Implications of China’s Growing Aggressiveness

Hello ladies and gentlemen. This is sheep also a very good evening, and thank you all for joining us today at 101 edition of our webinars. We have also organized a number of interactive sessions besides webinar which are addressed by one expert on the subject. Today's interactive session on implications of China's growing aggressiveness to be addressed by a senior army officer, Major General Katoch. He has a checkered career and had held a lot of staff appointments besides being on the front. He, on the operation, he will address you on this subject and analyze it thoroughly.

We have got registration, let me tell you, from the following countries: India, UAE, USA, Dubai and Singapore. The interactive session is sponsored by Premium Investigation, Risk Management Advisory Enterprise, Tax India Skills and JMD Cargo Private Degree. After extending heart welcome and hearty welcome to our eminent and learned speaker and other delegates, let me say a few words about NISSMAT. NISSMAT was established in the year 1990. It started training courses in the field of private security and cutting bus 30 million. With the passive time, now organization of more than 85 scholars who are providing inputs in the security, safety and current topics.

This mother established four important things. The first forum, which is conducted webinar. The second in NISSMAT Enterprises, which undertakes audits and surveys. Third is network training and education training, online training, et cetera. And then we intend to start NISSMAT Foundation to undertake welfare and social work for the society at large, particularly concerned with law and order situation.

Now, as I wanted to say that our moderator and chairman Mr Pawan Ahluwalia is unfortunately ill, is not able to join the session, so we have a moderator today for the session, Major General Deepak Mehta. In March 1972, he has seen active operations in J&K along with the line of control. In command, he commanded and went and defended an infantry battalion in J&K during the height of insurgency and was also wounded there. He has a checkered career of 37 years encompassing command, staff and instructional requirement. He has had his instructional appointment in the previous training assemblyman of the Army War College and Indian Military Academy. Major General Deepak will moderate this session.

Before he starts moderating session, let me say a few words about the subject as such, that in production subject that the implications of China's growing aggressiveness are growing activism. Now the geostrike security environment has recently witnessed a significant China's change are aggressive postures. China has exhibited its assertive portion in many forms, like not adhering to the laws of seas and navigation and staking claim in South and North China seas, which affected a large number of countries of Southeast Asia. China's economic and political footprints have expanded quickly. Many countries are trying to grapple with the implication of this growing aggressiveness. Even in most countries like USA are paying special attention to this aggressive behavior, and each group was constituted by some countries which were directly affected by the South China and phil points and white nine and southern countries with numbers of that.

They have said that, let me go into the details as to what is the China's aggressiveness, what is China's activism and how should we deal with it. They say that China's actually affects their state institutions, their state institution. They said some of the state institutions which are rather fragile and whose political landscape is weak, they are badly affected by the China. The recipient China's activism has growing interest. This is going to be considered in dimensions. Number one, how Chinese influence affects the choices and opinions in the local political and economic environment of the country. Very important that their influence affects the choices and opinion in the local political and economic environments of the country. How China's activism constrains the local media — it doesn't allow the media to fly or blossom. Chinese affect the local society. China's business model has started affecting the regulatory framework to various weak countries. Particularly, they say they have referred to Hungary and some country.

No, China particularly, I mean we should check growing Chinese, check us, promote your own good government then, and on the thought process of the country, do not over focus on soft software and then deny at some point, even deny at some places, China's diplomatic openings. And with these words, I feel that I should leave it speaker to analyze broader framework from the equations, from economic wiper, from political point of view, from intellectual point of view — that is how China's activism or aggressiveness has the implication overall invitation. With these words, I'd like to pass on the session to the moderator of today, Major General Deepak Mehta.

Thank you sir. Good evening everybody. Before I proceed, let me first introduce Mr C Paul Singh, the president of NISSMAT. Mr C Paul Singh is the ex-IPS officer, Indian Police Service officer, and retired at the rank of Inspector General. He is a masters in English literature and has served in a number of states and prestigious police appointments. He was made responsible by the Government of India to raise a new force, that is a Rapid Action Force, and after having raised this force, he was the first chief of the Rapid Action Force. This force was raised primarily to contain communal riots.

