Terrorism is the Weapon of the Weak

Ladies and gentlemen, this is a very good evening to all the delegates who have joined us on this webinar today on the subject "Terrorism is the Weapon of the Weak". This webinar, as you all know, is being hosted by NISSMAT. NISSMAT International has been hosting webinars on various subjects for the last more than one year. We have covered subjects on topical subjects; we have covered a lot number of subjects on homeland security; we have covered subject on terrorism earlier also, and on cyber security, on risk management, etc., receiving a very thumping response from all over the globe. We launched another series of webinar which is basically concerned with the defense and homeland security. In that series this is the third one, which is on terrorism as a weapon of the weak. I extend what welcome to all of you, and I'm sure that you will certainly profit by attending this webinar because it's being addressed by one of the most learned speaker on the subject.

May I say a few words about NISSMAT. National Institute of Security, Safety, Management of my Technology was established in the year 1990, about three decades back. Initially we started only with the subject of private security, safety, security management and technology. With the passage of time we started having subjects for certain retired defense forces personnel for their absorption in the private security. We also had some topics on the fire safety etc. Late in the last few years we thought of establishing NISSMAT as an important think tank and an organization we should claim its place foremost in corporates trading. NISSMAT has got now four wings: NISSMAT Forum to organize webinars, seminars, conferences, international programs, interaction programs, debates; then we have NISSMAT Academy. Mr Singh, unmute yourself. Mr Sipal, you've muted yourself, unmute yourself please, left hand side bottom. All right now, hello, yes, you're okay now, thank you. So then we have got the NISSMAT Academy, and then we have what, NISSMAT Foundation. Now this particular webinar is being conducted by NISSMAT Forum.

A word about our chairman, Captain Pharmanjit Alvaria. He took voluntary retirement from the regimental Parachute Regiment, I recorded, the Indian Army, at a very young age, and he jumped into the area of an unknown area, I would call, of business. But with his warmth as well as by his contagious smile — I will, okay, always smiling — yet he is very very firm, I must tell you, as far as his employees are concerned. So he has thought leadership quality and has a courage of conviction which made him one of the very important leaders in the corporate world. His business group, under the name of Alvaria Holding Company, has offices at multiple locations all over India and abroad. He is the past president and former chairman of Council of International Investigators, USA, and he also is an awardee — award is Welcome Thompson Award and Kutely Award by the Council of Internationals.

Now, having said a few words about the moderator, let me say a few words, introduce the subject. I said today's subject, no, it is about terrorism is a weapon of the weak. Terrorism as such is perhaps the truest of the crew of crimes. Assassinations, mindless killings of the innocent with the view to spread terror has become almost a regular affair nowadays. At times terrorism also has the support of the foreign countries, and this makes it all the more acute of the countries where it is prevailing or where it is being perpetuated. In fact another factor which leads to terrorism, as I mentioned, is encouragement by one country to the terrorist activities in other countries due to some political consideration. However, whether terrorism is practiced by weak and marginalized groups who are not able to influence the policies of the government, whether they are otherwise weak and cannot hope to change the prevailing policies and establishment and ideologies of the government in powers, and thus indulge in brutal terrorist attack to attain more visibility, to attain more propaganda value, and also to become a group of position in the international terrorist world — perhaps it is only, I think, this perhaps particular the subject which we have discussing, the terrorism is a weapon.

I only feel that probably this is a conventional view, the terrorism is a weapon of weak. This view has become so common that it is taken for granted. There is attacks like suicide bombing, brutal killing, ambushes to eliminate armed forces personnel are often used by them who are, they say, weak militarily compared to the establishment forces. Correct, maybe correct, that military they are weak, but if there is a weapon of the weak, that is to be discussed. There is also a belief that less popular and less and less what these girls get the most, they are in their resolve to intelligent terrorism. In fact the argument that terrorism is the weapon of weak is based basically, I think, on the vehicle military strength of the terrorists relative to the strength of the armed forces of government in power. The hypothesis that terrorism is the weapon of the weak should mean actually that greater the strength of the government forces, lesser should be the terrorist activity. It is not so always. Is also said that there is an escalation of terrorism when it's on the verge of defeat. Is it so? Some people say it's just a matter of relative military capacity. Maybe so, but for others, more to do with the magnitude of support they get from other international kids — whether they have got more support, so they are strong; if they get slower, that's four, they're weak.

