Nepal is India’s immediate Himalayan neighbor with deep civilizational, cultural, and geographical ties. Its geography makes it a natural buffer between India and China.
What this session covered
This session takes the form of a conversation between the host and a single guest, a retired Army officer with service experience in Jammu and Kashmir along the Line of Control and in counter-insurgency areas. The discussion opens by setting Nepal's position as a buffer between India and China, and revisits the basis of the bilateral relationship: the treaty of peace and friendship signed in 1950, long-standing cultural and civilisational ties, and an open border put at about 1,750 km. The speaker described the practical texture of that relationship as it stands, including India's position as Nepal's largest trading partner, energy and power cooperation, the volume of everyday cross-border trade, the presence of Nepalese workers in India and the tradition of Gurkha service in the Indian Army, noting that recruitment under Agnipath has affected the flow of Nepalese recruits while pension arrangements for veterans continue.
Much of the exchange concerned the security consequences of political instability. The speaker observed that the border is marked by pillars but is not demarcated, and pointed to two areas of dispute, Lipulekh and Susta, and to Nepal's revised map. Both participants discussed the misuse of a porous frontier by smugglers and traffickers, the movement of criminals from the Indian side into Nepal, and a shift in infiltration routes now that entry along the Line of Control and the international border with Pakistan has become harder; the speaker referred to interceptions of persons who had entered India through Nepal. The historical linkage between the Maoist insurgency in Nepal and left-wing extremism inside India was raised as something instability could revive, with consequences for Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal and, to some extent, Sikkim. Migration during periods of crisis, competition for low-skilled work, and the susceptibility of younger Nepalese to anti-India rhetoric during periods of turmoil were also discussed, alongside the memory of a blockade in 2015-16 associated with Madhesi grievances and the perception in Nepal that India interferes in its domestic affairs.
The latter part of the discussion turned to China and to regional institutions. The speaker described substantial Chinese investment in roads, railways and telecommunications in Nepal, interest in eastern Nepal, a proposed railway line into the country, and the market implications of Chinese goods, noting that the Siliguri Corridor lies only 22 km from Nepal's eastern border. Both participants noted the tendency of Nepalese political actors to play an India card against a China card during periods of instability. On regional architecture, the discussion questioned whether SAARC, headquartered in Kathmandu and operating by consensus, can take meaningful decisions while interim governments hold office in both Nepal and Bangladesh, and considered how connectivity plans running through Bangladesh and Myanmar bear on BIMSTEC. The speaker's suggested course was to rebuild trust: revisiting the effect of Agnipath on Gurkha recruitment, protecting religious tourism and cultural ties, and increasing people-to-people contact. Both participants framed the underlying policy problem as maintaining a balance between engagement and interference, with the host noting that India can neither remain passive nor intervene to the point of causing resentment.
Key points raised
- The session is a one-to-one conversation between the host and a single retired Army officer, not a multi-speaker panel.
- The open and undemarcated India-Nepal border was discussed as a management problem covering smuggling, trafficking, the movement of criminals and a shift in infiltration routes, with Lipulekh and Susta identified as areas of dispute.
- The speaker linked instability to a possible revival of cross-border extremist connections, recalling past linkages between the Maoist insurgency in Nepal and left-wing extremism in India, with implications for Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal and Sikkim.
- Chinese infrastructure investment in Nepal, interest in eastern Nepal and a proposed railway line were discussed in relation to the Siliguri Corridor, which the speaker placed 22 km from Nepal's eastern border.
- The functioning of SAARC, headquartered in Kathmandu, was questioned given interim governments in both Nepal and Bangladesh and the requirement for consensus; BIMSTEC connectivity was discussed in similar terms.
- The speaker urged rebuilding trust through a review of Agnipath's effect on Gurkha recruitment, protection of religious tourism and cultural ties, and greater people-to-people contact, within a careful balance between engagement and non-interference.
Session transcript
This transcript is auto-generated from the session recording and lightly edited for punctuation and readability; it may contain transcription errors. The video remains the authoritative record.
Read the full transcript
A very good afternoon, good evening and good morning to viewers wherever you are. I'm Chief Paul Singh, former IG Punjab and ex-chief of Rapid Action Force, Government of India. I am with you today as the president of NISSMAT, a think tank organization which conducts discussions and deliberations with scholars and renowned social and political personalities, also with ex-defense services, ex-bureaucrats. These interactive sessions, webinars and protocols have become very popular.
