. They are the troops which were trained for such, you know, that quick move to anywhere to the region. They were specially trained for special missions like that. We had the wherewithal, Indian army, and then we had the Indian navy, their Marcos for example, the most lethal special forces in the world, I must say. They had the capability even to skydiving and parachuting into the open sea, you see, capable of missions like that. So we had the required troops though we didn't have the standing QRF.

The Indian Navy had the aircraft carrier based strike capability. They had the fleet of air defense. They had the maritime reconnaissance ability. The air force had the ability to lift troops to anywhere to any part of the world. And they had the ability to strike and dominate the sky. They had the reconnaissance ability we could have utilized. They get some photograph of Malé on the third morning instead of planning on sort of, know that, various other normal paper all the thing, they could have utilized them. So these aspects made me to believe that nation didn't lack any different finances and it did have the required wherewithal on 3rd November 1988.

Now coming to the next point, the political military will. Well, nation always had that. For example, the Operation Polo in 1948 to annex Hyderabad, the nation decided that. The Operation Vijay in 1961 to liberate Goa. Then Operation Cactus Lily in Bangladesh, we just divided Pakistan into two. And Operation Lal Dora to support the government of Mauritius against the sort of feared coup in 1983. Operation Meghdoot in Siachen glacier in 1984. Operation Flowers Are Blooming against the attempted coup in Seychelles in 1986. Operation Pawan in '87. I must say that aren't these operations, is it not evidences enough to say that the nation had the will, the political military will was there with us? So I just, I'm sorry, I didn't agree with my chief on this aspect. Over to you.

I think we all had the incredible fortune to have served with the general, to serve with Brigadier Bulsara. He was an incredible soldier and in your book you also describe his style of functioning as one of the most incredible ways of a soldier. Can you describe something about Bulsara's style of leadership that inspired you and the men under him?

Fantastic officer. We miss him. May God almighty bless his soul. During the planning stage of Operation Cactus, all those past experiences, the age-old, time-tested, periodically updated military procedural matics, it was all set aside for, well, especially for Brigadier Bulsara. It was my way over the highway when he was made the final plan. He stood firm on his stand when he spoke to the vice chief of army staff from the office room of 41st in Agra. His stand was just non-negotiable. It was, I think, say, laissez-faire approach in decision making. And about Brigadier Bulsara in particular, he was an amazing and energetic leader, a hardcore maroon beret and he was always at the forefront of his command. He was always seen before he was heard.

I will just give you one or two example. Some way back in '87 I think 71 company was sent to Leh. So I said that go there, fine enough, I send my company, have the proper acclimatization, recce the right, so that there are a lot of, you know that, like rabbits, like animal there, they're called marmots, they make city on the ground, so any paratrooper landing on top with that speed and this thing and that, he just get inside and break his leg. I thought have a proper recce and then go and all. The next day when they reached Leh, next day I also went there and to my horror I found Brigadier was there and he was ready to jump with my men on that day. I said sir, kindly don't do that, but then he said that no Tommy, if you're coming you come with me. I said no, no, I'm not coming with you, but then he was with my men. He jumped and he broke his own ankle and the 32 of my men, they also broke their leg.

Brigadier Bulsara was that in Maldives also. Before we could reach that island, Tulusu island, I was with my column which went to island for a search and cordon operation. I was there with them, not to interfere in any of their operation, but then I was quite used to the blue waters. Some of my men were not comfortable, that's why I accompanied them. Before I could reach with my men there, Bulsara was already there in Tulusu island. So he was the man who was always in front and he was a military leader with a profound professional integrity and propriety. I said that we must say may God bless his soul.

Mind you, he's not the only one in our own army. We had a Sam Manekshaw, he was the captain in Burma campaign and he had I think a tummy full of bullets in his tummy and still was in the forefront. We had a Brigadier, man of ours, four Para. He was a Para brigade commander, 50 Para brigade commander in Jhelum. He was in the forefront. He got killed. Colonel Kadulo got in Bangladesh just chopped off his one leg and then he was with his men in front. In our own battalion, we had Colonel Rap Singh, late Colonel Harp Singh, Ramdas, late Abd Ramdas, Captain Left Bat. We lost them in Bangladesh operation. They're all in the forefront. So history is repeated with such heroes and Brigadier was one of them.

You've been very appreciative of the Indian Air Force in your book, especially you mentioned Group Captain Bour who was the pilot for the IL76 which flew you from Agra to the Maldives. And you also mentioned that, you know, he landed his aircraft in Malé almost in a darkness. Can you just describe your feelings at that time and why did you think that the Group Captain Babu was an excellent pilot?