There have been of course successful actions, I know, against the terrorists. As all of you know, our only referendum, one thing come to my mind is the Entebbe operations. That is where they were able to — the armed forces, the particular armed group of the Israelites forces, was able to have a complete success in this operation. But I feel that this was basically the result of immaculate planning and execution of an endure state. You cannot take it for granted that says they have been able to execute this, this is they were weaker and the armed. But I am not going to discuss further than that. Only I am saying that there are views this side and that side. Analytical studies about the psychology of the terrorists indicate that basically there are socio-economic factors, there are political, cultural factors, there are religious factors, there are cost affiliation which motivate them. If they are motivated, are they motivated and doing action as a vehicle group, or they want to come into limelight, that is the only ones they want to have, hence the intelligence. With these words I leave it to the London speaker, then Pranayak, to enlighten us and the delegates who are present there on this point of view that terrorism is a weapon of the weak. Thank you very much.

Before General Parnaik comes on, I'd like to acknowledge the presence of participants from different countries. We have today participants from India, the United States, of Kenya, Zambia and the United Kingdom. We are streaming live on Zoom and YouTube. This particular program today has been sponsored by Premiershield Private Limited, which is a security company, a manpower based security company; Premier Consulting and Investigations Limited, which is an investigations and background screening organization; India Skills Private Limited, which is an assessment company dealing with the Government of India; and Tax Scores, which is an assessments platform. During the course of the talk by the General I'd like all of you to remain muted. Please keep your videos on, switch off your cell phones so that there is no distraction, and note down and prepare to ask questions. And when your question is ready, just give me a chat, something on the chat, so that I know that you would be wanting to ask a question.

With these words I'd also like to introduce — please remain muted, it will help us all — I'd like to introduce the president of NISSMAT, Mr C Paul Singh. Mr C Paul is a Masters in English Literature and has retired as a very senior police officer. He has served the Government of India in various states. He was made responsible by the government to raise the Rapid Action Force and was also its first chief. He also raised the Internal Security Academy in Mount Abu, Rajasthan. During a service he has been decorated with the President's Police Medal for Distinguished Services, the Indian Police Medal for Meritorious Services, the Police Special Duty Medal with bar, and a Sena Medal by the government for his work with the armed forces, and a number of other commendations and rewards. Post retirement he's worked as a consultant with Tatas. He's also been the chairman of the technical committee of Quality Control of India, which formulated the standards for star ratings of the private security companies. He was involved in developing the curriculum for private security guards training under the security sector and skill development council. He was the head of the committee we designed and worked out national occupation standards for the training of private security guards and qualifications for the firefighters in India. In the year 2009, post-retirement, the President of India recognized his services and awarded him, or given the honor of, the Security Personality of the Year. He currently is the advisor to the Asian Professional Security Association, the Indian chapter, and is an honorary director general to the centralization of private security industry and the assertion of private detectives and investigators. Mr C Paul's face is well known in India as a dynamic security professional and is frequently called to share his views on various subjects connected to homeland security on national news channels.

Ladies and gentlemen, NISSMAT is also looking at opportunities from various organizations to advertise on its channels and propagate the webinars that we are having. It would help NISSMAT in raising funds to execute the tasks that it has taken upon itself. Today in the webinar we had two speakers lined up, Major General SP Rai and the General KT Parnaik. Unfortunately General SP Rai has been taken by Covid and is currently running very high fever and a sore throat, and he cannot speak. But I still like to introduce him. General Rai is an alumni of this Defense Services of College in Wellington and has had extensive operational experience in countless interagency areas. He served as the defense attache with the in Egypt and looked at the entire Arab world. He has 44 years of jacket carrier in the army, holding key staff, instructional and operational appointments. We are going to miss him today.