In recognition to his outstanding career that he's had in the police, he's been awarded a number of awards. They are the President's Police Medal for Distinguished Service, the Indian Police Medal for Meritorious Service, the Police Special Duty Medal that he got with a number of other recognitions and commendations. After retirement, he was conferred the prestigious award of the Security Personality of the Year by the President of India in the Global Security Conference. Presently he is the advisor to the Asian Professional Security Association, India chapter. He is also the honorary Director General of the Central Association of Private Security Industry, India, and Association of the Private Investigators and Detectives in India.

Now coming down to General Katoch, who is going to be the speaker of this evening, has been conferred the Sena Medal and also an awardee of the VSM. He is the alumni of the famous Sherwood College of Nainital. He has done his training in the NDA, the IMA and also the National Defence College. He was commissioned on the 31st of March 1972 into the Dogra Regiment and has a great pride in the fact that he's a third generation officer in the Indian Army. He has master's degree and M Phil in the defence studies from the University of Madras. He is also a recipient of the doctorate of philosophy conferred by the Indira Gandhi University.

After nearly close to four decades in uniform, in which he served along all the borders and also had a tenure in Sri Lanka, he retired in the 2009. Post retirement, he joined the premier think tank of the Indian Army, that the Centre for Land Warfare Studies, from 2009 to 2014. The last three years of it, he was a director of CLAWS. He has conducted a large number, he has edited a large number of books and also written chapters in a number of books. He is presently the director of the India Foundation and also editor of the Salute magazine. Having known Joe for the last 50 years plus, I have no reservations in saying that he's a scholar general. Over to General Katoch for his talk please.

Thank you Mr C Paul Singh, president NISSMAT, and General Mehta, for inviting me to share my thoughts on the implications of China's growing aggressiveness. Now this is a very interesting subject and has much to do with China's self-image as also of how the common candies perceive China's place in the committee of nations. Let me delve a bit here on a human trait referred to as personality. Now personality is the enduring configuration of characteristics and behavior that comprises an individual's unique adjustment to life, including major traits, interest, drives, values, self-concept, abilities, emotional patterns, et cetera. Now what happens if we replace the word individual with country? Now things start to get interesting. Does a country have a personality, and if so, what is the personality of China? What are the configurations of characteristics and behaviors that are unique to unnatural for the Chinese people?

Now based on a three year long survey conducted in many countries, the results for China showed that the people exhibited two distinct traits. One, there was a deep belief in the ideas of humanism, encompassing altruism, compassion and understanding. Two, the people showed a preference for order and organization. They preferred certainty and thoroughness and often judge success in terms of completion of a task. On the macro level then, it appears that humanism and order are the two traits valued by the Chinese people in a great manner.

So if humanism and order constitute the personality of China, why is China perceived as an aggressive and volatile force? This is where the concept of a nation's character comes in. This refers to the shared beliefs or perceptions — and mind you, I'm using the word perceptions — of personality characteristics common to members of a particular nation, both within the nation and outside it. Now this perception of China, in the eyes of its own people and even outside of China, is controlled by the Communist Party of China, the CCP. Now viewed through this lens, the personality of China is not congruent with its character. This has the potential to lead to internal unrest, protest and displeasure, against we see the heavy propaganda inside and outside of China, and is humanistic, orderly and completes his projects in a timely manner, keeping the good of the people at heart.

So the ending of poverty in China is a very important landmark in that country, along with projects such as the One Belt One Road, the BRI, which are termed as China's humanistic and altruistic outreach. The crackdown on corruption which you periodically see in China can also be seen in a similar light. Now there is also a third characteristic which defines China, and that is its sense of nationalism, grounded in the belief that China was once a great power and that it must regain that status. Now this sense of nationalism dates back to well before the establishment of the PRC, but it was the PRC which has since 1949 promoted the narrative of the century of humiliation, which is largely conceived as having begun with the first Opium War in 1839, in which the Royal Navy opened up China to western capitalism, and only ending in 1949 with the PRC coming to power in China.

