On November 10, 2025, at least 10 civilians were killed and another 32 injured when a slow-moving car exploded near the iconic Red Fort in Delhi. The explosion was the handiwork of a Terrorist module constituted of a group of doctors who had been radicalized.
What this session covered
This session takes the form of a dialogue between the host and a single guest, a retired Major General of the Indian Army with service in Jammu and Kashmir and in the Army's training establishments. The discussion was framed by a vehicle explosion near the Red Fort in Delhi in November, which the host described as having been officially characterised as a terrorist attack traced to organisations based in Pakistan. The speaker set out at the start that he would confine his remarks to the western sector rather than central or eastern India, and worked from the groups listed in the first schedule of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act. He distinguished three Khalistan-linked organisations, whose activity he described as now heavily restricted by policing in Punjab, from a set of externally supported groups including Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Hizbul Mujahideen and others, which he said operate under changed names to conceal identity and are supported by Pakistan's ISI.
A substantial part of the exchange concerned Jaish-e-Mohammed, described as founded in Karachi on 31 January 2000 and run largely as a family enterprise, with a women's wing under the founder's daughter and, according to recent reports cited by the speaker, an attempt to raise a women's cadre in India. He referred to continued fundraising through charities, front organisations and digital wallets despite sanctions, to the destruction of the group's Bahawalpur headquarters during Operation Sindoor in May 2025, and to indications that Nepal is being used as a transit route for infiltration. The two men then drew a working distinction between infiltrated modules, homegrown modules and sleeper cells: the first entering across the Line of Control with the help of guides and local support networks, the second rooted in local radicalisation and therefore harder to detect, and the third remaining dormant for long periods on need-to-know communication. The speaker noted that snow and improved surveillance suppress infiltration in winter, and both attributed the apparent shift towards pan-India activity in part to the abrogation of Article 370 and to economic and tourism growth in Jammu and Kashmir. The possible effect of instability in Bangladesh and Nepal, constitutional change in Pakistan, and the extradition to India of a co-accused in the 2008 Mumbai attacks case were each raised as factors that might prompt further reaction.
The later portion turned to materials and to radicalisation. The speaker described a case in which ricin was said to have been distilled from seeds bought on the open market, and the diversion of agricultural fertiliser for use as explosive, citing something in the order of 3,500 kg said to have been accumulated; both men argued that open sale of ammonium nitrate makes resource control difficult. On radicalisation, the speaker argued that clerics act as talent hunters who identify psychologically vulnerable individuals, including well-paid professionals, and that funds reach them from abroad through hawala and electronic wallets. The host qualified this by saying he would not label all madrasas in this way while accepting that radicalisation occurs in some places. The remedies canvassed included a stronger intelligence network, faster inter-agency communication, a unified database on sales of controlled materials, unified command and control, real-time monitoring, drone and UAV surveillance, community outreach and youth engagement, trust-building with local populations, and attention to anonymous reporting.
Key points raised
- The speaker limited his survey to the western sector and worked from organisations listed in the first schedule of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, separating Khalistan-linked groups, described as heavily constrained by policing in Punjab, from externally supported groups he said operate under changed names.
- A working distinction was drawn between infiltrated modules, homegrown modules and sleeper cells, with homegrown cells described as harder to detect because of local roots and personal networks, and sleeper cells as remaining dormant on need-to-know communication until activated.
- Infiltration across the Line of Control was described as seasonal, suppressed in winter by snow and by improved surveillance, with guides and local support networks assisting movement into populated areas during the summer.
- Jaish-e-Mohammed was discussed at length as a family-run organisation with continued fundraising through charities, front bodies and digital wallets, and with reported attempts to raise a women's cadre in India.
- Diversion of open-market materials was a recurring concern: ricin said to have been distilled from commercially available seeds, and agricultural fertiliser used as explosive, which both men argued calls for resource control and checks on bulk purchasers.
- Recommendations canvassed included faster inter-agency communication, a unified database and command structure, real-time monitoring, UAV surveillance, community outreach and youth engagement, and greater attention to anonymous reporting.