And now I'd like to introduce General KT Parnaik, whom I've had the privilege and honor of doing since we were 15 years old, so that takes us back almost 40, what, 45 years. General Parnaik has had a distinguished career spanning over 41 years in the Indian Army. He was commissioned in and commanded the Second Rajputana Rifles, an illustrious battalion of the Indian Army. He served with dignity and professional excellence, holding leadership positions in challenging command and staff assignments along the entire northern and western borders of the country. He's a third generation officer. He commanded a brigade in Jammu and Kashmir during Operation Parakram along the Line of Control, a division in Sikkim, and a corps in the northeast. As Director General Perspective Plans he was closely associated with modernization and transformation of the Indian Army. The General is credited with several foreign assignments, to include Chief of Staff of United Nations Mission in Angola and Commandant of the Indian Military Training Team in Bhutan. At the peak of his career the General held the most coveted assignment as General Officer Commanding in Chief of the highly active and sensitive Northern Command, a 450,000 strong force dealing with military operations and logistics in some of the remote and hostile terrains along the northern and western borders of our country. He was responsible for envisioning and implementing a proactive and strategic synergetic strategic strategy to marginalize the terrorists, minimize infiltration, and brought about a sea change in the environment through a well-conceived perception management strategy. For his outstanding leadership, strategic vision and effective synergizing the operations in J&K he was awarded the Param Vishisht Seva Medal in 2012. General Parnaik is presently serving as the joint managing director of Volta Defense Technology Systems since 2016. He is also a director on the board of Rolta India Limited and Rolta Thales Limited. Ladies and gentlemen, I present to you Lieutenant General KT Parnaik.

Thank you very much, Pawan. Thank you very much, NISSMAT, for inviting me on this program. I think it's the first time that I am speaking. It's a great pleasure and honor to be with you. Let me straight away get on with the topic that you have set for this evening, terrorism is the weapon of the weak. I start by saying that terrorism thrives on the basic primordial factor, which is fear. If you look at the early human beings, they were traumatized by the elements of the earth — the fire, water, earth — and these are the elements which destroyed living beings and drove many species to their extinction. And that is how fear has continued to be playing a major part in our lives, whether it is used for good or bad or other purposes. Today more and more countries and societies are coming under the thoughts of terrorism, and therefore it is important that we understand the implications, we understand the way, the reasons, the causes, and also try and find out solutions how to deal with it.

To start with, the definition of terrorism, in fact, it has been an agony for most of us, and especially for India. Security Council has not been able to define terrorism in its entirety. The Security Council Resolution 1566 of 2004 talks of and describes terrorism as a criminal act against civilians committed with an intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the public, group of persons or particular persons, intimidate them, or compel a government or an organization to do or abstain from doing any act. Now if you really go through the literature, almost every country — EU, the Arabs — have defined terrorism in a way it suits them. Therefore I feel terrorism is a dynamic issue, and the difficulty in defining terrorism is in agreeing on a basis for determining when the use of violence, directed by whom, at whom, and for what end, is legitimate or it is not.

If you look at the contents of the parameters of terrorism, the major reasons for terrorism in various countries span from being basically — it comes to poor governance and separation by the government of the population. The causes could be political, economic, social, ideological, religious, ethnic, racial or sectarian. The targets for terrorism would always be individuals, groups, states; it could even target environment, national resources, logistics or infrastructure. All activities of terrorism are violence oriented and therefore they are unlawful, unconstitutional. Sometimes these activities dwell in the reign of being psychopathic, barbaric, destructive, heinous and genocidal, and there are examples for all these categories which we are aware of. The means of threat or violence which is used is basically intimidation, sabotage, and also efforts to jeopardize, destabilize, provoke or compel a state or a group of people.

