New Afghanistan Govt. – Difficulties in buying peace by India

Hello, this is C. Pal Singh, President, NISSMAT. A very good evening, and thank you all for joining us at NISSMAT interactive session. Today we have conducted so far 129 webinars, and these webinars, minimum two scholars participate in session. We have also conducted by now seven interactive sessions where one scholar addresses the audience and responds to their queries, and these interactive sessions only by one speaker. Today we are having our eighth interactive session on New Afghanistan Government - Difficulties in Buying Peace by India. This session is being addressed by Dr. Sahni, who will introduce to you by the moderator of the session.

I extend hearty welcome to our eminent and very learned speaker Dr. Sahni. Thank you very much, sir, for having accepted our invitation. I'm sure that all of us will learn a lot from these deliberations and would carry home many problems and many points to deliberate on.

Let me introduce NISSMAT in a few words. NISSMAT was established in the year 1990, about 30 years back. Started training in private security, and gradually it started training also for the — excuse me — it also started training for the ex-defence person for their absorption in the private sector. Now NISSMAT has aspired to become a foremost cardboard training institution globally and a think tank organization, and in this process we have divided this within four forums. Versus this book forum as such, fourth segment, I recorded this with forum is one segment to organize webinars, seminars, conferences, interactive sessions, debates and awards. NISSMAT education is the second segment, where we are conducting virtual training programs, assessments and certification. Then we have got NISSMAT enterprise, where we propose to undertake global audits and verification and establish international partnership and alliances. NISSMAT foundation ultimately shall undertake welfare and social work for the society at large, with particular reference to the security and safety subject.

A few words about the chairman of NISSMAT and moderator of successor, that is Captain Pawanjit Ahluwalia. He took voluntary retirement from Parachute Regiment of Indian Army and at a very young age started his second career in business. He is really very warm and very calm person. He also has that capability to bring out the best in the other people, here almost an internal sizing to find out the silver lining in any situation, courage of conviction, thoughtfulness, inspiring leader. He has created a business group under the name of Ahluwalia holding company. With his continuous hard work, risk-taking attitude and ability, and at times of course learning from pitfalls, he has grown and achieved the position of prominence in the business world. He is the past president and former chairman of Council of International Investigators, USA, and is in the body of Malcolm Thompson Award and Kotalia Award by this council. Shri Pawanjit shall moderate the subject — said moderate the session, I'm sorry.

Introduction of the subject. Now I'll say a few words for the subject, that is the New Afghanistan Government, Difficulties in Buying Peace. I'll introduce the subject, a few words. As far as our knowledge goes, India and Afghanistan once had a very strong historical and cultural relationship. The exchanges between people to people used to take place frequently. Afghan musicians had been inspired and trained in Patiala gharana and shared a cultural heritage with India. Despite all the refugees of international warfare or interferenced by some superpowers, Afghanistan for the last many years, despite the activities of ISI supporting Talibans and radicals and reduction of radical groups of Pakistan, continue to keep its place and importance. Despite training and raising of Talibans and Haqqani groups in madrasas of Pakistan to create problems in India and to contain India's influence in foreign, they still continue to maintain good relations with us under the President Hamid Karzai.

The present Taliban government now is a little different cup of tea. I mean, it forces to be — it is supporting Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan in a way, and some frontal attacks on Pakistan-backed forces in the tribal belt. They are also given a thrust to that. The present propaganda by the two groups of the new government of Afghanistan is a common ideology — that's very interesting — and slamming Pakistan deep state as an enemy of Islam. That is what they say. But ever since the fall of Kabul, the Talibans have been finding it difficult to rule Afghanistan the way it had bragged earlier. As this is a very factor for us also that still some harsh points continue to govern the present government as women are concerned, as far as religious minorities are.

Sir, Pakistan is also continuing simultaneously its proxy war and campaign in certain areas like province where, you know, off and on skirmishes are going on. The area affected by this campaign are mostly confined to the eastern forus. India has earlier invested huge amount of money in creating new infrastructures, in creating highways, Parliament House, schools, colleges and hospitals. Should it continue the same way? The question is, should we continue the same way? India's role and importance for Afghanistan had earlier caused irritation and annoyance to Pakistan, as Pakistan influence was gradually declining. Pakistan shall not like India's influence to increase further.

At the same time, the new Afghanistan government has started saying that we are going to have good bilateral relation between India and Afghanistan. Even the new government has come with the legitimacy provided to the new government by United States of America, which is exposed to India's good ally. Pakistan has also defined a new government in Afghanistan as now Afghanistan. Now, however, is there — Afghanistan is yet to be determined, yet to be seen. On the ground, very little seems to have changed. The apprehensions, the doubts about freedom and rights of citizens of Afghanistan under the new government in Kabul continue to remain. Utterances by some leaders of the present dispensation, as well as statements made by leaders of the Haqqani group, the new Afghan government will have policy of non-interference on Kashmir issue — very important — has been received well by the Government of India so far. But India also cannot simply overlook the old deep ties between Taliban radicals and Pakistan military establishment at one time. It needs to be watched, it needs to be seen, it needs to be weighed with lot of care if the attitude of the present new Afghan government would really mean independence from the influence of ISI or Pakistan.

Secondly, India cannot let down its thoughts about the security concerns to India, keeping in view the earlier activities of ISI at tandem with the radical Taliban groups and indulgent proxy war in India. There are some radical elements present in Afghanistan today which are still being supported by ISI of Pakistan. Though what happens in the times to come supposed to be in the hands of the new Afghan government, yet it has to be kept in mind by us, that is defined by India, that the Taliban factor supported by ISI cannot be completely ignored. India has a hard bargain to buy peace with new Afghanistan government. Earlier also the absence of earlier patterns of America had made Indian interests a little safe at that time. Today the position is different because the American allies are not there. Pakistan may continue to activate its Haqqani groups. Pakistan may continue to have some counter measures to reduce the interests of India. And the grouping of China, Pak, Afghanistan could be exploited by employing insurgent Taliban for geopolitical dominance in this area.