Session transcript
This transcript is auto-generated from the session recording and lightly edited for punctuation and readability; it may contain transcription errors. The video remains the authoritative record.
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Hello viewers, I'm S. Paul Singh, president of NISSMAT. Good morning. Good afternoon, good evening wherever you are. NISSMAT is a think tank organization and we bring before the viewers podcast on various important security, commercial, technical and day-to-day happenings. Today NISSMAT is bringing before you a dialogue protocol on main terrorist organization and terrorist modules operating in India.
Before the start of the dialogue, let me introduce you a main idea for where we got this that we should talk about. This module is about the Red Fort blast. That is a singular shock on 10th November where at least 10 civilians were killed there and then and another 32 were injured, some of them critically. A slow-moving car exploded near the iconic Red Fort in Delhi. After 2 days, after initial investigations, the government announced officially that this was a suicide blast or a terrorist attack. And government press release cleared that it was floated by some organizations based in Pakistan.
I like to recall that since 26/11 Mumbai terrorist attack in 2008 which killed 70 personnel including 44 civilians, a number of terrorist attacks have taken place since then, and the more important and alarming terrorist attacks which have taken place in India are the Pulwama attack, then the Pahalgam attack etc. These terrorism attacks have been backed and supported by terrorist organizations based outside India and have been executed by terrorist modules either after infiltration from across the border or by some terrorist groups we can call as homegrown terrorists who activated, or some of them activated the sleepers. We'll go into the details again. Today we shall discuss the terrorist organizations and terrorist modules operating in India.
With me I have Major General retired D.K. Maha who is a third generation officer of the army. He is a post-graduate in defense studies from Madras University. He has seen active operations in J&K both in counterinsurgency areas and along the line of border control. He commanded an infantry brigade during Ops Parakram also and a mountain brigade, mountain division. Subsequently, General Maha has had a very illustrious career in the army, and he also has been in appointment in the training establishment of the army wars college and the Indian military academy. I will now request General Maha to go ahead and give us elaborate details of these terrorist modules and the terrorist organization backing these modules. General Maha sir, please come.
Thank you sir. Thank you very much for saying a few words or good words about me. Now let me also introduce Mr. S. Paul Singh who is the president of NISSMAT. Mr. S. Paul Singh joined the central police service in 1962. He underwent the initial training in the central police training college at Mount Abu and also of the prestigious National Police Academy of Hyderabad where he completed his advanced police training. He has served as a senior police officer in a number of states. By virtue of his credible service, he was made responsible by the government of India to raise a new police force, the rapid action force, to deal with the communal riots and also appointed as the first chief of this allied force.
In recognition of his outstanding performance during the service, he was decorated with the president's police medal for distinguished service, Indian police medal for meritorious service, Indian police special duty medal with bar that he got it twice. He's also got an army award, that's the Sena medal, and a number of commendations and rewards thereafter. After retirement, he was conferred a prestigious award of the security personality of the year by the president of India in the global security conference. Presently he is advisor Asian professional security association India chapter, honorary director general association of the private security industry, the CAPSI central association of the private security industry India, and association of the private detectives and investigators India. Now sir, there's a few words on you sir.
Thank you very much. Please let us go with the description on terrorist modules.
Now sir, coming for the terrorist modules which are operating in India, sir I've only restricted myself to the western front, that is I'm not taking the central India, I'm not talking about the east India, I'll only restrict myself to the western part which is actually the trouble created as of now. So there are basically 10 groups which are operating which have been listed in the first schedule of Unlawful Activities Prevention Act. Three of them are Khalistan organizations. They are the Babbar Khalsa, Khalistan Commando Force, Khalistan Zindabad Force. These forces, yes they were there till the time some time back but now their activity is highly restricted because of the active police organization which is working in Punjab.