Today I have with me, to go into a dialogue on the subject of today's discussion, Major General Deepak Mehta, retired, who is a third generation officer in the army, a post-graduate in defense studies from Madras University. He has been in active operations in J&K, both in counterinsurgency areas and along the line of control. He commanded an infantry brigade in Operation Parakram and mountain day subsequently.
Before starting the protocols on the subject — the subject, as you know, is instability in Nepal and its implications for India — let me give a brief about the subject as such. Nepal's geography makes this country a natural buffer between India and China. Any instability in Nepal weakens this border role. And the long open border between Nepal and India, extending to about 1,750 km, becomes difficult to monitor. Political weaknesses in Nepal allow also the misuse of this border by smugglers and criminals.
Anti-Indian elements, at that point of time when the border is porous, exploit the boundary for their infiltration into India. This creates law and order challenges for the states like Bihar, UP, West Bengal, which are very close to the border of Nepal. Further, the instability in Nepal allows China to deepen its footprints in Nepal. And Chinese presence in Nepal could, as you know, threaten India's security in the north. China can also use Nepalese territory for collecting intelligence on India. It can also mount indirect surveillance on India at any time if it has footprints and if it has stronghold in Nepal. This is of great strategic importance to us. Major Deepak, further to give the viewers the historical perspective, the challenge.
Sir, thank you very much. You see, India and Nepal have had a special relationship defined by the treaty which was signed in 1950. It is a treaty of peace and friendship. Basically, two factors were there. Firstly, it was cultural and civilizational ties. Secondly, open border facilitating movement of people as also the trade and goods. We have had very good cooperation with Nepal in the past.
Firstly, with trade and investment, India is the largest trading partner of Nepal. Actually, if you go to Nepal, anywhere in Nepal, all the shops have Indian stuff. You can't make out if you are in any shop in India or in Nepal. The hoardings on the shops are all the Magahi script. So the language is also quite common. Then we have had a very close relationship in the field of energy and power. We are importing power from Nepal.
Besides that, we have had very close people-to-people interaction with Nepal. There are large number of Nepalese who are working in India. There are very large number of Nepalese who are part of the Indian army. And as far as this relationship goes, the chiefs of both Indian and Nepal army are given honorary rank of a general in the respective armies. I have been interacting with the Gurkha troops in the past. Bulk of them are second generation officers. With this Agnipath having come, Nepal has stopped sending any Gurkhas into India, which I think is going to affect, though we are still maintaining the PPO, that pension paying organization, to pay pension to the old ex-servicemen of Nepalese who are part of the Indian army.
Sir, as far as the borders are concerned, firstly, the border is not demarcated. There are only border pillars, but there is no demarcation per se. Smuggling, yes, I agree with you, sir. Smuggling is only of items which are of critical nature and which are short supply in Nepal. But if you're traveling from Guwahati by any train, you find trade is going on full fledged. People in the trains are selling wares which they procure from Nepal. So trade is going on between India and Nepal as it was in the past.
One minute. This instability now, as it is certain, I think it also leads to a lot of migration problems. Thousands of Nepalese citizens who want to seek job in India during domestic crisis, they tend to enter into India. Yes, exactly.
A factor which is very important, General, is that I feel, and I have talked to some people, the young Nepalese nowadays are being swayed by anti-Indian rhetoric during turmoil in particular. When the power was particular, then these young Nepalese, they were being swayed by anti-Indian rhetoric. So for India's foreign policy, for diplomacy, this instability in Nepal is indeed a very complicated issue. And India must view, I feel, General, they must view the stability in Nepal not just as a neighborly concern but as a strategic necessity — not only as a neighborly concern but as a strategic necessity for its own security and growth. Please carry on. I am with you, sir.
Absolutely correct. Now, I just want to bring up one or two more points as far as the open borders are concerned. Earlier there was never a problem. But now it has effect on the criminals. There have been large number of cases where the criminals on our side of the border, they carry out an act and try to get into Nepal. There are large number of cases which has happened. And also there is infiltration. Just about, I think, a month or two back, three Pakistani — because we have a very strong defense along the line of control and also on the international border, the infiltration from Pakistan, the state sponsored infiltration, has come down quite a bit. But now they are finding different routes, maybe from Bangladesh. Three chaps have been caught coming from Nepal into India. So this border is a problem, and what you say is right. It's a difficult aspect to control.
I agree. This territory becomes not only prone to misuse by smugglers, as you rightly mentioned, traffickers, and even the anti-India elements to some extent. Now, as you recollect, the extremist groups can exploit Nepal soil as a safe haven for their stay. Absolutely, sir. We must remember, sir, that the Maoist insurgency in Nepal once had very strong linkages with the left-wing extremists inside India. That's right. Instability of this nature can cause and again revive this cross-border extremism.