It was indeed a diving, their dive to uncertainty by Group Captain Bour and Binu. It was one of the most daring air transported operation worth cherishing for years to come. Taking off from Agra at 1804 hours on 3rd November, Group Captain Bour was in the first aircraft with the Brigadier Bulsara and then Sara group. It was a flight of 3,707 kilometer at the altitude of 37,000 ft and it took about just 3 hours and 44 minutes from wheels up to touchdown, and that too avoiding knockage. You know, knockage is the way points and route where an aircraft reports. It was because of security reason they didn't report any of this knockage. Group Captain Bour and Wing Commander Gil, they believed in themselves and their flying machines. It is just within 15 hours of the Maldivian presidential office requesting the PMO's office, within 15 hours of the telephone call, the troops were there in Maldives. They delivered about 398 maroon berets against NSA so-called reported 200 heavily armed mercenaries. A fantastic job done, Group Captain Babu.

Now about 30 kilometer away from the Hulule Island, before reaching the island, Group Captain Bab asked Brigadier Bulsara, so shall we drop 60 paratroopers or shall we land? Hang on. Brigadier took the decision to land. That is one fantastic decision he had taken. Nation is very proud of it, other than biggest national tragedy. So when he got the clearance, Group Captain contacted the ATC. We had a mole there, thank God we had, and the ATC was contacted, God word was passed and then we requested for about just for about 10 seconds that runway to be lit. The runway was lit and about 25 km before reaching the Hulule Island, Group Captain Bobo steadied his aircraft, the computer, it guided the aircraft to touch down. After 10 seconds the light went off, the pitch dark, touch down, moved forward within that 1,700 m runway, just short of 30 m the aircraft stopped. It's a fantastic job done by him. Marvelous.

And the first aircraft of the people, Brigadier Bulsara and his brigade tactical quarter, six Para group, that the first group of the strike force, they downloaded. The second aircraft landed subsequently of Wing Commander Gil. He said that, know that, in front of his aircraft these servicemen, they were crisscrossing like, you know, that chased gazelles in that, you know, desert night. We all seen that animal how they cross. It was something so dangerous but they enjoyed it. So they landed. The air force did touch the sky with glory in a true sense. It was an act of extraordinary courage and unparalleled achievement. I must say that the nation salutes them, for the air force giving the nation the recording that was important.

So your book, in the preamble of your book, you know, you describe this amazing job done by six Para in the first flight and you also talk of then Major Dylan and his men who landed into Malé at that time and they advanced into the hostile capital, located the president and secured him, all in just a matter of a few hours. Could you describe what you felt at that time?

Yes, it is in my mind very clear that though I was just an oversea, but then I heard about it from mouth, like now Brigadier. At 0030 hours on 4th November morning, the first aircraft with Brigadier Bulsara with tactical headquarters including Major Vinod, the assault group of six Para with Colonel B Jooshi comprising about 180 troops, Major Dylan and Major Singh's company, they touched down and men of C and D company dashed out of the aircraft and the Major Dylan and couple of servicemen went to the ATC. They had a little problem to sort out that, Major NSS major there in ATC. They got the ATC under control.

Then comes Major Babaya. He also went to the nearest shoreline. They seized about 12 boats and boatsmen, local boatsmen. They were scared, but then 41 paratrooper, 41 Para field engineers had their own men. So the first group of Major Dylan's men were taken to Malé by Babaya's men in these boats. Before the second wave of boats, Major encased guy of three Para company with Major, amazing, with his troop, they occupied the western shore of the island where they found a suspected sort of move of a freighter, a vessel. So they said that there is something suspicious about it. So Brigadier Bulsara was there at the spot, gave them order to take a pot shot and they fired with the 84 mm RL and I think the ship went limping.

Major Dylan, with the help of the NSS guide there in Malé after landing, they tried to get into the NSS headquarter. They got in and then went into Mr. Gayoom's house. Not his house actually, he was hiding in a two room servant quarters. They went there, met him. Gayoom was with his daughter and his wife. He said that sir, you have saved. And immediately after that Brigadier Bulsara and Colonel SV Jooshi landed up there. They met the guy, thanked them, and then Major Dylan made a call to Delhi, the prime minister's office, so that the Gayoom could speak to Mr. Rajiv Gandhi. It was a very interesting thing. Major Dylan spoke to Delhi and said that look, Major Dylan speaking from Maldives. The president of Maldives, Mr. Gayoom, would like to speak to Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. From the other side the reply came, yes, Rajiv here, please. So Major Dylan said that look, I, Major Dylan, I want to speak to the prime minister. So he said that Major Dylan, I am prime minister, and said why, do you want to speak? So then he was allowed to speak to the president of Maldives. So it was, that was quite a fantastic job done by Bulsara and then Para group 41. They finally saved the president.