As far as foreign support terrorist groups are concerned, they are the LeT, they are the Hizbul, Islamic front. Now all these organizations they have made different names for themselves. They have to hide the identity when they are operating. For example, LeT has another name, JeM has another, Hizbul of course is there, then you had Al-Umar Mujahideen. So all these groups they have taken a different name altogether, this to hide the activity, and all these organizations which I'm talking of, other than the three Sikh organizations, they are all supported by the Pakistan ISI. The ISI has been carrying out large number of operations through LeT, JeM, and their boss is sitting in Karachi, Al-Qaeda and Harkat-ul-Jihad. So all these organizations basically which are operating are being supported by Pakistan and by the ISI.
Now JeM, reports have come that they are also raising a female group, a women group, and let's see how it comes up but yes one lady doctor who was caught lately around Delhi she apparently was the contact person for raising this women's group. Talking of Jaish Muhammad, Jaish Mohammad means army of Muhammad, was founded on 31st January 2000 in Karachi by Molana Masood Azhar, a radical cleric, a veteran of Afghan jihad. If you recollect he was also released by us in the Kandahar hijack which took place. He was released to get the passengers out of the place. The ideology and objective is to get Pak Kashmir out of India. This organization rooted in jihadism. Jaish Mohammad considers the liberation of Jammu and Kashmir from India as a religious obligation. Masood Azhar remained the JeM, his exact whereabouts now after Op Sindoor is not known, apparently he's ill and he's somewhere around Gilgit Baltistan area but he's under the protection of ISI.
Center leadership and structure, of course you are explaining Masood Azhar who is the main architect of this JeM. I understand the JeM operates as a family sort of run enterprise.
This is a family enterprise and women wing Mohammad Mina that is led by Azhar's daughter and engineering radicalization and other recruitment etc is by and large under the control of other individual who is also very close to Azhar.
What I am trying to emphasize sir is that this is sort of family-run leadership and organization, and go ahead further, they have got very —
Yes sir.
If you can mention that their roots are coming into India, this women group which is being formed, Dr. Shaheen who has been apprehended just about a week, 10 days back. She was the one who was tasked to raise the women force in India. And if you see this group has been very active. In 2019, the Pulwama suicide bombing attack where 40 CRPF personnel were triggered and this resulted in the Balakot strike by us. In 2025 as you had mentioned sir, this group was responsible for killing 26 Hindu tourists in Pahalgam.
Yeah, which resulted in our Operation Sindoor. Quite right. Go ahead sir.
Yes sir. So now despite global sanctions JeM is still continuing to raise funds through the charities and front organizations such as Al-Rehmat trust. Now they have come on to digital fundraising via apps like Easypaisa and SadaPay donations and foreign funding estimated to be around 14 million.
Is it 25?
Very now going in for funding based on electronic wallet so it cannot be caught anyway.
Okay. So that's how the funding goes by. So you talk about the recent developments.
In the recent developments which have taken place, I would like to emphasize here the JeM operations in Pahalgam etc resulted in a very strong reaction from the government of India. On May 2025 as we remember India's Operation Sindoor destroyed the JeM's Bahawalpur headquarters. A number of places were destroyed there. Number of hideouts were destroyed there. And again in July 2025, intelligence indicated that JeM is using Nepal as a transit route for cross-border infiltration and creating problems in India through their modules. In September 2025 again JeM commander admitted that there have been some campuses and army has not saved us. Even they said they have betrayed their own army. So they have been having frustration as far as the attack and restriction of their places or hiding places in Bahawalpur was concerned. So therefore the sense of frustration is leading sometimes to infiltration of more insurgents inside and creating more problems for India.
Let us understand how these modules operate in India in the vocabulary of modern security studies. Terrorism is not in a single uniform shape. It emerges from different soils, different motivations and sources of inspirations. Some groups are nurtured externally. Then they are pushed across the border and they start operating in India. Others take roots quietly within the country in which they have to operate, say in India. These internally rooted modules can be also termed as homegrown terrorist modules.