So this discourse reiterates the humiliation of the Chinese people, the dismemberment of territory, the loss of sovereignty to foreign powers, and domestic weakness and corruption. This sense of nationalism also drives China's foreign policy, with the PRC being sensitive to public concerns and taking into account popular nationalist sentiments. Now let me give you an example. In 2012, when quenching arose over the disputed Senkaku Islands, the Chinese public boycotted Chinese products, linking the same to patriotism. Please remember that the Nanjing massacre, which occurred immediately after the Battle of Nanjing in the second Sino-Japanese War by the Imperial Japanese Army, and which lasted for complete six weeks beginning in 13 December 1937, still weighs heavily on the Chinese consciousness. It is a Chinese public which is averse to the continuing Japanese practice of honoring of its World War II martyrs at the Yasukuni shrine.

This public behemoth at times outstrips even the hardliners within the PRC government, serving to push policy further towards hawkishness, with netizens criticizing their own country's policy makers for not being aggressive enough. And if China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the MFA, is perceived to be undermining Chinese address, then they too are subjected to ridicule by the public. Now two factors indicate this trend. One, I think most people in this audience will be surprised to know that the MFA, that the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, constantly receives calcium pills on a regular basis. This is the popular choice of insult to indicate the spinelessness of their diplomats. And two, in the online world, the MFA has garnered the unofficial nickname the Ministry of Protests, due to its tendency to do little more than issue denouncements of unfavorable international developments. You can perhaps relate this to the, you know, what we say in India, you know, often expressed by Indian ministers when terror action takes place and the public doesn't like it. The Chinese public says no, take action.

So with this as a background, let us look into Chinese aggressive policies astride its land borders as well as in the western Pacific. Since early 1990s, when China was pursuing its economic and military growth agenda, it did not want its growth to be seen as threatening to its neighbors. So Beijing resorted to the rhetoric of its peaceful rise and was restrained in its foreign policy options. It engaged with digital multilateral organizations such as ASEAN and also made great effort to promote the so-called win-win relations with neighboring states through trade and investment deals. So China wanted to be, at this stage of its life, a good boy.

But with China's rising clout, there has been a change in its stance over the past decade, with Beijing adopting a more assertive foreign policy line, more confidently pushing back against the US and promoting its own core interests. Now towards this end, China has not shied away from applying military and other coercive economic and diplomacy leverages. Now regardless of protest emanating from neighboring states and from the UK and from the United States, Beijing has intensified the construction of airstrips and military facilities on the artificial islands in the South China Sea and increased the control of fishing and oil exploration activities of neighboring states in their own exclusive economic zones. Furthermore, Beijing has increased the economic, diplomatic and military pressures on Taiwan and the neighboring states such as the Philippines and Japan, and continues to strengthen its military activities in the East China Sea.

Now these changes are reflective of a weakening unipolar world order taking place concurrently with China's rise. So as China grows, it is pushing back against the US led international system, and it is promoting its own core interests, applying military and other coercive diplomatic and economic leverages where necessary. Now it must be remembered here that China's rise took place in a unipolar world. While polarity creates strong incentives for states to balance the unipole, there is a cost attached to such balancing which makes the challenger tread cautiously. And China has stayed cautiously all this time. But as China grew in strength, it resorted to soft balancing. While not directly challenging the United States, it sought to use military and non-military means, such as territorial denial and entangling diplomacy, to delay, frustrate and undermine US policies.

It desisted from hard balancing, which is reflected by military buildup and military alliances, because of the higher transaction costs involved. Now hard balancing is much easier to achieve in a bipolar or a multi-polar environment, but in a unipolar environment, hard balancing would be viewed as revisionism and as a dangerous threat to the international order. So that is why Beijing, rather than confronting the United States directly, has fixed its attention to its own neighborhood in East Asia. While Beijing is confronted with the dominant position which the US occupies, but because of China's strengthened economic and military capabilities, and because of the advantage that accrues to it from geography, it has greater confidence to do something about it.