Yes. In your book you acknowledge the element of luck. You also mentioned the valor in every action, rapidity in each movement. From your command perspective, how did the paratroopers' high standard of training and adaptability turn your plan into a 100% success?

For me, it was sheer luck. Just sheer luck. Mr. Ronson, the joint secretary at the PMO's office, at 8:15 on 3rd November he spoke to the chief of army staff, said that there are about 100 to 200 Sri Lankan terrorists in the Maldives. They are well-armed with AK-47, hand grenades, mortars and shoulder fired missiles etc etc. It was a perilous plan to do an airborne assault, thinking of doing an airborne assault with 130, 150 paratroopers on just a 200 by 200 area of football field in the heart of Malé, which is the capital city of Maldives, which is inhabited by about 80,000 residents, just 2 kilometer square area. We are planning a paradrop of 130 paratroopers. I couldn't even imagine that how one could think of such thing.

And then they plant of another alternative plan was about 60 paratroopers will be dropped on Hulule Island which is about 2 km south of Malé. Mind you, both these islands were under the control, had been under the control of the so-called mercenary. They could have been shot up in the air itself by a desert while descending. The wind speed of Maldives, and then Hulule Island is about 15 to 20 kilometers, the tropical wind speed, it would have taken all the paratroopers who come from 3,000 ft high, could have been taken away to the middle of the sea. They all could have been drowned. So it was a very perilous sort of another plan which was made.

This was objected by rather Brigadier Sapatnekar who was predecessor to Brigadier Bulsara. During the briefing there in the army headquarter by chief of army to the prime minister, Brigadier Sapatnekar said that kindly don't do this paradropping. You establish a foothold at Hulule with some sort of commando operation, then you do the paraland, what you call that, the landing of the troops. So it was absolutely a perilous plan. Thank god Brigadier took the decision to land instead of paradrop and finally, you know, he said that in his own article that I faced my moment of truth at about 2025 hours over the Indian Ocean and now I can justifiably say that I made the right choice. Thank god you made the right choice. Yes.

Wonderful. Then in your book you also mentioned that seven Para, our battalion, was deep in specialized jungle training when the call for Maldives came. This new mission was, as you pointed out, not related to the requirements of the training that you were all undergoing at that time. And how did our unit seven Para mentally pivot from being trained in jungle warfare to pivoting to an operation in Maldives?

Pardon, for the men of seven Para, why seven Para, for the men of the Parachute Regiment, anytime we had the required mental and physical flexibility to shift swiftly from one operational scene to another operational scene or from one theater to another theater. It was not a problem for us. And for example, for my battalion, our battalion 7 Para, was hurriedly airlifted in 1971 from Agra to West Bengal to sort out the Naxal events. Before we could finish off the job there, we were moved to Raipur for training the Mukti Bahini. We were moved again and from Raipur, from the Gauhati, again we moved to Barrackpore on 6th December to join the Bangladesh operation and we crossed, on 7th December we crossed Bogra, and then we were in Bangladesh fighting against the Pakistanis and there we lost our CO and then two more officers. It's so unfortunate. And on 8th of December we airlifted to Bhatinda to face the Pak there in the western side. So this sort of the frequent move is nothing new to us. We are quite mentally and then physically we are so flexible on that aspect. There's nothing new about it.

Seven Para was the second wave of the strike force into Maldives and it was tasked with securing the Hulule airfield and conducting the Tulusu sweep. Why was the stabilization role, which led to the capture of nine mercenaries, so vital for ensuring the coup was truly over and the victory was public?

But the subsequent combing operation by company of three Para and six Para on fourth, fifth November in capital city Malé and seven Para on fourth, or rather on 5th, we went to Tulusu island. We done the combing operation there. It was absolutely essential to wipe out the rebels completely so that, you know, that a second recurrence of such coup doesn't take place immediately. On 5th November, two columns of seven Para in couple of country boats, we sailed 26 kilometer away to reach Tulusu Island. Carried out cordon and search operation. Apprehended about nine mercenaries with weapon. Once everything was over, I spoke to the islanders. They all got together in the jetty. I spoke to them that we are not an occupational force. We just came to your island to help you out. Your president invited us. That's why we are here. Once our job is over, friends, we are off. So we are here on the request of your president. We did well there. We treated them with the dignity, both this captured mercenaries and then the villagers. They were not harassed or anything. And for this excellent performance, Captain Gapor of seven Para and then Subedar Ram Singh of seven Para got chief of army staff commendation card and card respectively. It was a good job done and combing operation was necessary there.