Now, this extremist network, cross-border extremists, has become difficult for us to have a strict control on. This means that directly it impacts Indian states, as I showed you — Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, and to some extent Sikkim — but the mainland of India also becomes prone to these extremist elements, particularly young Nepalese who have been swayed against India. Therefore, border management is not only a necessity, I think it is a very, very important strategic requirement. It is not confined to Kathmandu. In fact, this problem is not only confined to Kathmandu. The echoes can be heard in the villages and towns of our border states and India. Please continue.
I agree with you, sir. And now to add one more you brought out — this instability and China. You see, we have this Madheshis who are in the plain areas of Nepal which are bordering our UP, Bihar. They have a very close linkage with the people towards our side. And they can be exploited for nefarious activities if a check is not kept on them, sir.
You are very right on that score. Now, prolonged instability — this problem increases. Prolonged instability in Nepal increases the problem which we have referred, that is migration, smugglers, anti-India propaganda. This increases rapidly. This creates pressures in Indian border towns. And another important factor is that this increases the competition for low-skilled jobs inside India. This, at times, you know, the rivalry of jobs, low-skilled jobs, creates sometimes and fuels social tensions inside India. Exactly. Most critical implication, of course, lies in the strategic sphere, but other factors which we have mentioned, like smugglers, inflow of extremists, low-skilled jobs competitions, they are also creating social tensions in India. Now, as far as the strategic challenges are concerned, would you like to elaborate further, sir?
Yes, sir. As far as the strategic challenges are concerned, firstly, there is no demarcation in the border, which has led to border disputes in two areas. Firstly is the Lipulekh area and Susta area. Now, they have changed the map, which is actually incorrect. Though the diplomatic aspects are going on between India and Nepal, we say that Lipulekh area is in our area. They have changed the map. So this is the first major implication of the instability. As you brought out, it could lead to discontent in the neighboring states, that is UP, Bihar, and Sikkim.
Strategic challenges with China's influence, because of political reasons, political aspects of Nepal, have increased tremendously in the field of economics and political engagements. China, as you brought out, they have shown a lot of interest in the past towards eastern Nepal. Now, eastern Nepal is the one which is very close to the Siliguri Corridor. Mhm. They were going in for construction of roads in eastern Nepal. Now, if you see the key dynamics of that area, Siliguri Corridor is only 22 km from the eastern border of Nepal. Chumbi Valley is very close to the Siliguri Corridor. Oh, I see. The Chinese are reconstructing or rejuvenating an airfield just south of Siliguri Corridor. So this is a very major aspect in terms of a strategic challenge. Carry on, please carry on. Sorry. Carry on. You want me to say a few words? Yes.
China has already invested heavily in Nepal, as you know. A lot of infrastructure, roads, railways, telecommunication have already been set up by China in Nepal. Whenever Nepal is politically unstable, the leaders of Nepal tend to play the India card versus the China card to create sort of, you know, problem. They always play on this card — India card, and then versus China card. China is doing this thing, India is doing this thing. So this all comes in their sort of, you know, creating more problem for India in due course of time.
So not only this is of course dangerous as far as the strategic importance is concerned, the implications of unrest in Nepal and the strategic importance of the Nepal border with India — it is a very important issue to be considered by our diplomats. But China has already invested in Nepal, and it is trying to create further footsteps. Will you elaborate further how the instability in Nepal has weakened its role as a buffer state, and how do you intend to monitor the long end of Nepal border, keeping in view the porous border as well as the Chinese footprints in Nepal?
Sir, good, sir. I feel that all this has happened because of the political changes which have taken place in Nepal. The political ideology of the parties there was pro-China. One party, the Nepal Congress, has been put into the cold freezer, into the freezer. So the political parties there which are coming to power — I don't want to name the leaders — they were pro-China in their ideology. Now, you see, as far as infrastructure is concerned, the Chinese are planning to construct a railway line coming into Nepal, which has a very major effect in terms of, you have brought out, in terms of intelligence. They are going to flood the complete market of Nepal with the Chinese goods. Mhm. Hopefully, with the new government coming up next year, hopefully, we should be able to stabilize this affair, sir.