In view of these developments, India may have to design its own policy. It may have to charter out its own course to keep continuous relations with Afghanistan. India would have to move cautiously to watch and see that the new Afghan government, though professional policies, are actually followed in letter and spirit. Possible action by India could be continuing humanitarian aid and assistance. Also it could be that within the countries bordering Afghanistan we should have good relation, and they could also face problems from Taliban and ISI in times to come. Further, the Islamic Emirates could soon start behaving like an ISI-style caliphate, emulating Syria, Africa based terrorist group. These are the dangers which loom large on the horizon today. It has to be the policy, and that the steps to be taken have very well modulated, very well structured, very well thought out. And we have today with us Dr. Sahni, who is exceedingly, as I know personally, exceedingly good and a very learned speaker as well as these subjects are concerned. With these words I pass on the session to Captain Ahluwalia for moderating the session now onward. Thank you very much.

Thank you very much, Mr. President. Before I start, I'd like to acknowledge that we are at the moment streaming live on YouTube as well as on Zoom, and we have participants registered from the following countries: India, UAE, USA, UK, British Guyana, Singapore, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Monaco and Zambia. The sponsors for the evening today are Premier Consulting and Investigations Private Limited, which is a background and general investigations company; Fema Shield Private Limited, which is a security guards and manpower solutions company. It's also supported by India Skills Private Limited, which is a assessment agency for the Government of India; JMD Cargo, a logistics company; and Tag Scores, which is an assessments platform.

Our president, Mr. C. Pal Singh, is a Masters in English Literature. He served the Government of India in very senior police assignments. He raised the Rapid Action Force and also was its first chief. He also raised the Internal Security Academy in Mount Abu, Rajasthan. During his service he has been decorated with every conceivable medal that the police services can offer, including the Sena Medal by the Army for his service during the terrorist activities in Punjab. Post retirement he's worked as a consultant with Disco and was assigned the responsibility to streamline the security and vigilance matters in the coal field divisions of Disco. He was also the chairman of the technical committee of Quality Control of India, which formulated the standards for the star rating of private security companies. He was involved in developing the curriculum for private security guards training under the security sector and Security Sector Development Council. He was the head of the committee we designed and worked out national occupation standards for the private security guards and the firefighters. Post retirement he was awarded by the President of India in 2009 as the Security Personality of the Year. He is a current adviser to the Asian Professional Security Association, the Indian chapter, and is the Honorary Director General to CAPSI, which is the centralization of private security industry, and the association of private detectives and investigators. Mr. C. Pal Singh's face is well known in India as a dynamic security professional and is frequently called to share his views on various subjects to homeland security on national news channels.

I now have the distinct privilege and honor to introduce Dr. Ajai Sahni. Dr. Ajai Sahni is the Executive Director of the Institute for Conflict Management, the South Asia Terrorism Portal and Khalistan Extremism Monitor. He is publisher and editor of the South Asia Intelligence Review, Fault Lines: a KPS Gill Journal of Conflict and Resolution, and Second Sight. He's also the project director for IMPACT. He served as a member of the Madhukar Gupta Committee on the restructuring of the Ministry of Home Affairs and is presently a member of the Police Modernization and Strengthening Committee of Uttar Pradesh. He has researched and written extensively on issues relating to conflict, politics and development in South Asia. He has participated in advisory projects undertaken for various national and state governments. He jointly with Mr. KPS Gill edited the Terror and Containment: Perspectives on India's Internal Security, The Global Threat of Terror: Ideological, Material and Political Linkages, and separately The Fragility of Order: Essays in Honour of KPS Gill. He has lectured at numerous professional institutions and appears frequently as an expert on terrorism and insurgency in the electronic and print media in India and internationally. Ladies and gentlemen, I present to you Dr. Ajai Sahni.

Thank you, Mr. Ahluwalia. Thank you, Mr. Singh, for your earlier comments. I think I would like to start with the whole idea of buying peace. You were very correct when you said that India has made significant investments in Afghanistan during the preceding regime, the Ghani regime and the Karzai regimes there, over time building very, very important infrastructure projects. It won India, I think, tremendous popularity in a country where the Indian identity is already extremely strong among the people. Unfortunately, we must understand the difficulties of buying peace, particularly in a conflict region where religious identity and religious ideology are the defining factors. Today this is not a contest for popularity among the people of Afghanistan. It is a question of how do we deal with the Taliban regime.

We must understand that the United States put in more than 1.2 trillion in developmental aid, apart from its military expenditure there, and it still failed to buy peace or buy the loyalty of a sufficient number of, shall we say, critical elements, armed groupings in Afghanistan, and certainly it received no respect and no concession from the Taliban itself. So one, the idea of buying peace is, I think, a little unrealistic. The second thing is, in terms of our own objectives and intentions, who do you want to buy peace with? This is a question that India must first answer before it sets out to buy peace. Are we trying to buy peace — first of all, who are you buying peace for? Are you buying peace for Afghanistan? Are you buying peace for India versus Afghanistan? Are you trying to buy peace for Jammu and Kashmir, to ensure that there is no intervention or interference by Afghan Taliban there?

Now, as far as if we are trying to buy peace for Jammu and Kashmir, my answer is very simple: that Arabs and Afghans and all these groupings from the global terrorist networks have no real capacities to intervene on Indian soil. They have been trying for decades. Al-Qaeda has been trying since 1996. Since 2014 the Islamic State has been trying. They have not even got a toehold in India. I do not believe that the Afghan Taliban has the intention, number one, or the capacity to actually significantly intervene on Indian soil. For that you need the Pakistanis. There is a cultural factor — they can mix in, they can meld into our populations, and therefore they are the real threat, and they are the ones who have the sustained sense of enmity with India. The Afghans and the Taliban itself is indifferent to India. The only idea they have is, all right, these are kafirs, we are unbelievers. So that is their only problem with us. But I don't think the Taliban itself has shown any intention to propagate a global Islam. They are more concerned with their own country and will remain in a crisis for many, many, many years to come. They are not in a position even to control the country itself.

