Hear Maj Gen Lakhwinder Singh (Retd), the “Enraged Bull of Drass,” recount his pivotal role in the 1999 Kargil War.
What this session covered
This session is an interview between a host and a single guest, an Indian Army artillery officer who commanded an artillery brigade in the Drass sector during the Kargil conflict of May to July 1999 and was decorated for his part in it. After a brief account of his early career and commissioning into the artillery, the speaker described the run-up to the fighting: infiltration that went undetected, an intelligence failure he said occurs too frequently in India, and a set of peacetime mindsets — confidence in the diplomatic thaw then under way, the established practice of vacating high-altitude posts in winter, and the assumption that limited infrastructure on the Pakistani side would give India warning — that together allowed the intrusion to take hold. He also faulted the holding formation, stretched across a very long frontage, for neglecting patrolling, and noted that early attacks by a newly inducted, unacclimatised brigade failed with heavy losses before a division-level response was mounted.
The core of the discussion concerned the employment of artillery in Drass. The speaker recounted the improvised use of Bofors guns in a direct-firing role against enemy bunkers, first trialled at Tololing, and the massing of large concentrations of guns on each objective, with gun positions ringed around targets, a mix of high- and low-angle fire, and supplementary observation positions manned by commanding officers to direct fire the forward observers could not see. He described the demoralising effect this had on the Pakistani defenders and recounted episodes from the battles for Tololing, Point 5140 and other features in the sector where artillery proved decisive after infantry assaults alone had stalled — direct fire destroying bunkers and pillboxes, and, in one action on a feature flanking Tiger Hill, indirect fire brought down close to pinned-down troops at their own request, enabling them to extricate themselves. He argued that artillery should be regarded as a decisive arm rather than merely a support arm — a view he said the war in Ukraine reinforces.
On leadership, the speaker praised commanders who resisted pressure to launch attacks before troops were ready, and stressed personal conviction and genuinely combined-arms thinking. He was critical of the war's conclusion, arguing that India stopped short: the withdrawing Pakistani troops were allowed to pull back without punitive cost, the Line of Control was not altered to India's advantage, and the outcome was celebrated although, in his view, India had only recovered its own territory. He connected this restraint to subsequent Pakistani-sponsored terrorism, referring to an attack in Kashmir a few days before the recording, and closed with a call for India to remain prepared in equipment, manpower and mindset.
Key points raised
- The session is a single-guest interview with an officer who commanded an artillery brigade in the Drass sector in 1999, not a panel discussion.
- The speaker attributed the initial surprise to intelligence failure compounded by peacetime mindsets: faith in the ongoing diplomacy, the routine winter vacation of high-altitude posts, and an overstretched formation that had let patrolling lapse.
- He described the direct firing of Bofors guns and the massing of concentrated artillery on each objective as decisive in the Drass battles, arguing artillery should be treated as a decisive arm rather than fire support.
- Close artillery-infantry coordination, including observation positions manned by commanding officers, was presented as central to the recapture of Tololing, Point 5140 and other features in the sector.
- The speaker criticised the war's conclusion, saying India allowed the Pakistani withdrawal without punitive cost or any change to the Line of Control, and linked that restraint to later terrorism, citing an attack in Kashmir days before the recording.