Correct sir. The homegrown terror modules they have the cells usually consisting of individuals radicalized through their local network, radicalized in India wherever they're operating, and this means that the detection of these modules becomes difficult, because there are local people who are involved with this. They receive structured sort of support from the hostile external entities as in this case the JeM was there externally but they were homegrown by and large as far as the recent Red Fort blast is concerned. Their goal is often to destabilize through strategic violence here and there. But this country in which they are operating, homegrown cells are actually driven by internal influences as I told you and the recruitment also depends on the personal network and emotional bonds which they are created in the local population.
Correct sir. Homegrown cells again grow silently and almost invisibly and their familiarity with the local terrain, the local population, the local roots gives them the advantage to these modules and again these are actually sustained. They are at least sustained as I told you by cross-border infrastructure also. Though they are homegrown modules but the sustainers come from outside. Funding is from outside but they grow in the country itself in the area in which they operate, the roots they have known, the people they have known, emotional bonds they have created with them. So it becomes very difficult for time to bust these modules.
By definition there are certain modules which come from the border area. They are the outside modules. I like to, Janab sahab, you may describe, elaborate that broadbased groups how they rely on infiltration routes. What are the infiltration routes and how they come in from outside? I've talked about the homegrown but how are they infiltrating, the other broadbased other modules?
Right sir. As far as the line of control is concerned it's all along the hills. Now basically what we have been seeing in the past is the major infiltration used to take place during the summers but when the winter comes in and the snow sets in the infiltration reduces, it goes very very small. Because when the infiltrating parties come, the trail is seen on the snow. Besides that we have a very effective surveillance system now making it that much more difficult for the infiltrators to come from the Pakistan side. The latest report of course was saying that about 150 terrorists have been collected in the various staging areas to be infiltrated. But if the people come in now in the winter season when the snow is set, bulk of them are going to be caught or killed. Last encounter which took place out of 11 chaps who were trying to get in, five chaps were killed and rest ran back into Pakistan.
So the snow factor becomes a sort of a hindrance for infiltration from the west. And actually when they infiltrate in the summers they have guides to help them come in. These guides take them to various habitations where they get support. So sir go ahead go ahead. Sorry.
So basically this infiltration into these winters is curbed because of the snow factor, it'll come up but once they infiltrate into our side in the summers they get into populated areas where they have underground and overground workers to help them to reach further depth towards the Chenab side or whatever the side they've been discussing.
Now what was the reason, that would come into my mind, what was the reason?
Yeah.
Why Pakistan and ISI is going pan India? Like for example lately a group of doctors who were earning up to four lakhs a month —
Yeah.
They got involved in radic, like to become radicals. I feel sir why they are going pan India, as you talked about the homegrown terrorists, you see article 370 was a big hit as far as the Pakistanis are concerned —
Quite right, that has created another frustration, abrogation of article 370.
And that has created another sort of, you know, frustration in them and therefore their reaction. Go ahead. Yes, you're right. Yes.
Second aspect what I feel after this application of 370, the economic growth of J&K of our side of Jammu and Kashmir has gone multifold. There's tourism, there is trade. The large number of tourists which have been visiting our part of J&K. So that, and when they compare our side to their own side in Baltistan and PoK there are a lot of difference between the two. So it causes frustration there also. So there they feel that the chances of operations in J&K reduced tremendously. Do they want to go pan India?
As you have already corrected, some alternate routes which they were using and particularly PoK nationals who were apprehended some time back in the process of infiltration from Nepal probably involved in the narcotic drugs also. I think that also led to this sort of frustration that their evil designs are being strongly met by the government of India and agencies.
Absolutely. Absolutely.
What we have to be a little careful now, of course the western side as far as the line of control is concerned is well protected under heavy surveillance. That is what, as you brought out, people they are trying to find alternate routes to come in. Nepal is one, lately about a month back three chaps of JeM were caught infiltrating from Nepal. What you have to be careful now with a close association between Pakistan, ISI and Bangladesh.
Quite right. Yes.