Then who do you want to buy peace with? Do you really want to buy peace with Taliban? This is a question you must first answer. Have we accepted Taliban rule? Is it a reality, and will it remain a reality for 5 years, 7 years, 50 years? Do we want it to remain a reality for this period? Or do we prefer to buy — not buy, but establish a situation where we can have an arrangement with the National Resistance Force, which seems to be negligible today. But 20 years ago, after the Americans came into Afghanistan, the Taliban was not an existing force. They had disappeared from the ground. They were all in Pakistan. So we have a proclivity in this country to accept the situation as given. Whatever is there, we have to deal with this, and we cannot look at any options beyond what exists. We don't think of creating options. There are certain existence — there is already in Afghanistan today a wide range of possibilities. I will go through some of them. But more importantly, new possibilities can be evolved. But what is required for that is strategic will, strategic focus and persistence.

If you keep jumping — oh, now the Americans are in charge; now it is a Karzai government; now it is a Ghani government; now it is a Taliban administration; now we have to deal with this — then, you see, there is this wonderful line which says: if you have no strategy, you will always be part of somebody else's strategy. And this has been the unfortunate reality of everything India has done, not only in Afghanistan but everywhere in the world. We have no strategy. We have no persistence. We have no focus. And we do not have a strategic perspective, level on strategic will. Strategic will comes after a strategic perspective. So what we have to decide first and foremost is that there must be, in what we are choosing to do, strategic clarity. We must define our goals. We must define the resources we are able to commit to those goals, and then we must evolve rational, reality-based steps, strategies and tactics to secure those goals. Not next week, not next month. There will always be situations to which we have to react. There is a humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan; we are sending aid — that is not in contest. But what is our long-term goal in Afghanistan, and how are we going to pursue that long-term goal?

Then we must also understand very crucially that we are living in an environment of global insecurity, global uncertainty. Very minor players are today intervening, punching much above their weight. Pakistan is a case in point. You have Turkey. You have the strongest nations in the world today, the coalition, the NATO, being challenged by Russia. You have the prospect tomorrow of NATO and the global powers, including Asian powers of which we are in a loose coalition as well, being challenged by China. So nothing is given. Global power equations today are completely unsettled. This is a very difficult situation on the one hand. It is also, if you choose and if you have clarity, a situation in which multiple opportunities exist.

Now let us come to Afghanistan as the conditions are and what are the opportunities in it. First, please understand that there is a steady rise in violence within Afghanistan — of course, nowhere compared to what was happening in the period when the Americans were there, where you used to have deaths in the thousands every month. Today, in January this year, we had 151 fatalities. This was up from 56 fatalities, 46 fatalities last year in December. So this is more than a three-fold rise in fatalities in one month. We have an increasing activity of the National Resistance Front on the one hand and of the Islamic State on the other. The National Resistance Front actually accounted for 69 of these 151 fatalities this year — this month, sorry, in January. You had just more and more activity by the National Resistance Front across Balkh, Panjshir and Baghlan. Islamic State is largely confined to activities in the south and in Kabul, but they are constantly growing in, at least, the lethality of their operations. More importantly, the spring offensive has been announced by them, which means that there is definitely a planned escalation. Whether it materializes or not depends, but I would be fairly certain that there will be a significant escalation of violence by them.

At an ideological level, the Islamic State has condemned the Taliban as a traitor to the cause. They describe the Taliban as opportunists who have negotiated with the enemies of Islam simply because of their ambitions, of their desire to secure power. So we have got a situation where the Taliban is not managing, number one, to eliminate these enemy groups, which are still incipient, which are very small. But you must understand that the National Resistance Front had been completely routed within weeks after the Taliban took over in September, October, and everybody just gave up on the National Resistance Front. But they are back again. They are operating at least in three provinces, and so we have to see where this goes. The situation, as I said, is not a given.

You must also understand that there are regular intra-Taliban clashes, and these are based on ethnicity. The Afghan population is not a given and uniform whole. Everyone actually thinks Afghan means Pashtun, but the Pashtuns are only 42 percent of the population. The others are there — the Hazaras are there, the Uzbeks are there, the Tajiks are there. These are the three other major groups, and there are other much smaller groups. So have they all accepted Taliban rule willingly, or has the Taliban stepped into a vacuum left behind by the flight of the Americans? So again, you have got many intra-Taliban clashes. More than about 20 people were killed just in the last one month, and this is the kind of thing that is happening all the time. So we shouldn't look at the Taliban as a single, unified, monolithic entity. The Taliban itself is driven by tribal and regional contestations and personal, shall we say, ambitions of many of its prominent leaders.

There is, of course, a tremendous crisis at the level of humanitarian needs. Half the population, by some estimates, of Afghanistan is only living on the very edge of starvation today. The Taliban is failing to govern, and if this failure persists, there will be a time when desperation will overwhelm fear. The Taliban at its peak had only 70-odd thousand people in its armed cadres. So the question is that there may be a point of time where, if they are not able to establish some measure of order, they will be overwhelmed by the growing dissatisfaction, the growing dissension and the growing desperation of the population.

India does have — I think Mr. C. Pal Singh very significantly pointed out India's cultural and India's past record in Afghanistan — and we very certainly do have some strengths there. The conditions locally are extremely unstable. The country's future is uncertain. We have what we could call the emergence of conditions of savagery, where the state does not actually control any significant power except by extreme threat, violence and brutal punishment. So in this situation we will see more and more opportunities growing. But to take advantage of those opportunities, the first questions I raised: whose side are you on? What is the outcome you seek? What are your goals in Afghanistan? Unless we answer these questions first, and then pursue their direction in the long term, we will fail.