Now no rising power would want military bases and forward deployed troops of its rivals next to its own borders, and so Beijing is seeking to establish some form of control over its immediate external environment, or a sphere of influence around its borders. As the US seeks to preserve its dominance, we see the outlines of a conflict emerging. The difference here is the US is far away from the place of action. It is consequently attempting to expand its diplomatic, economic and especially its military influence in the region. The Quad is thus one manifestation of US efforts to keep China in check. But the real story is that a change is in the offing, though it may be many years distant from the present time moment. Essentially the unipolar dynamics is weakening and other dynamics are strengthening, presenting Beijing with a variable set of options in which it can maneuver in East Asia.

For this, the CCP would rely on the support of its people, in the absence of which its ability to maneuver gets restricted. As the Chinese sense of nationalism provides the necessary level of support to the CCP to pursue its agenda, this will not be too great a constraining factor for the ruling dispensation, though it will have to be sensitive to domestic public opinion. Now for China, its strategy of promoting amongst its neighbors the idea that China's rise is peaceful and non-threatening has worked well till now, but it has its limitations. This strategy was predicated on US unipolarity, where China was enabled to free ride, as it did not have strong economic and security interests outside its own region, which made a low profile approach possible. With the gradual shift in world power, while China is still not carrying out the hard balancing option with respect to the US, it is increasing soft balancing options and intensifying cost imposing strategies and the everyday resistance to US power.

A look at the Chinese military power indicates that as military modernization has been focused on guarding itself against the most threatening elements of US military power. Now for this, just look at China's A2AD, that is the anti-access area denial military buildup. This is designed to push US naval and air power further away from the Chinese territory and prevent the US from intervening in the Taiwan Strait, as was the case in the mid-1990s. China now has the military capability to prevent the US military from operating near the Chinese coast and has actually prevented the US military from doing so. The show by China of its anti-ship ballistic missiles in its military parades is also designed to send a very clear message to Washington that China has the capability to sink US aircraft carriers. So by augmenting its A2AD capabilities, China has raised the cost and the risk for the US to operate its aircraft and ships close to China's near seas.

So China is also attempting to shape international developments by increasing activities and setting the agenda in multilateral organizations without directly confronting the US. For this, it's worthwhile to note that in a conference on confidence building measures in Asia, which was held in Shanghai in 2014, Xi Jinping outlined the Chinese ideas about the future security structures in Asia and emphasized that strong military alliances, making an obvious reference to the US, would be opposed. Now this is the first time since the end of the Cold War that a Chinese leader or the has role in regional security. In the economic sphere as well, China has formulated clearer responses and alternatives to the US led regional free trade agreement and the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the TPP. Now how did China respond? They responded with the Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, the RCEP, which was concluded in 2020, albeit without India. So China's BRI, that is the Belt and Road Initiative, has to be seen in this month.

To maintain its position, the US launched its pivot or rebalance to Asia under the Obama administration and now is invigorating the Quad. But the US strategy has been a bit incoherent, which has resulted in uncertainty in US allies and partners about the extent of US engagement and commitments. So this scenario is still playing out, and we will see in the years to come how it actually pans out.

A word here about the internal power dynamics in China is in order. Now we all know that China maintains an authoritarian political system with no opposition to the Chinese Communist Party, but many developments in the system have taken place which could upset this balance. Now the four Chinese modernizations which have been underway over the last four decades have seen rapid economic developments in China, which has huge implications for Chinese society and its relationship with the CCP. In order to continue the economic reform process, certain adjustments of the Chinese political and bureaucratic systems have been necessary, including the need to gradually allow more room for Chinese societal actors, encouraging private initiative and entrepreneurship and a higher degree of flexibility and dynamism in the Chinese economy. Consequently, a more diverse and active Chinese society has developed, where critical voices regarding developments in and outside China have emerged.

In addition, the Chinese society has become increasingly capable of showing his disappointment and anger, as well as taking advantage of the spread of new social media platforms and communication technologies. Put simply, China's spectacular economic growth has produced sweeping societal changes which have the potential to challenge the CCP's capacity to rule. So we now see that the CCP leadership is preoccupied with maintaining domestic control and legitimacy, and is quite prepared to use increasingly repressive methods to deal with the situation. Consequently, the efforts to reinvigorate the societal support to the Chinese party state have therefore also been intensified. You will see increased propaganda on this account.