What do you say, your reaction? Bangladesh also and Nepal also are now in turbulence. It is I think likely to give a further vent to the terrorist modules or terrorist organizations in India. And then on top of it you see that after this the Pakistan amendment of constitution is giving lot of, you know, fillip to the Islamic organization particularly with the man himself being a very strong pro-Islamic and sort of supporter of ISI at one time because he was leading the ISI. So do you think that these two three factors like Bangladesh, Nepal, and then the constitutional amendment in Pakistan is also going to give fillip to the terrorist modules and organization who are operating in India?
Absolutely sir. You were talking about the homegrown modules and sleeper cells. The fact that large number of people from Bangladesh and the Rohingya who have come into India, a very large number, and they're pan India.
Yeah. Yeah.
They have to be kept under check because they could be exploited for nefarious activities in India.
You are right because it is another problem, you know, because they operate in almost a camp, they have got entrenched camps in Bangladesh and their operation on the borders of India, their camps, I mean their activities being on the borders of India is a point of worry for India also. I like to tell the viewers the terrorist modules and sleeper cells. Sometime you use the word terrorist module, sometime, let me elaborate on that and let me clarify this point. The terrorist modules are actually small operational groups as we earlier discussed who are trained to execute attacks, while the sleeper cells are dormant network. These dormant network that stay inactive for a long duration sometime. The sleeper cell is there. They are of course ultimately going to get into modules but the sleeper cells, their network is like that, they stay inactive for very long periods and activate as and when required, maybe as and when required by those modules, maybe as and when required by the infiltrating modules or with the homegrown modules, but the difference is the sleeper cells normally operate through isolated units and they use need-to-know communication, they don't go ahead with all communication, only the sleepers has only very limited need-to-know communication and remain, as I told you, inactive for years. Therefore the reason is there for us, worry is there, that we have to find out the sleeper cells, the modules, homegrown modules and the infiltrated modules, you know these are the very very slight, high distinction. The infiltrated modules also come into India and operate. They have been infiltrated across the border. The homegrown modules also, they have got alignment with the terrorist organization outside, and the sleeper cells. So therefore sleeper cells become as I told you active as and when desired and they remain silent for a long time. So we, the internal security forces in India have to keep vigil because the sleeper cell can become potential at one time that we are looking after the modules and all of a sudden some sleeper cell becomes active. So these are some points which have to be kept in view.
General Maha, will you please explain how the geographic and demographic challenges are faced by India as far as these terrorist modules are concerned?
Yes sir. As I mentioned earlier, as long as the line of control is concerned it's all along the mountainous region other than in the south, say Akhnoor area and little beyond that, no sir, by and large the complete line of control is a hilly sector, it has got heavy vegetation of pines and deodar, so infiltration becomes that much simpler because of the vegetation which is there but with our surveillance system that we have it is becoming that much more difficult for them to come in. Then second aspect is that the population centers are not very far from the line of control towards our side.
Oh.
So when these people infiltrate they have guides to get them in and they come into the populated areas and merge with the population there and thereafter, after some rest and refit, then they go to the various areas where they are told to go for the operation sir. So it is becoming that much more difficult for them along the line of control.
I'd like you to elaborate, nowadays after this particular operation, Red Fort blast, a lot of things, a lot of ways are being termed bioterrorism, they're calling it bioterrorism. How do you define that, how do you explain actually bioterrorism, only in terms of use of certain material and that material may be called a biological material or something? So therefore what is your explanation about it?
Absolutely sir. You see the group of doctors which have been caught lately, there is one person who was making ricin out of the product which is available in the market and he made a small distillery to take out the ricin and it's a very potent poison. There is no antidote to this ricin as such even today. Now the other chaps who are in this university and who are teaching in the university and doctors, they have been picking up fertilizers which can be utilized as explosive. What was done in Red Fort was a fertilizer.
But sir, the sale of this nitrate, open nitrate open sale, I mean is also a point which is a worrying point because actually it's a fertilizer and is used by the farmers and therefore they get it under the name of some farmer etc and then there's no such very strong checks on the sale of certain quantities of ammonium nitrate. Will you please go ahead with that?