Now let's come to Pakistan. Without question, Pakistan has supported Taliban through all these decades, not just years, and the Taliban, one would believe, would be very grateful for this. But if you speak to people, including much earlier, people connected with the Taliban, even when they were completely dependent on Pakistan, most Taliban groups, other than the Haqqani network, do not have a very high regard for Pakistan. Many of them have expressed open hatred for the manipulation of the Taliban and the conditions that have been created in Afghanistan, often as a result of Pakistani mischief. Already we see clashes all along the Durand Line. First of all, the Durand Line has never been accepted by any government in Afghanistan, including the last Taliban regime. And today we already have clashes all along the Durand Line over the fencing of the border, and a reiteration again and again that we do not accept the Durand Line as the legitimate border between Afghanistan and Pakistan; we claim all the Pashtun areas of Pakistan.

Now we come to the Taliban-Pakistan. The Pakistanis have repeatedly been saying this, that the TTP is launching terrorist attacks into Pakistan. In November-December last, there was a ceasefire announced by the TTP, and very interestingly, it was a ceasefire mediated by the Taliban. It broke down after one month, on December 9, because, the TTP said, the Pakistan Army has not honored its commitments to us. But the point is, it broke down, and the TTP continues to operate from Afghanistan into Pakistan. So let us not believe that this compact between the Taliban and Pakistan and the ISI is a very healthy and enduring compact. It is a fragile compact.

You must also understand one very, very important thing. There is this mythology that has been created, that was reiterated by the entire West: the Afghans have never been conquered. And when they say Afghans, they always mean Pashtuns. Please understand that nearly half of Pashtun territory was ceded to the British Empire and was inherited by the successor state, which is Pakistan. It is still in Pakistan. That while the Pakhtun population in Afghanistan is about 15 million people, the Pakhtun population in Pakistan is more than 40-odd million, and they seek unification. They seek unification. Now the question is, where do we stand on this? What do we do about it? I am not in favor of the Pakistani strategy of arming anti-state groupings and creating chaos and mayhem and murderous sort of movements like the TTP or any of these other groupings that have come into existence, or like the Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, which have been directed against us. But where is the problem in globally projecting the unification of the Pakhtun areas on both sides of the Durand Line as a movement for the freedom of a conquered people? So here is an opportunity. Here is a direction. And if we do this, we would certainly find ourselves, at least on this issue, in harmony with the Taliban. So the question is, what do we want? Where do we want to go? And then, once you have decided on your direction, you will slowly be able to find instrumentalities to secure, slowly over the long term, the objectives that we have given for ourselves.

Now, of course, Pakistan has also — we have also said that the Taliban has asked us to continue with our developmental projects, to complete what we have not completed. I think we are sitting on the fence for the time being because we are waiting for the situation to settle. Pakistan has also said that it is going to invest in, you know, complete all the projects it had initiated in Afghanistan. So there is a competition going on on the ground, and we must consciously decide, as I said before, our objectives, and then pursue those objectives through this entire thing.

You must also understand that the Afghan nation today has been brought to ruin. This was a highly educated country. In the 1950s, in the early 60s, it was a country where women had been enormously emancipated. A very large proportion of the workforce, and the educated workforce — the bureaucracy, the doctors and engineers — they were women. And this has all been brought to a level today where you have a primitive, brutal, tribal society. And here again are opportunities. These women, these people, have, under whatever chaos that the Americans were able to, you know, manage over there, experienced once again some degree of freedom and some quality of life, which has suddenly been lost to them. Here again is an opportunity. Here again is a question to be asked: who do we want peace for? Do we want peace with the Taliban, or do we want peace with the people of Afghanistan? And if it is the people of Afghanistan, then the tools and the instrumentalities to secure that peace will have to be devised, will have to be imagined, will have to be resourced.

Now comes in the whole issue of China, and China is this big — what do you say — in this country today, everything China does. China has limited opportunities in Afghanistan. China operates essentially and overwhelmingly through Pakistan at this juncture, and it comes in with money. But China is very, very, shall we say, parsimonious. It does not give anything without taking much more. Its investments in Afghanistan, its commitments in Afghanistan are a mere 3.5 billion dollars. I'm very sorry, but that's a tiny amount of money. It sounds very big for individuals, but for a country in the condition that Afghanistan is in, it is a very, very small amount. And it is committed to the extraction of copper from the Mes Aynak mines, and this extraction has not even begun as yet because of the uncertain conditions and the risks and the threats in Pakistan — sorry, in Afghanistan.

So what is China's role? China's role today is negligible. China seeks a very much larger role. This is a very resource-rich country. Again, all these countries which are in trouble today are extremely resource-rich — resource-rich in the sense of mining resources. Oil, gas — oil and gas is also a possibility — but very largely iron ore, coal, copper, lead, zinc. Afghanistan is very rich in all these resources, and China is hungry for these things. If it is to sustain its leadership role as a manufacturing nation, it is going to seek these out. But it will not seek them out in a situation where security and endurance of the projects is not assured. It is only when it is confident that a Taliban government will not only survive but will rule, will be able to assure minimal order and security, that they will actually make a real and large commitment of finances, of other resources, of technology, of engineering staff, of other workers, which they always bring with themselves. So again, this is a wide open space.

Our difficulty, historically and even today, has been precisely the same: that we are reactive. Something has emerged in Afghanistan; now we must see how we are to manage this. And consequently we constantly shift gear. Now we will give them money; now we will not give them money. We will give them recognition; we will not give them recognition. And none of this has any kind of a long-term perspective or a consciousness of India's own goals. Why are we sending them aid today? I do not object to this sending of aid, but are we aware that the aid that we are sending today is going to consolidate the Taliban? The West is also sending aid. They are not sending direct aid. They are not sending aid to the Taliban. They are sending aid through various — USAID is dispensing aid over there, the UN agencies are dispensing over there. Money is being committed by all sorts of organizations to Western organizations, and those Western organizations are going out and distributing the aid. With the Taliban, of course — you cannot operate there without the cooperation of the Taliban. But the point is, this aid is perceived by the people of Afghanistan not as something that the Taliban is securing and providing, but as something that outsiders, international agencies or donor groups, are providing.