Now stepping into the Indian Navy. The Indian Navy also did a commendable job in intercepting the freighter MV Progress Light which was fleeing with some mercenaries on board. Your book says that they did a commendable job. How crucial was the naval action in capturing the remaining mercenaries and drawing the final curtain on Operation Cactus?

There was a freighter hijacked by a group of 47 mercenaries. They were fleeing from Maldives towards Sri Lanka with the 27 Maldivian hostages on board which included the Maldivian transport minister Mr. Ahmed and his wife, Swiss wife. INS Godavari, a frigate of ours commanded by Captain Gopalachari, and Betwa, another frigate commanded by Captain Gokhale, made the rebel to surrender in the mid sea. It was a tactic, very tactfully carried out negotiation by Gopalachari made this leader of this rebel group to surrender in the midst. The Marcos of ours, the most lethal force, they were brought by INS Deepak. They escorted this freighter and this surrendered mercenaries back to Malé. There was another ship called INS. It patrolled the island around. INS Deepak, a fleet tanker, it provided the logistical support to Godavari and Betwa in the mid deep blue. I must say that the Indian Navy stood strong. Their actions actually drew the final curtain on Op Cactus. They did well. Really well. Yes sir.

Yeah. Your book, you also mention, you know, and we must give credit to some unsung heroes who were also part of the operation but did not get any mention. Specifically 60 Para field ambulance, the paramedics, the medical people, the 411 sappers who were part of the Para brigade, then the Para signals and a whole lot of others who took part but were never even mentioned anywhere. And even seven Para was never mentioned in the way that, you know, its participation deserved the mention. Could you just speak about where you feel aggrieved of this?

See, it is true that their contributions are generally overlooked as compared to the direct combat armed units. The subunits are naturally, they're always sort of, know that, they're overlooked. And the military operations are impossible without the specialized skill provided by the combat support and that combat service support. 411 sapper carried out the role assigned to them, perhaps more than what is required. They were right in front with six Para group. They seized those boats and then ferried Major Dylan's group to Maldives and from Hulule to and fro. They kept the Hulule airfield operational on 3rd and 4th November. There were a lot of blind grenades thrown around, that they cleared that. They kept the jetties operational. Got the water desalination plant working again. They established prisoner of war camp in Omadu Island. And so I'm talking about 411 sappers. They trained the innocent persons in mine detection and bomb disposal etc. A great job done by them.

Now come to six Para field ambulance company. They set up an ADS at Malé and their surgical team headed by Major AK Sharma, Major Dag and a paratrooper. They worked around the clock for over 48 hours without an anesthetist to save the lives of many wounded. Kept operating and kept operating. They saved the life of many. There are the signalers of 50 Indian Para brigade signal company. Why we don't talk about them? They ensured that no one in the list was out of communication. Very important role played by them.

And finally I want to say that there was another unsung hero of Operation Cactus, was brigade major, Major Batya. Vinod Batya. From 1000 hours on 3rd November when I received many unclear information and unfeasible order from the DDGMO and the vice chief of army staff till 12th November when he flew out of Maldives with the brigade tactical quarter, it was the moment filled with the high stakes professional situation and for Vinod, then, is now retired lieutenant general, it was the catch-22 situation for him. He ensured that effective coordination between the brigade and various unit and the army headquarters throughout the operation. He is nowhere to be seen in the list of performers, and role played by the supporting units and that of seven Para in Operation Cactus stood underplayed in all media projections and then the records and the literary works by various scholars, reason best known to them. Yes, they deserve it. Six Para and 17 Para field, always their name is taken. They deserve it. But it is just unjust to see the role played by this subunit, three Para, 411 sappers, we just ignored. They are not listed in the list of performers anywhere. It's just unfortunate. It happens sometimes. Yes.

Perhaps you mentioned in your book that the Operation Cactus was India's most successful tri-services military intervention. For our international audience, can you explain what were the key factors from all the three services that came together to make this incredible complex long range operation such a resounding success?

If you ask me about the key factors of success, I must say that the first come that remarkable political military symbiosis, remarkable, is an amazing operational togetherness of the three services of all, the daredevil performance of Group Captain Bour and the Commander Ahmed G, the swift action by Captain Gopalachari and then Captain Gokhale of Taragiri and Betwa, the daring decision made by Brigadier Bulsara, the death-defying actions of men in maroon berets. It was just amazing. So these are the key factors which really gave operation the required success.