Now, there was also, sir, this — the political parties which were there earlier, as what you have correctly brought out, they were playing the India-China card. This had caused a lot of distrust between India and Nepal. Nepal felt that time that we are interfering in their domestic affairs, which is not so. As a matter of fact, 2015-16, there was — we had a blockade in support of Madheshis. So that, you know, these are things which exaggerated the problems with Nepal. Hopefully, with the new government coming in, things will stabilize, sir.
Now, as you have very explicitly indicated, the stability in Nepal is very essential for India's strategic comfort, at least. Besides, such instability also strengthens the external powers who are unfriendly to India. Certain external powers who are unfriendly to India, they also get a leeway. Cultural and religious ties also get strained during this — the cultural ties which we have with Nepal and religious ties which we have with Nepal and the religious tourism which has been going on between India and Nepal, this also gets heavily strained during the instability.
Now, as I mentioned earlier, some propaganda has been portraying India as interfering in Nepalese politics. Sir, that is another thing. The young Nepalese particularly, they are swayed by this anti-Indian rhetoric. During turmoil, they say the propaganda has been there that India is interfering in Nepalese politics. So hence, instability also undermines the soft power links between the two countries. Therefore, our policy has to be very, very — we have to be very careful. Neither we have to allow extra interference in Nepal, nor we can stay away absolutely from what is happening in Nepal. Therefore, you may like to elaborate as to how we should go about further as far as India is concerned, so that even if there is instability, our relations do not deteriorate to the extent that it will be difficult to have back our neighborly relations with Nepal.
Sir, I feel that this aspect of Agnipath which came into being, this has to find a division. We have to get these boys from Nepal back into our Gurkha regiment. They were a big support. Yes, yes. In Nepal, PPO, the pension paying authority, had been interacting with these very large number of veterans in Nepal. So I think there's a requirement to look into this aspect of Agnipath, which I think the government is looking into. Second aspect is, we have to be very careful so that the cultural and religious ties do not get affected. A large number of people make a visit to Nepal for the Pashupatinath Temple, and they come to the Buddhist temples here. So we have to be very, very careful and tread a very careful path, as you brought out, diplomatically, in the field of trade, and get back to the trust factor between Nepal and India.
I know that for security, economy, culture, and diplomacy, Nepal's instability is obviously having multi-dimensional challenges as far as India is concerned. But at the same time, India, though, cannot remain passive about political developments in Nepal. Correct. It also should not have excessive interference to create resentment in Nepalese that we are trying to interfere with their affairs. Absolutely, sir. The balance between support and interference into their affairs is a very delicate balance, and we have to maintain it in a very nice and a diplomatic manner. You can elaborate further, sir.
There has to be more people-to-people contact, and we have to be very careful now with this Gen Z which came into Bangladesh, which is now coming into Nepal — it should not come into India. And all this, what happened in Bangladesh and Nepal — it is of course, in Nepal they say lack of employment, corruption, what have you. But definitely it has been exacerbated by someone else outside. We have to be very careful. Our intelligence agencies have to be very careful on that factor.
I'd like to touch another point which also you may like to elaborate. Now, Nepal has been the basis for SAARC and other regional alignments. For SAARC in particular, not other alignments also. How do you view that? Because this problem can upset the apple cart of these regional balances, and because Nepal is the headquarter of SAARC indirectly. Yes. And BIMSTEC also, they have got deep inroads — the secretariat depends on Kathmandu and all. Could you elaborate on SAARC and BIMSTEC, that how instability in Nepal can widely affect, broadly affect these regional balances and how it indirectly can affect India also?
You see, sir, as far as SAARC is concerned, there are eight members. They have to be working on consensus. As you mentioned, the headquarters of SAARC is in Kathmandu, which is right now with the interim government. Now, if they are working on consensus, there are two nations where there are interim governments, Nepal and Bangladesh, which is also a member of SAARC. Now, will their secretariat of SAARC function? If so, with the interim governments both in these countries, would they be able to take any decisions as interim government? So that is the question mark. So it is coming out that it's not a very stable organization right now. And once the governments of both Nepal and Bangladesh come into being, then it has to be seen how best this organization will function, sir. I don't think any worthwhile decisions are going to be taken, because the two governments which are members of SAARC will not be able to take any decisions in the interest of the nation.
And what about BIMSTEC? What about the other organization? Is there an organization BIMSTEC? BIMSTEC again, sir, is a group of eight countries which are around India. It had a very good sort of understanding. It was trade, defense, communication between these countries. But again, this has diversified, because the communication with Nepal is just — we were working on a communication going right through Bangladesh, Myanmar, Thailand, up to Vietnam. With the change in regime in Bangladesh, this connectivity is not there anymore. So as far as trade is concerned, there's some trade which is going on. Tourism — some tourism will carry on with Nepal. Tourism in my opinion with Bangladesh will come down. There is by and large no tourism in Myanmar. So these are the effects of both ASEAN and BIMSTEC. So hopefully time will set the things right, sir.