So again the question arises: why are we doing something? We are doing something because, oh, there is a humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan, we should help. And this is good. But good is not strategic. The same good has to be done in a manner that it secures or consolidates India's strategic ends and objectives. Similarly, tomorrow — now, why don't we recognize the Taliban? If we think we are to deal with Taliban, then there again we come back to our original set: who do we think is going to endure? Who do we want to endure? Do we want to deal with, do we want to consolidate the Taliban regime? Because this is not an either-or option. We can talk to the Taliban, and we can keep talking to the Resistance Front. We can keep providing aid. A lot of our strategy, a lot of our tactics, a lot of our investment can be covert. Everything does not have to be done in the open. And just because we say, all right, for the time being, since Taliban is in charge, we will support the Taliban, does not mean that we have closed down all the other options. But in India, what we do is we tend to do an either-or, and we do it reactively. So now, as far as I can see, the perspective tends to be that the Taliban is in charge, therefore we must go along with the Taliban.

The next issue that I would like to make is that too much of our thinking and our policy is dictated by Western perceptions. We must understand that the West does not act altruistically, however good the propaganda machine is — excellent. We always think that the West has gone into Iraq and bombed everybody out of existence — they must be doing good; they are doing it for democracy. The West has gone into Syria and murdered I don't know how many hundreds of thousands of people, but they are good people, because they are trying to get rid of a dictator and we will try to establish a democracy. Or they have gone into Libya and they have got rid of a dictator, and they have established chaos wherever they have gone. We must not take our lead — strategically, tactically, at the level of global policy — from the prevailing sentiment in the West. They are not always wrong, but crucially, they are also not always right, and they act in their own self-interest. They do not act on principle. Today the West is making so much noise: oh, how many — hundred and sixty thousand, hundred and seventy thousand — troops are massed along the Ukraine border; now they have attacked Ukraine. When China was massing troops on the Indian border, did a single country speak for us? So understand the fragility of your relationships. Understand that at the end of the day, you are on your own.

And now the final point I'd like to make is that all this conversation we have — this is all up in the air. What do we bring to the table? Do we have leverage, or are we just talking? Can we actually influence the situation on the ground, or can we not? Or the situation in global forums? If we do not have the power — and power is of two kinds: the power to do good, which comes with wealth, with military strength, with whatever; or the power to do evil, in which the Pakistanis have a genius — we have the power neither to do good nor to do evil. We want a place on the table, but we bring nothing to the table. Don't go in for these symbolic things which we celebrate: oh, we are going to send 50,000 tons of wheat to them; we have sent so many tons of medical supplies to them earlier. Very nice. You feel good about yourself. And this is the problem with Indians. We like to feel that we are good people. But feeling that we are good people will not make you a strategic power. It will not make you an emerging great power, and it will not give you any significant leverage in Afghanistan. One last line: we have built a parliament there, we have built a road there, we have built schools there, we have built universities there. It is people who can blow up these places require much less resource and exert even greater influence than all your building activity can do. Always remember that. Thank you very much. Happy to take your questions.

Thank you very much, Dr. Sahni. What a wonderful talk you have given. I start with the first question that I have: why is Afghanistan important to India, and why is India so worried about it?

I think that's what I've been talking about all through, and it's a very pointed question. It's an excellent question from whoever has put it up. We need to answer that. Why is Afghanistan important? And all this nonsense — oh, it gives strategic depth to Pakistan. What is the meaning of strategic depth? I want to know. Does it mean that when we invade Pakistan, all the Pakistanis will run into Afghanistan? What does strategic depth mean? What are we going to do with our influence in Afghanistan? Are we going to actually do what the Pakistanis accuse us of doing — create a force that we can attack Pakistan from both sides, that Afghanistan will attack them on one side and we will attack them on the other, as we are imagining that China and Pakistan will force us into a two-front war? I don't know. I have never heard any Indian leader or strategic commentator or military leader ever say that we need to and want to create a situation where we can attack Pakistan from the Afghan side and from the Indian side.

So my answer to your question, which is a very important question, is: I don't think the government has an answer to that question. We don't know. And it comes back to our whole point of strategic blindness. We don't know what we want. We just want to have good relations with Afghanistan. What for? Let them stew. Or if we say, no, we have this old cultural relationships, you know, then all right, on a basis of humanitarian and cultural linkage you can keep giving them little bits of aid. Understand also, these little bits of aid have no strategic impact. They are little drops in the ocean. Everyone is giving aid. Do you think everyone who sends a few million dollars worth of aid to Afghanistan today is creating a strategic bastion in Afghanistan? So my answer to you is, I don't know what we want to do in Afghanistan. I don't know what our objectives are, and very honestly, I don't think our leadership knows either, in concrete terms. And since we do not know what we want to do in Afghanistan, so what good can we do to Afghanistan? Precisely what I'm saying: you can keep on throwing these little drops into the ocean, you can keep giving them little bits of aid. And we don't know who we are giving the aid to. We are giving the aid to Taliban. Are we validating Taliban? Are we endorsing Taliban? Are we helping Taliban consolidate? Do we want to help Taliban consolidate? In which case, if not, then we should have sent the aid in some other form, through some other agency. We should have given the aid to the UN agencies — that, all right, you distribute, we will not give it to the Taliban.

No, the wheat has gone to the United Nations agency. No, no, it's a direct — the transport is direct, but it's been handed over to the United Nations.

Oh, then I'm very, very wrong on this. Excuse me.

The wheat has been handed over to the United Nations for distribution further.

Okay, that is a very important correction. My apologies for that.

And one more question before I hand it over to the audience. You know, I was reading that — right, we are giving aid on one side, we've given medicines, we've given wheat now — and the Afghan army has named a unit in the Afghan army as the Panipat forces, because the third battle of Panipat, in 1976 or something, we lost, and to spite the Indians they have a unit in Afghanistan.