Now here it must be noted that since the start of the economic reform process in China, that happened sometime in the late 70s, the ideological legitimacy of the Chinese leadership has been gradually undermined and replaced with the performance legitimacy. The Chinese leaders must continuously deliver on domestic stability, economic growth, growing prosperity and higher standards of living. Furthermore, they must fulfill the growing domestic expectations about regaining great power influence, status and respect. This is what we have pledged to do in the social contract with the Chinese population. It is still their main claim on legitimacy of the CCP leaders led by Xi Jinping, but it is getting more difficult to deliver while the expectations from the Chinese society are only growing.

So the relative decline of the US power in East Asia has further increased the nationalist ambitions and expectations in parts of the Chinese population, that China now will stand up and take what is seen as its rightful great power position and demand great past status and respect. This growing nationalist sentiment will constrain Chinese foreign policy choices, forcing it on a more belligerent path and reducing room from a new world. Now this was evident in the 2012 anti-Chinese protests in China that flared up after Japan had taken the decision to nationalize three of the contested Senkaku Islands. These were a group of five islets and three barren rocks about 200 miles of the Chinese coast, northeast Taiwan, which are claimed by China, Taiwan and Japan, but which are in the de facto control of Japan.

So in practice, Chinese leaders have been satisfied to declare Chinese sovereignty over the islands and to criticize Japanese efforts to demonstrate Japan's sovereignty claims — the kadhi ninda which I mentioned earlier — while not actually taking steps to challenge Japan's de facto control over the islands. I think this will now stand changed, with heightened concerns among the CCP to meet the people's demands. You now see nationalism projecting to Chinese claims in the surrounding areas and being linked to the domestic legitimacy of Chinese ruling clique. An assertive foreign policy has economic consequences. The relative weight that the Chinese leaders place on legitimacy derived through economic growth versus legitimacy derived by achieving nationalistic goals will be an important factor in the development in East Asian politics and security for the years to come.

In the present environment, there are clearly complex and continuously changing dynamics between the top-down nationalism and the bottom-up nationalism in China. Under Xi Jinping, the CCP has promoted a more uncompromising nationalism and been more willing to accept risks, including domestically, to advance what are seen as Chinese legitimate rights and claims. This is further combined with the tightening of political control and party discipline, inclining Chinese officials at all levels to take a tough nationalist stand. So we find Chinese diplomats are both reacting to a more nationalist public opinion and also seeking to satisfy their superiors and follow the party line. So rather than having a satisfying and calming effect on the people, or the bottom-up nationalism, it is only further strengthening. In such a context, the top-down nationalism and the bottom-up nationalism in China are thus interdependent and tend to mutually reinforce each other.

In China, national rejuvenation under Xi Jinping is the clarion call of a civilizational state. It is both flexible in its ideological scope and expandable in its territorial ambitions. Importantly, the nationalist rationale of the rejuvenation construct is not sourced from narratives or victimhood suffered during the century of humiliation, but is located in the glory of an imagined past, and is thereby both more assertive and aggressive in its orientation. In addition to being a nationalist project, national rejuvenation is equally a personal investment by Xi Jinping. Successful reclamation of every entity and ideal that belongs to the landscape of rejuvenation and field is positioned as a leading figure within the CCP pantheon. Therefore, China's increasing bellicosity towards Taiwan needs to be located within the dynamics of CCP's political expediency, Chinese nationalism and Xi's ambitions.

We can thus expect greater belligerence from China in the years to come. Both the South China Sea and the East China Sea will see increasing militarization, though China will seek to avoid direct military confrontation and use non-military methods to realize the goal of national rejuvenation and thereby the resolution of the Taiwan question. The ASEAN countries will attempt some form of rapprochement with China on their respective claim lines, but Japan will in all probability dramatically increase its defense budget and seek parity with Chinese naval and air power over the oceans. I had a talk a few years back with some of the Japanese delegates, and when I gave them this proposition, they told me Japan will never do it because it is forbidden in their constitution — and I think it was about eight or nine years back — I told them, you will change your constitution. They laughed at me, but believe you me, Japan will change its constitution.