Sir, these chaps had collected something like 3,500 kgs of this fertilizer. That means this was going all over India or maybe certain parts of India as an explosive. There has to be a resource control. You see, imagine ricin being produced by the seeds which are procured from the market. Anyone can buy the seeds. What about the fertilizer? The doctors going and buying fertilizer when they have no reason to be doing so. They're teaching in the university. That means the trader is not even checked up who's buying them.
Quite right. They are just selling in a very small farmer's name or something and just because it is openly sold, and you know this is sold openly for the fertilizers but there are certain limitations, certain laid down rules etc, and it's very, because it's such a widespread, you know, fertilizer used everywhere, they're very difficult to keep a check as to who is selling how much and who is taking it. I mean you are not going to identify everyone who comes and takes this say five kg and they go on taking and accumulating. You are right, that is a very difficult process. So there's what is required, I feel sir, that there is a very strong intelligence network required to be operated by us particularly to keep a check on such, so that the idea that they are having a sort of faster inter-agency communication in their case, that is not there. We can have intelligence network. We can have faster inter-agency communication with each other. If somebody finds something, he should immediately communicate to the other agency. Or if the police find, to tell the NIA, all the agencies which are operating, they need to have a very faster inter-agency communication with such a thing in case they come to know, because unless we have got very strong intelligence network, very very strong intelligence communication and then another one, there has to be some unified database as to where they are selling and how they are selling and who is selling. And then the other point is that after collection of this intelligence which is peaceful intelligence coming, it has to go to some unified command control so that they are able to get into that and find out as to how they are operating and whether there is somebody at the back of it or just a farmer.
Then in addition to these points which are concerning for the internal agencies, then security agencies, intelligence, I think there has to be a very strong community outreach. We have to create a sense of community outreach. People who are staying close to it and if they smell that something is going wrong they should immediately try to communicate with the local agencies, local police, otherwise they can't know, there are welfare stations, there are so many things, home houses, so this community outreach has to be there. Then I am of the view that the youth engagement is to be accelerated in these cases so that they are able to keep a check. Of course as you said the strengthening border security and coastal surveillance is also there. Then I feel sir that nowadays the drones are being used for various reason, why not start operating drones also in a way that they're able to get some intelligence and able to crack. I don't know how it should be done technically.
It is being done sir. The troops are deployed in the land of patrol. They are using these drones or UAV for intelligence purposes and a lot of patrolling is being done by these UAVs.
Sir actually then it means that actually what I am trying to emphasize is there has to be a real time monitoring system. Unless we monitor it at the right time, they will create much more nuisance in our country, and community policing and local intelligence have to be generated, have to be created, have to be coordinated. Building trust with the local population is more important because our local population sometime doesn't rely on the intelligence agency or police that they will do this thing or not. So the trust has to be built in, your information is valued by us, and we'll go into detail. So I am of the view that number of things are required to be done, so that even, I am of the view that even encourage anonymous reporting, if there are certain anonymous reports we can just try to find out. Invariably anonymous reports are not attended to but sometime the local population doesn't want to reveal it, even anonymous reports we should pay attention so that we are able to check these modules etc.
Now we referred, you know, earlier, I'd like to say a few words about 26/11 and this was a very very defining event in Bombay and because of the enormity of the attack where about 106 people including civilian and police authorities, police people and security forces were killed, this event was very important event at that point of time. And the people who were main, of course in addition to JeM and all, we took all action which is required, the foreign people who were operating there were headed, who confirmed during his interrogation in USA that ISI directorate and elements in Pakistan's army coordinated with the LeT, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and other Pakistani terrorist organization. Headley was arrested somewhere in probably October 2009 and after that he was arrested at the airport in Chicago somewhere and after that he was convicted for a good about 35 years in prison. Headley went for five years in prison for federal crimes because certain Americans were also killed in this attack. So it was, he had related his role which was proved and he was given punishment 35 years. But the other friend of him, that is Tahawwur Hassan Rana, Rana Tahawwur Rana, he continued to escape the gallows some or the other on one reason or the other. Then Indian government ultimately requested his extradition from America because he couldn't be convicted there, so the extradition finally came through after lot of difficulties when Rana has exhausted all his legal avenues in America. Extradition has come through and Rana's extradition in India is now confirmed that it has been, but this is a significant event in the trajectory of security justice, is a very significant one, is extradition after so many years.