So now, you know, as we conclude, this is the last question that I'm going to ask you. Operation Cactus was an awakening that led to new doctrines. How did this operation's success cement India's role as a net security provider in the region and earn praise from world leaders like President Ronald Reagan of the United States and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of the United Kingdom who said, "Thank God for India. President Gayoom's government has been saved."

Operation Cactus showed India's willingness to intervene to protect the democratic governments and its strategic reach. It did set a precedent for the future operations. At the same time it also revealed that the Indian military was caught unaware on 3rd November 1988. It was primarily due to the lack of specific intelligence. General Vian Sharma wrote in his article, "The operations succeeded despite no force or procedures existing for rapid deployment, no maps, no actionable intelligence and on dark moon light, just luck favored us and also bold plan of Operation Cactus." So he's talking about the luck favoring. We, in Para attitude judgment, I'm sorry, we don't believe in luck. We believe in our performance. I'm sorry.

Then General VP Malik wrote in his book, the state of unpreparedness and the imperfections during the preparation, planning and the execution stage during Operation Cactus, which were studied in depth and a new concept and reformed procedure were drawn without losing much time. It took 46 hours of independence to do such things. I'm sorry. But when it is the fact that Operation Cactus woke up the Indian military from its deep deep slumber. Immediately after Operation Cactus specific units were designated as QRF and seven was the first unit have been designated as a QRF. It is immediate after Operation Cactus. We got better weapons, better clothing equipments, communication system and more tri-services training came into practice. It is all immediately after Operation Cactus.

Subsequently after 1999, the Kargil operation, and then 2001 parliament attack, there was a push towards modernization and enhanced so-called atmanirbharta. As I said, that an integrated command setup was formed in 2001 for the strategically important Andaman and Nicobar. The Indian military deployed a cold start doctrine. I'm talking about immediately after the operation, the subsequent period. We developed a cold start doctrine aimed to enable rapid limited offensive operation in response to the threats from Pakistan without crossing the nuclear threshold. For effective services functioning, what we have today, we got a joint doctrine for three services. We got a chief of defense staff. We got a department of military affairs. For the Indian Army we got Brahmos, the Russian supersonic cruise missile. Dhanush, the 155 mm gun system for our artillery. Akash, the air missile system. Arjun, the main battle tank. That for the army, we saw subsequent developments, and when we realized that we were sleeping for 43 hours.

Then subsequently the Indian Navy. We had INS Vikramaditya in 2013, unarmed aerial vehicles and enhanced data communication satellite. New INS Vikrant was built indigenously, built in 2022. We had INS Nilgiri, then Taragiri, Udaygiri and Himgiri. These are all the indigenously built frigates. We had submarines indigenously made like INS Kalvari, Karanj etc. We had an indigenously built diving support vessel INS Nistar in 2025. So Indian Navy kept increasing its efficiency. Subsequent period after Operation Cactus, they inducted the midair refuelling aircraft to support the combat jets and AWACS. We got Sukhoi, we got Mirage, we got light combat Tejas for example. We established the defense communication network.

But when all this advancement, and not because of Operation Cactus only, the political military dispensation realized the need of the hour. So that's what all this happened and today we are ready to face a two and a half front war. We have realized that and we are ready for it. We conduct more often than before joint tri-service exercises within our country and then with the UK, USA, France, Germany, Australia, you talk about anyone. The Indian military today is ranked among the world's most capable militaries, renowned for its extensive combat experiences and the ethical conduct. Operation Cactus, surgical strikes, Balakot strikes, it all proved it all, our ethical conduct. Nation is no longer non-aligned in this historical sense. We are aligned. We are aligned with peace. So that's what the today's situation, the three services of a nation, but I must say that they are not three different forces. We are just one and for us the nation comes first. So that's the fact. Once again, it's a real honor to be interviewed by you so I could sort of, you know, voice my views on the Operation Cactus. Thank you very much.

Sir, I'd like to conclude, you know, your insights have been very valuable. You've been able to truly bring to life the immense pressure and professionalism of the forces that were involved in Operation Cactus. It's clear that the mission success rested not just on the planning portion, which has been under scrutiny, but on the leadership and split-second decisions you and your colleagues made on the ground. My deepest thanks to you sir for sharing your invaluable experiences and for meticulously documenting them in this book.

To our listeners, if our conversation today on the strategy, leadership and high stakes operations, if it has captivated you, I urge you to read the full story in the book Operation Cactus Recalled, which Colonel Thomas has written. And also, if you've liked this podcast, I'd like you to sort of like it and share it and subscribe to it. I'm Pavit Alua, on behalf of NISSMAT, saying thank you to all our listeners for listening in.

Thank you, and to you sir, thank you for writing the book.

Thank you very much. Thank you.