For India, we have the advantage of geography in the Indian Ocean region, but would have to ensure an effective naval presence to guard our interests. The Quad serves India's security interests, though it is not yet a security grouping. On India's border with Tibet, it is a conflict which India will have to fight alone, though help in the form of intelligence or perhaps material support will in all likelihood come from the US and other western partners. The key factor in any war over the Himalayas will be cyber and space capability and control over the skies over the Tibetan plateau. So long as India is prepared, China will be reluctant to take on a military adventure which she may well lose. Internal stability, economic growth, military preparedness and astute diplomacy thus will be the essential components of India's response to Chinese belligerence. With this I conclude my talk, and now I'll be happy to take on any questions on any aspect which has not been covered so far. Thank you.

Katoch, you have given a wonderful talk. I think John has a question to ask. John, could you please take your questions?

Your question — and diplomacy, there are no permanent friends or enemies, so collectively India and China should think that are they being stupid, but and emerging as the number one and number two in the world economy. What are your — and sooner or later China and India will both realize. What is your opinion on that?

Right, thank you. Actually your voice was getting cut, but I've got the essence of your question, so if I missed out something, please let me know. You know, essentially when you look at the India China equation, theoretically if Tibet as a country still existed and was a buffer between the two countries, I think we would have been the best of friends and allies. Now that situation doesn't pertain any longer. China has occupied Tibet, and now we have a land border on the Himalayas. China unfortunately desires to control the complete Himalayan range, because control of the Himalayan range gives it control over the waters which flow down towards India, and if you control the waters, you control the land down below. That is China's ultimate aim.

China has made it very clear: one mountain cannot hold two tigers, and in their philosophy they are the tigers, and India will have to play second fiddle. India too is a civilizational state, and India is not going to play second fiddle to China. Unfortunately, it takes two hands to clap, and while India is prepared to extend that hand of friendship, I don't think China is prepared to take it. They seek total dominance. That is the situation as of now.

So for India, I think the best policy option as of today is to remain strong enough to defeat any Chinese misadventure over the Himalayas, and for that, as I mentioned in my talk, the key is not the Indian Army. The key is cyber capability and a stronger air force over the Tibetan plateau. If the war has to be fought on the Himalayas, I'm afraid we are already on the receiving end. The war has to be fought and won deep inside Tibetan territory. On the skies, you win the air war, you will win the ground war. It cannot proceed beyond that. So we have to ensure a stronger air force over the Tibetan plateau. We have to ensure essential cyber and space capabilities and missile capabilities, and if we do that to deter China, there will be no war, and that is what we should actually aim to do.

Friendship is an ideal situation. I don't think it is going to come about in the near future with the present Chinese dispensation. However, the people of China are — I'm very sanguine — they have a very soft corner towards India, as perhaps the people of India have towards the people of China. It is the dispensation, the ruling elite in China, which I think is the cause of the problem. I hope that answers it to some extent. Any other questions? Go ahead, unmute yourself.

Yes, I am moji peruvinder simarji. Very comprehensive talk we heard, but you see that still our concern remains the China developing villages just close to the line of actual control, number one, and claim some towns, and claim some towns that are not cheap already. How do we solve this kind of problem? How to reach or how to do this? These are two very important things that they're already doing it. So then what is our resources, if something happens, some war happens, what will our resources?

Right now, very frankly, ever since 1947 — and I'll tell you the roots of the problem; I'm not going to get into the political aspect of it, so my comments are not politically related to what happened with the earlier dispensations or the present dispensation, which is irrelevant — the fact of the matter is India refused to build infrastructure on the Himalayas post independence, on grounds which I think can be bordering on treason. And the grounds were — and please take it from me, this is the actual reason — they said if we build roads right up to the line of actual control, or the border or whatever you wish to call it, the Chinese can use it to come to Delhi, so we will not build any roads. You know, the point is, it is true that a road can come to Delhi, but that same road can go to Beijing.