And I am of the view, why I'm referring to this is that his extradition order may give fillip to the terrorist modules and groups operating under JeM because he was a very strong man, strong agent of the JeM, and in view of his release plus as you mentioned Operation Sindoor where we, as I also mentioned, where lot of structures of JeM and Bahawalpur were destroyed. I think that sort of frustration and reaction is likely to be seen in the near future. I think we have to be very careful because of these two particularly. Am I referring to this, this extradition is true almost and ultimately they know that Rana will be convicted in India after some time and may go to gallows. I am of the view that these events plus what we have discussed earlier, that certain events, certain happenings in Bangladesh, happening in Nepal, amendment of constitution, extradition of Rana etc, as I told you this is likely to give fillip to the terror organization, they like to some other react, and therefore we have to be very very careful about. And will you like to say about the radicalization by certain?
Yes sir. I have a few words on this sir since you have brought up the sleeper cells and homegrown terrorism. My views are based on this various reports which have come in the recent past. This radicalization is basically being done by the clerics in most of the cases. I will call them talent hunters. They find people who are psychologically weak and they hold onto them.
Yeah.
Take the example of these doctors who are doing well and who are teaching and earning well. They apparently were psychologically brainwashed. And these sort of people who are brainwashed they start increasing the numbers by their radicalized views. As far as the money is concerned, the money flows from abroad by Hawala and also by e-wallet, like when the locker of one of the doctors opened I think they found about 3.5 lakh rupees in that. Wow. Lot. Where the money come from, money's come from abroad. And it's also been seen for example this chap who blew himself up at the Red Fort, he had gone to Turkey. Bulk of these chaps are being paid for by some foreign agency to go to a foreign country and meet the handlers and then they start communicating with the handlers. Imagine this handler, I'm sure he couldn't be a Turk. He has to be from Pakistan who has gone and met this chap in Turkey and he became his handler. So this radicalized person, I feel sir the educational institutions they have a very major role to play, the organization with the people to find out who are the psychologically weak links who could be radicalized, and clerics in particular have to be kept in check sir.
Sir, the radicalization as rightly pointed, most of the madrasas somehow or the other are associated and they may not be teaching them as sort of to become terrorists. I will not like to label all the madrasas like that but there are certain places where this sort of radicalization does come in and as you say they are psychological weak persons and they come under the ambit and the control of their sort of moulvi and all and they start —
Absolutely. Absolutely.
And then this, you know, there's their weakness, psychological weakness, plus as you rightly said the flow of abundant funds from abroad either through Hawala or through certain other, nowadays e-wallet has also come into operation, so therefore the flow of fund also is important. And third, as we mentioned earlier there is a little bit of more coordinated intelligence and community policing sort of is required because otherwise they are going to be, they are constant in the body of India, India's environment, there all the time, we are always saying this place, that place, somewhere something is happening and it creates some sort of worry in the minds of law abiding citizens, you know those who are close by, they are killed unnecessarily without any reason or rhyme because the idea is not, the radical doesn't think as he's killing, the radical, another radical group or he is killing the civilian. The more the civilians are killed the more sort of popularity these homegrown modules get. So under these circumstances as you rightly pointed out that lot of points which have been considered by all of us particularly the government organizations as well as by the citizen so that we are able to keep check on these modules, and you may please conclude and thank the viewers.
Correct sir.
You may please thank the viewers and close up discussion.
Thank you sir. Thanks for getting me onto this. Thank you very much sir.
Thank you Janab, and thank you viewers for watching and listening to our discussion. We'll continue with such subjects, such sensitive subjects in our future podcast also. Thank you very much indeed. Thanks.
Thank you sir. Thanks. Thanks.