I mean to briefly sum up our discussion. I'd like to start — since the abolition of monarchy in 2008, Nepal has witnessed frequent changes in government, as you know. Absolutely. Coalition politics, then party splits, the rivalries in Nepal have created a very fragile sort of situation and administration in Nepal. Correct. This constant instability, sir, hampers not only developments in Nepal, it also allows some of the external powers to gain grounds in Nepal. Of course, China has been already trying to have grounds in Nepal. The tourism sector, which is of mutual interest both, that is for India as well as Nepal, suffers badly during this turmoil due to this fragile situation prevailing in Nepal. As you mentioned just now, India-Nepal religious tourism, which is a necessity for both the countries, suffers when relations are tense and strained. Thus, there are serious implications. There are serious ramifications due to this instability in Nepal.
The member countries of SAARC, as you said — Afghanistan before joining in 2007, but Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka — this also has sort of aftershocks, certain tremors there. Headquarters being in Kathmandu, the functioning becomes a little difficult for the SAARC countries. Of course, for quite some time SAARC has been a little in common state. It was also in common in the incumbency, but it was very active. The first SAARC summit in Dhaka, Bangladesh — it has created a lot of requirement, primary objectives for itself that it took: to promote regional cooperation and to promote peace, to promote economic growth, to promote economic and collective self-sufficiency. All these countries will have a direct or indirect influence due to this state of fluency, a state of imbalance and sort of, you know, fluctuation in Nepal.
Then, the youth-led protests, as you said, Gen Z protests over social media — that has created a lot of problem. Corruption and nepotism also created problem, and it faced resignations from government to government and reshuffling of the government. Then, the institutional functioning of SAARC and BIMSTEC, they will also get affected because of this instability. Absolutely. Absolutely, sir. The decision-making, sort of, you know, or the consensus which is likely to emerge if SAARC functions from Kathmandu, is likely to be badly affected. It may lack also the authority or lack the internal cohesion which earlier was there to commit on some regional agreements which were already undertaken in SAARC. So by and large, it will affect largely these regional balances and regional treaties which we had.
Now, the open border, the porous border, especially with India, with a weak government in Nepal and unrest in Nepal, could lead to increased cross-border trafficking and spillovers of refugees and other people in India. A possible scenario and outcome could be that in such a sort of instability, not only the Indo-Nepal relations get affected, but certain regional treaties where Nepal's stability is important also get affected. You have already touched on the BIMSTEC, that is Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation. It gets affected. Again, the countries involved are Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, and Thailand. Again, these key countries which are there, their key sectors and land ports, etc., they are so intertwined, they are so close to each other, that any instability in Nepal can affect these countries which are on these treaties with Nepal as a sort of headquarter.
I am sure that not only the prevailing fluid situation in Nepal is very, very dangerous or has to be viewed — if not dangerous, has to be viewed with a lot of concern by India. At the same time, certain regional alignments also will get affected. Therefore, I feel the implications of unrest in Nepal have not only direct consequences and direct effect on India, but they have indirect effect also because of these regional treaties and regional alliances being affected. If you want to add something, kindly do add so that we can wind up, sir.
No, you've given a very good rundown on the ASEAN and BIMSTEC. I think we have to build up bridges with Nepal once again. Hopefully, the next government which comes into being — the basic problem was with Nepal was the ideological, political ideology, which was more China-oriented. As far as the employment is concerned, since there was no employment in Nepal, the Nepalese have also gone to high-intensity areas. I'm aware of the fact that there's a friend of mine who was going to Kabul before, when the problem in Afghanistan was on. And I told her, I said, "You better be careful." She said, "No, I'm very safe. We have Nepalese as a protection to us in Kabul." So, you see, one can't rule out that some boys may go to high-intensity areas where the war is on, looking for jobs. So I think we have to build bridges with Nepal in the times to come, sir.
Thank you very much, Sandeep, but we had a very sort of meaningful discussions and dialogue. I hope it will be viewed extensively by our viewers, this dialogue, and we look forward to our next podcast shortly. Thank you, sir. And let the viewers be on the lookout for the next podcast from this platform. Thank you very much, viewers, and thank you very much, General Sahab. Thank you very much, sir. Pleasure being with you, sir. Thank you, thank you.