Now, you see, this is what I said, that you know you can't really buy peace in a conflict where the foundations are religious ideology and religious identity. These people will always — it is not Afghans, it is that the people who are currently in power in Afghanistan hold religious identity above everything else. And if that is the case, then this kind of provocation will come from them. They take great pride. But we must also understand — don't read too much into it. You see, for them, this is the glorious history of conquest. All histories are glorious histories of conquest. We abuse the Mughals and the people who came here, but we also boast that there was a time when our empire extended all the way to wherever — all over Afghanistan, into Saudi Arabia and wherever we claim — some of it truly and some of it as part of our contemporary mythology. But the point is, this may just be a point of local cultural pride. So we should not necessarily take it as a direct provocation to India, because simultaneously you have heard many, many statements from the Afghans, from the Taliban, saying that they want good relations with us, that they want us to come back and work with them. So all these things need to be assessed and evaluated, not in a fragile, thin-skinned way that, oh, they have insulted us.

But please understand, people of Indian origin are not safe in Afghanistan. They have had to be extracted from there. There are only 10 Hindu families in Afghanistan today. Yes. So, as I said, their emphasis on religious identity is extremely problematic — their emphasis not only on religious identity but on a religious ideology which is extremely regressive and extremely hostile to all people who do not accept the primacy and dominance and rightness of Islam. This is extremely problematic. And unless there is a transformation in this fundamental belief system in Afghanistan, in the ruling elite of Afghanistan, whichever that will be, India cannot have any permanent basis over there except through the sheer exercise of power. What do I mean by that? That power we do not possess, but perhaps in future we will develop or seek to develop that kind of power. I mean something like what is happening with China today. Nobody talks — not even the Taliban has said one word about the Uighurs. Pakistan has repeatedly said, oh, but we don't see any problem; China is a very great nation; they are treating their minorities very well. So when you have that degree of overwhelming power, both military and economic, then all sins are forgiven.

All right, General, please ask your question.

Dr. Sahni, the wonderful talks that we've had with you. Now, what I perceive: the Taliban had two groups, one the moderate group, which was actually looking into the talks at Doha, and was the radical group. But when the government was formed in Afghanistan, Pakistan managed to put in the Haqqani group in major powers to act in the governance, with Haqqani group actually controlling the governance. What are the prospects of India gaining good foothold into Afghanistan very soon?

Short answers are: none whatsoever. But if you want an elaboration, I come back to the same thing. You have to recognize that the Taliban, while it may be currently dominated by a pro-Pakistani hardliner, is constituted of many divergent groups, including ethnically divergent groups and ideologically divergent groups. As I emphasized in my presentation, you've had intra-Taliban clashes — Taliban groupings fighting against each other, very often because of ethnic factors or because of leadership factors and dominance. Now, immediately I do not see prospects of our gaining any significant foothold in the decision-making process in Afghanistan. But over time, if we can decide who in the Taliban is more amenable to Indian policy objectives, then it is possible to begin a process of selection and cultivation. But if we are doing what we always do — reacting to a situation given to us — then the answer is, as long as the hardliners dominate — and you must always understand one thing more, that in such a situation where violence has been the deciding factor in the seizure of power, the most violent groups will always dominate. The moderates may have negotiated the peace deal, but it is people with guns who will dominate, at least for the time being, till they are delegitimized by bad governance, by their failure to meet the aspirations of the people.

So these factors need to be taken into consideration, and once again we have to decide what we are trying. Do we want a what-is-called moderate Taliban in power in the long run? Answer this question before we go to the other question of whether we can do something about it. Or do we want to do something which would create a situation where perhaps forces such as the Resistance Front, or forces more amenable to our concept of civilized governments, are brought back to power? As it is, in both cases we are marginal players. It's not as if, oh, I've decided Resistance Front, I'm going to support, so Resistance Front will sweep Afghanistan in one week. Nor will the moderates sweep Afghanistan in one week or month or year. But decide where you want to go, and then push slowly, steadily towards your objective. And then, perhaps, as a military leader, I think you would understand the importance of strategic will and of certain strategic persistence. Absent strategic will and persistence, we will achieve nothing. We will keep dancing around what other people have given us. That's it.

Please ask your question.

Yes, sir. Sir, good evening, sir. Thank you so much for giving me this opportunity. So my question is: what do you think about the Pakistan Prime Minister just visited Russia two days ago, and he was giving a helping hand to Russia — and the same Russia and the same Pakistan 20 years ago, which was supporting the USA against Russia? What do you think about the same thing, or the hypocrisy of the Pakistan?

It's a very good photo opportunity. That's it. That is the beginning and the end of the significance of Mr. Imran. I mean, his statements over there, I think, should have been embarrassing to every Pakistani. "Oh, I am so excited to be here." You are going there in a situation of extreme — let us say — a crisis. You have nothing to say about the crisis. You are just so happy that you have been allowed into the presence of Mr. Putin. So I don't think we should be bothered about, you know, people like Imran Khan. In any event, Imran Khan has no strategic significance in the region. As far as Pakistan is concerned, all strategic influence is exercised through its military leadership. So, as I said before, for Imran Khan this was a great photo opportunity. He took it. He's all over even in your newspapers and channels. We may be laughing at him, but we are looking at him. So it's a very successful, I think, outing for him.

And I have another question. So what do you think about the killing of the Pakistan army personnel by the TTP, and the same TTP is being supported by the Taliban Afghanistan?

This is what I had made very, very clear — that there are fundamental fissures both in Pakistan and in Afghanistan. The TTP is a Pashtun-dominated group. The Taliban is not happy with Pakistan, does not accept the Durand Line, is assisting the TTP, will continue to do so. So these again are openings. There are opportunities for us to understand and to strategize and to develop in a direction that is more amenable to Indian policy objectives. As far as the TTP is concerned, the TTP has been against the Pakistani state virtually since its formation, with intervening periods where they have softened their stance, but then they have always hardened. They reject the legitimacy of the Pakistani state. They regard them as an anti-Islamic state. They say they are hypocrites and they have betrayed the Islamic cause. So they have a very fundamental opposition to the Pakistani state, and the Taliban, given its own hostility and its own contestation of the Durand Line — so it's not just that the TTP is killing Pakistanis; there have been clashes on the border where Taliban forces have actually fired upon and killed Pakistani soldiers. So this is a complex situation. There are extremely powerful interdependencies, but there are also extremely powerful forces of, shall we say, division and potential conflict. Thank you.