People like me who have commanded a division there — it was a very sorry state of affairs. As a general officer commanding, for me to get to Bumla, you know, it was a very rickety ride, but my Chinese counterpart could come on a metal road, you know, in minutes. The situation has changed over the last five years, five to seven years I would say, where more than 2,500 kilometers of roads have now been constructed. Now the thing was that if you look at the map of Arunachal Pradesh, especially on the eastern edge, the Chinese have built a road right up to the McMahon Line and then they have crossed over it actually in one or two places. Now their road has come up, and obviously they have settled some people there. The Indian road from that point is still 20 kilometers away. For us, our patrol takes one day to reach. So there have been problems, but those problems are being rectified.

There is no way in which you can kick them out from where they are — that is point number one. But I think it is equally important to understand that the key result area is not on eastern Arunachal Pradesh, what we call in the army, right, or the rest of our information.

Please unmute yourself. Okay, sorry. Yeah, I was saying the key area for India is still Tawang, and that is what the Chinese claim. Now why Chinese claim Tawang is because it can give them a leverage to tell the Tibetan people, we have got Tawang back for you. Now Tawang is something which we are not going to give to them. They will have to fight for it. They will have to lose hundreds of thousands of men to get it, and even then there is no assurance that they will get it. So that is something out of the question. So this conflict will remain on east.

The same situation obtained in eastern Ladakh. We didn't build our roads, we didn't build our infrastructure. Today, when you see the Doklam crisis, please take it from me, the key result area was the Indian Air Force deployment there. China doesn't have an answer to that, because if push comes to shove and there is a war, it will be fought first in the air, and I don't think China can face the humiliation of losing 50 to 100 aircraft. So you will have a peace, but just a little short of time. Who wants to ask a question? Yes, please go ahead.

Yeah, thank you General, and General Mehta. Very comprehensive, but you mentioned it in passing. Now as you are aware, China, the PLA Navy has been making increasing presence in the Indian Ocean region and also been looking for bases all around India, including in Sri Lanka, where they developed report and trying to get it on a long term lease because of, you know, they're not being able to pay off the money. So while Indian Navy has started in some ways mission-based deployment further away, in your view, increasing presence of our navy in the South China Sea and indeed, you know, on the maritime side of China — would it not also bring in some kind of pressure on China that we can always do a tit-for-tat if, you know, she ventures too much into the Indian Ocean? It could probably also ease some pressure on the land borders. Your views please.

Oh, actually a very friendly, Vice Admiral, moderator. And my view is that the two issues, you know, our land borders and what happens on the oceans, will be two unrelated issues. These things will be fought separately. As far as the Indian Ocean is concerned, I think we need to maintain a very strong grip on the Malacca Straits, which is why, you know, what we do in the Andamans I think is of very great interest. We have got our second aircraft carrier, we are going in for additional submarines. We need to have dominance in the Indian Ocean region.

Now can we maintain that level of dominance? At the moment I think we are okay, but 10 years from now I have very serious reservations about India's naval capabilities unless we pump in much more money and resources to the navy, because the key battles are going to be, or the key dominant areas, the decision movements, will be there actually in the oceans and not in the mountains. Mountains we are in a position to handle. So we would need to really buttress our naval capability. I'm glad the second aircraft carrier has come. We are not going in for a third; we are going in for submarines. I hope we do get some nuclear submarines. But we are in a very dominant position, basically because of geography. We should be grateful that we have the perfect geography, which regardless of what China does, they will not be able to match. And with the western Quad also coming up, I think the situation will remain in our favor. I don't think the Government of India is going to allow a situation by which the Chinese navy will have a predominant role to play in the Indian Ocean region. We need to increase our defense budget certainly, as far as our naval capacity and capability is concerned. That is my short answer.

Sorry HSK, I'm sorry, this is the last question, we'll be short of time. Our borders and our geography — probably China will not be able to impact us much. Let's have an opinion and word from General on this.

