Encounter of 4th Dec 2021 in Nagaland – resentment and demand to repeal AFSPA

What this session covered

Recorded shortly after the events it examines, this session addressed the encounter of 4 December 2021 in the Mon district of Nagaland, in which an army operation resulted in the deaths of civilians, and the public agitation and demand for repeal of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act that followed. The format was a discussion between a host and two invited speakers, one drawing on an army background and the other on a police and internal-security background. It opened with an account of the north-eastern region's strategic importance and a summary of the long history of Naga insurgency, its factions, successive ceasefires and the more recent framework of peace talks.

Much of the discussion turned on a distinction between a failure of intelligence and the conduct of the operation itself. One speaker offered a reconstruction of the sequence of events — drawn, it was noted, partly from ground accounts and partly from speculation — describing an ambush laid on the basis of intelligence about insurgent movement, a vehicle that did not stop when signalled, firing that killed occupants who proved not to be insurgents, and a subsequent confrontation with a gathering crowd during which further lives, including that of a soldier, were lost. It was argued that the intelligence had failed, since those first fired upon were not insurgents, and that a court of inquiry under a senior officer, already ordered, would establish the facts and any culpability. The view was pressed that troops on the ground should not be blamed for acting on the information passed to them, and that responsibility lay higher up — with those who collated the intelligence and, ultimately, with the political leadership, which should acknowledge the error and apologise.

On the Act itself, the discussion set out its principal features — powers of search and arrest without warrant, the power to use lethal force, and protection from prosecution without prior central-government sanction, applicable only in areas formally declared to be disturbed. The two speakers differed in emphasis. One argued that prolonged application had fostered a mindset of intimidation, was counterproductive to a political settlement, and sat uneasily with constitutional values and with Supreme Court rulings that had upheld the Act while attaching safeguards; reference was also made to a government-appointed committee that had recommended repeal. The other maintained that a soldier on the ground does not act by reference to the Act, that it provides only the legal protection without which forces cannot operate in a disturbed area, and that abuses had become the exception rather than the rule, discipline being enforced by commanders. Both nonetheless appeared to converge on the assessment that insurgency in Nagaland is now at a low level and that, were the governments to judge the area no longer to warrant it, the disturbed-area declaration — and with it the Act — could be withdrawn there, as had been done in other north-eastern states. It was emphasised that a durable end to insurgency would come through political settlement rather than through the Act.

Key points raised

• The session distinguished a failure of intelligence from the conduct of the operation, treating them as separate questions.
• One speaker reconstructed the sequence of the encounter, cautioning that parts of the account rested on ground reports and speculation.
• Responsibility was located with those who collated the intelligence and with the political leadership, rather than with the troops on the ground; it was said the State should acknowledge the error and apologise.
• The Act's principal features were set out: search and arrest without warrant, use of lethal force, and protection from prosecution without prior central sanction, in areas declared disturbed.
• The two speakers differed in emphasis on the Act — one stressing its effect on rights, mindset and political settlement, the other the legal protection it affords deployed forces.
• Both suggested that, with insurgency in Nagaland now low, the disturbed-area declaration and the Act could be withdrawn there if the governments so judged.