Can you please ask your question now?

Yes, sir. Thank you, sir. So my simple question is: drug addiction is a major problem in our country, especially in the border states like Punjab and Rajasthan. So do you think we can control drug peddlers with the help of our government?

Absolutely not. The Afghan economy is almost completely dependent on drugs today. With all other — you see, 80 percent of the Afghan government's budget, till the Americans withdrew, came from aid. Today the most significant resource for Afghanistan is the drug trade. They get nearly an estimated 10 to 12 billion a year from drugs. So I'm afraid they are not concerned about the impact they are having on the consuming countries. They will continue to produce as much drug as they can, push out as much drug as they can, and make as much revenue as they can. Years down the line, when there is a healthy Afghan economy on the basis of other productions — if it ever happens; I mean, Afghanistan has been at war for 40 years, more than 40 years now — so they are not going to suddenly develop into a stable, prosperous nation in any foreseeable time frame. And as long as they do not become that stable and prosperous nation which has alternative means of revenue and production, they will continue to support the drug trade. Where the drugs go is not something that concerns them. Most of the drugs come to us not from Afghanistan but from Pakistan. The distribution center is Pakistan. So that's what we have to deal with. Afghanistan is making the primary production and just throwing it out. So much of it goes to Europe, so much of it goes to Southeast Asia.

Colonel John, please ask your question. John, are you there? Okay, next question.

Thank you, moderator. Dr. Sahni, I must actually compliment you for very well, perceptively put across, and especially — I don't hear people talking so often about having a strategic plan and pursuing it. Now that you have said it, I have two points or two questions. One is, from your study, and your depth study of Afghanistan, do you think it is a point that we should pursue, to try and help them, to really give us any kind of strategic advantage? But on strategic advantage I have another view: that, you quote from going back to our shastras, they always say that your neighbor's neighbor will always be your friend, because you have problems. So as a military man, I would think that is another point, where if you are able to get your bases there, where you'll be able to position some troops, if they allow you to, then it's a sort of a counter to Pakistan, with whom we are going to have a long-term — I don't think you're going to find a solution immediately. So these are two issues. But again, as you brought out, whether we will get that kind of leverage. Now, one example is, see how China is building bases all around India. Look at the kind of investment — using Sri Lanka very good, uses forces, he has done that in Myanmar, he's doing it in Pakistan, and Djibouti, which is just across. So what do you feel? What are your views on these lines on the Afghanistan situation?

I think you give very important examples as far as China is concerned, and I think the answer to your question is contained therein. The question is not merely to have a strategy. What is strategy? I mean, as someone from the services, you must understand that strategy is not just an idea. A strategy also requires an assessment of the resources required to realize that strategy, and then the acquisition and commitment of those resources. What are our resources? 50,000 tons of wheat, 10 truckloads of medicines? I'm sorry. So please tell me, what are the long-term resources you are willing to commit to create the bases that you want in Afghanistan? I mean, my enemy's enemy is my friend, my neighbor's neighbor is my friend — absolutely. But the difficulty is that none of our neighbors and none of our neighbors' neighbors are our friends. Why? Because we do not back our talk up with action and with resource. So these strategic questions, this Chanakya niti that we are all very proud of, are worthless. They are reduced to low cunning, and they're reduced to postures. They do not become strategy, because, as I said, the heart of strategy is the commitment — the evaluation and commitment, assessment and commitment — of resources.

So first you need to have the idea, no doubt, and your ideas are both valid. But then we have to have a corresponding commitment of resources. Do we have the billions of dollars to trap Sri Lanka? Hambantota was your port, sir. How many years did Sri Lanka wait for you to build a port in Hambantota? Why do we not have a port there? Because we did not have the resources, or we did not commit the resources — one or the other. And then China came in. They built a port in Hambantota. They built an unusable airport in Colombo, outside — a vast international airport. And then, both of them, the Sri Lankans, sitting there saying this is making no money and the interest is piling up. So how do you back your ideas up with resources? Do you back your ideas up, or do you just keep talking — oh, my enemy's enemy is my friend? Thank you very much. How does that help you fight a battle? Have you been able to effectively reach out to this enemy's enemy? And is this particular enemy's enemy your friend? Is the Taliban your friend? Have you answered that question? Or is the Resistance Front your friend? Or are we seeking some other group of friends in Afghanistan? Answer that question, then begin the process of investing in that answer, and then perhaps you will have something that resembles a strategy ten years down the line — an effective, actual strategy, not words.

John, please ask your question.

Sir, I hope I'm not stretching it too far, but my question is: where will India stand if, in the next 15 years, Pakistan breaks up into four or five failed states — high possibility; the Punjabis hate the Sindhis, the Sindhis hate the Punjabis, both of them hate the Baloch — and Afghanistan into another two failed states? So we'll be handling five failed states. Stranding our neck — bad idea, difficult, sir?

Sir, Pakistan has been failing for 70 years. I wish the damn thing would fail. I mean, isn't it good for us? Okay, let me answer that question unambiguously. It is good for us. A strong, unified enemy is far more dangerous to us than five internally divided, violent and collapsed states. What is Iraq doing to its neighbors today? It is a collapsed state. What is Libya doing to its neighbors? It is a collapsed state. So, you know, we terrify ourselves with our own imagination. Oh, what will happen — millions of refugees will come over here. How will they come over here? Why will they come over here? Do we have nobody on the border to stop them from coming? Oh, there will be a humanitarian crisis. It will be their humanitarian crisis. We will call upon the UN to come and help them set up camps in their territory. Why are we frightening ourselves with all these nightmares that we inflict on ourselves? What will happen? A collapsed, disordered Pakistan is much better for me than a unified and focused and relatively strong Pakistan which is hostile to me. Simple answer.