Okay, thank you very much Mr C Paul Singh. Before that I want to say, you know, this very distinguished crowd of 40, and Deepak and Katoch can understand — they've been a very distinguished lot running on parallel lines all the time. It's been an excellent presentation, great show. You see, as far as mountains are concerned, well, we cannot wipe out the mountains. They will remain a major threat, and we have to have an impregnable defense there. We've got to have an offensive defense there. The offensive corps which has come up is a step in the right direction. Increasing our non-kinetic resources is most essential. What is important is that we should avoid getting into any kinetic war with China on our northern frontiers.

Now Galwan was one issue. China did back off at a point of time, and we should continue to increase our infrastructure development, and both, as Katoch said, defense budget. I said combining the both — actually we have to increase our economic effort. We have to make our economy strong, and one of the major factors for making the economy strong is, you know, is our aim to become an arms exporter, and we are doing that. And the recent, you know, talking of the US ship, has got our shipyard or the shipping industry right into the global market. So I think these are the fronts which we have made. Mountains, I feel that we have to control China with our resources being increased there. And Katoch again brought out the air force — there's a news about the Tu-160, Russian, six pieces coming. So those are the steps which are in the right direction. So I would add that much, sir, for your consideration. Thank you General.

Sir, now time is a little short. Now I'll request you to conclude the session, sir.

Oh thank you very much, thank you indeed. Well, I would not like to say more than one line — that's not only a very comprehensive, very very elaborate, but very very competent and very very efficient, and you gave a very nice presentation. And you started that China wanted to be a good boy. When you started, wrong, that's good boy. But we know that nationalism sort of thing, you said, is giving the nationalism, probably making them naughty boys instead of boys, because everywhere, you know, China's growing media influence is affecting other countries. In countries like Hungary, it has embraced close ties with China, and you know that Chinese influence in Hungary, being in the heart of Europe, can adversely affect the European power source. At the same time, you also know that the track record of China dealing with other countries on equal footing is poor. So there are dangers, and we have to strengthen our own state institutions, our civil society institution, our land border laws, our land borders — all this has to be by and large.

The activism of China is not only, as I said, only on the strategic point of view. It is influencing the intellectual content, influencing the ideas. Confucius institutions have been raised or certified, giving the idea what to focus said of China, that they want to be dominant, they want to be big brother. So this is the danger which is there, afraid. But at the same time, I mean, as well as the Indian in practice, the sun, I'm sure that there was an impact with the brilliant people in the army like you. And as we saying there, because the foreign force in Pakistan, acquiring ports in Sri Lanka, acquiring force in Djibouti in Africa — they, by the Chinese, indicate that they are going to have a strategic area of interest in places where they force their environment. Again, economic aid which they are providing to countries like Pakistan, to countries like Nepal, Myanmar, Bangladesh, which is close to India, can directly affect the strategic security environment of India, to the extent of even sometime affecting our policy towards Palestine. They are the looming dangers. We have to be careful about it. With these words, I thank you very much for having come here and discussed at length what would be the impact, China's activism in India, about other countries, and how they are countering. USA also.

With these words, let me tell everyone a banner please: our next webinar is hybrid working, on the teamwork leadership. Speakers are Lieutenant General Doctor Prakash Menon, another brilliant army officer and also a member of the National Security Council, Government of India. The second speaker, he's a very senior management consultant, an ex-CEO of the foods business, and who is globally known for his management techniques, which he has been innovating many meetings, he has been propagating. These are the two speakers. They will be addressing this webinar. I request you all who are present there to be with us on 26th of August at 6:00 pm, again 6 to 7:30, because that session is going to be having two speakers, 6 to 7:30 pm. With these words, I once again thank everyone who have come here, and particularly our great speaker. Thank you very much.

Thank you very much. An excellent exposition. Now, yes, I'm going to be more interactive with you, Deepak, after this. Take a picture on the threads of excellence which NISSMAT has been presenting ever since, I think, the Galwan issue took off, and to that extent I have tried to follow quite a few of them, and really grateful to Mr C Paul Singh, to permanente, and to you Deepak — you've also been a bedrock there. I think these are sessions of intellectual stimuli and excellence, I can say. We gain so much from it at no cost basis. So I'm very grateful too. Thank you.

Thank you sir. We are in need of light. I'm overwhelmed with your affection.