And by the way, when Pakistan collapses into these four or five entities, not all of them will be hostile to me. Not all of them will be understandable. And if all of them are hostile to me, then there is something wrong with me. Please understand that also. People must turn to us in their time of need as friends, and if nobody turns to us in that time of need as a friend, then there is a problem with Indian policy, and we need to look at ourselves very, very closely. Ask ourselves: why is Nepal against us? Why is Bangladesh having problems, despite this particular regime being very supportive of Indian objectives? Why is Myanmar unhappy with us, despite the fact that if you go there and talk to people, they say, why are you not coming here? We don't want the Chinese; the Chinese eat up every country that they go into. But I'll tell you why they are all against us. We go there, we sign tens of MOUs and all sorts of understandings and this and that and the other. We make massive commitments — we will do this, we will do that. We come back and we forget about them, because all we are interested in doing is making friends with the white man. I am a very strong racist in reverse. We only want to do precisely what Mr. Imran Khan has done: go there and be seen with a powerful global leader. We do not want to have friendships with — we treat our neighbors with contempt or with indifference, one way or the other.

So please understand, a broken-down Pakistan is in all circumstances to our advantage, and in fact a broken-down Pakistan should at least leave some residual friends for us, if our policies are correct in some measure. And if they are not, we are not worth saving. Let me let it be very clear: if we are going towards being such a bad country that nobody likes us, then we need to look into the mirror and start a course correction, instead of worrying about what Pakistan will do and what Afghanistan will do and what China will do. What are we doing is the first question we must answer if we are to face a secure future.

Doctor, there is a little crystal gazing that I want you to do. We have, during these last couple of years, had a lot of Afghan persons coming up and being trained in the Indian armed forces institutes, even at the IMA and NDA. We've had Afghans, you know, being trained by us to be officers in the Afghan army, which was then probably an instigation from the United States. Now those very people who we were training are stranded in India. The Indian government has increased the duration of their training by one more year. What do you think is their future?

Their future is what we perceive it to be. Here is either a burden or an asset, and that depends on what we think we want to do in Afghanistan. If these people are sympathetic to the Indian perspective — and I think they will be, if you would have interacted with some of them; some of them are also there in the National Defence University in Delhi every year — so the question you have to ask yourself is: is this an asset, or am I going to just keep weeping? So it is again part of your own strategic perspective and clarity. You can make these your assets, whether they remain here, whether they are sent back. Where are they sent back? Are they sent back, if they wish to go — are they facilitated to go back and join the National Resistance Forces? Can they be located in, and funded to be located in, one of the neighboring countries? Again, the question is: what do we want? If you don't answer that first question, then the choice is: oh, if they go back, what will they do, what will the Taliban do with them? And if that is your question, then the answer is very simple: they are a burden to you, and we don't know what to do with them, just as there are a lot of civilians who are here and we don't know what to do with them.

If you had the ability to advise the Home Minister of the country, what would you tell him to do?

I do not have that ability, sir. I do not enter into conversations with the ministers of India.

All right, I think there are no more questions from the audience, and I'll hand the proceedings back to the President. Over to you, Mr. C. Pal.

I am just going to say that I am overawed by the presentation. That's the name — first of all, being practical, not skeptic. You questioned the very premise of my subject, and you first started: why buy peace, why is what significance. So straightaway my idea has been shattered by first line, and followed by every other line. That means there's no question of buying peace, because it does not matter, and whether this government or that government is buying peace has no meaning. Then you very elaborately pointed out that religious and cultural ties matter a lot, and that is why you had given some hints to the cultural, religious guys who are getting together and creating problems for India. Beautifully you delineated whether we should buy peace, whether it's important to buy peace with the radical elements of ISI, with them, whether we should buy peace with some other people around — with whom should we buy peace, that was your question. And one by one you analyzed them, that there is a problem of buying peace, and therefore this is the element. And then ultimately you came to the strategic planning. I was really enamored when you said — I mean, that is something a speaker will try to avoid — that ultimately you give analysis and all, but you do not give a conclusion. You also say what is to be brought on the table — that was more important. What has to be brought on the table, that was more important, and how to utilize that particular strategic planning for our benefit.

So my submission, one last question, which is only for your thinking, because I may include subsequently the next one: what should be brought on the table for such a thing? My question is that, let us say, you have given one thing — there are so many people, so many elements of all which have to be considered. Which is the biggest people out of these with whom we should buy peace? It doesn't matter to them; it matters to us to only accept a little bit humanitarian; otherwise it has no strategic value. I would like to request you and tell me that when you bring on the table some planning, which is the most important thing which should be done? When we think the powers were there, but I know no question of not giving them some intelligence input, and when you being there and the people know you, what is the important element we will be able to take, in terms of, I think, analysis, which should be to the benefit of India? That's my question.

I think Mr. C. Pal Singh's lost connection. I think I'll take over and fill in the gaps for him. Dr. Sahni, thank you so much for a wonderful talk. I think the question answers and everything has been enlightening, and your talk has really been — it's opened up a lot of horizons for people to think as to what needs to be done by the government in order to sort of pursue a policy or strategically be successful in Afghanistan. Thank you very much, sir. Thank you very much for your time, and I really appreciate your talking to us today.

Thank you very much for the opportunity.

Thank you very much, everyone. Our next webinar is on the 11th of March. It's on cryptocurrency and its implications. The speaker is Colonel Singh, who's an IPS officer from the 1984 batch, and he has mastery over the subject, being earlier the Enforcement Director of the country. Thank you very much, everyone. Thank you very much, and Dr. Sahni, thank you very much.

Thank you, sir. Thank you, Dr. Sahni. Very clear. Thank you so much. Thank you. We'll ask you for the next session. Thank you, sir. Thank you. Designated under what name and style. Okay, okay. Thank you very much, everyone. Thank you. Thank you very much. Thank you. Thank you so much. Thank you.