I would also try, before I go on to the subject proper, I feel that there is a need for me to try and differentiate certain other parameters which are acting to terrorism or they are related to terrorism. Now let's take for example insurgency. Insurgency and terrorism are different things altogether. However, a terrorism activity or a group which resorts to terrorism, when it gets more public support, it gets moral support and support in terms of arms and ammunition, could graduate into an insurgency. An insurgency actually is a political movement which is aimed at realizing political goals, whereas terrorism could reign through various domains which I have just spoken of. The examples for countries which have gone into this kind of activity are plenty. If you don't go too far and you stick to what is happening in our own countries, the Maoist insurgency started with a national movement, some violence, some terrorism; it is a full-blown insurgency today. Similarly in north east, most of the groups, we started because of the oppressive and neglected areas — we did not get any development, there was no unemployment, and they got eliminated from the country. So they resorted to terrorist activities, but slowly, with the popular support of their people, with provision of arms and ammunition from across the borders, their ideologies changed and they mushroomed into an insurgency which has carried on for many years now.

Other distinction could be made between terrorism and guerrilla warfare. Basic difference here is that the guerrillas own a territory. They operate from a territory. They also resort to activities would be labeled as terrorists, but they operate from a territory, they have a larger support base, and they have inferior strength visibly the government or the people or the groups they are targeted, and that's why they have to resort to guerrilla warfare tactics. A very recent example globally is the Hamas. The Hamas, from Gaza Strip, East Bank, Israel, continues to target the state of Israel despite all the beatings they get back from them. But it is a clear example of how a terrorist organization could mushroom into a guerrilla warfare when the environment and the infrastructure is available.

Similarly, when you talk of guerrilla warfare, there are other terms which can confuse us. Some call them militancy. Now militancy — if you remember, most of our northeast terrorists are groups, they were initially known as anti-national elements, ANEs, or they were called as militants. So the difference is that in an insurgency, a group which is propagating insurgency, it has a militant cadre, it has a political cadre. So the militant cadre is responsible for carrying out activities against the security forces, police forces, against the organizations, and the political cadre then furthers agenda of achieving his political goals. They could be similar ones — rebellion, insurrection, mutiny, resolution, uprising, etc. These are also adjectives to violence and terror, and they need not be confused with terrorism. While terrorism is common to all of them, all these groups which I have described resort to terror in some form. Here I thought we would understand these basic differences before we want to discuss the main topic, because as Mr C Paul Singh said in the beginning, these are hypotheses which have come out of western empirical studies, and these hypotheses allow us to view the methodology by which whether the terrorism is an act which is propagated by the weak or it is otherwise.

To my mind, when you look at terrorism, I think it is an interplay of the state, the group and the cause. It depends what kind of state are we looking at — autocratic, democratic, a weak state or a welfare state. Similarly, what kind of groups are we looking at? Are these groups politically oriented? Are they economically and socially deprived? Are these groups sectarian? Are these group religiously radicalized, etc.? And the cause would be, what is the end state of what these terrorists are wanting to do? Do they want secession? Do they want independence? Do they want an area which is autonomous for themselves? So these are factors which interact to tell us who, when and why terrorism is used.

Let me come to those hypothesis which in some way Mr C Paul had talked of in the beginning, and I'd like to discuss these with some examples that we have around us, to see whether these are — this is a truth gospel, or there is some latitude which will, you know, go away from what this is being said. Before I say that, what I wanted to do was that make you aware that there has been an empirical study carried out by the western countries, basically the US and the UK and the EU, which have looked at the overall terrorist models existing in the globe, and they have looked at the type of states or countries where they have existed or where they have taken place, and they have also studied the type of violent activities perpetuated by the groups — what kind of groups and what were the results. They have categorized it into number of violent incidents, number of deaths, etc. So this is an empirical study. It is not complete in itself, but it draws some conclusions by data, and these datas have been drawn from the combined armed conflict datas and the global terrorist data. I don't want to show these datas because they are just figures and they don't speak, but I will try and analyze some of these hypotheses which have been propounded by them.

The first hypothesis is that the weaker the rebels — weaker militarily to the government — the more they resort to terrorism. Obviously a weak group which wants to confront a state which is very strong cannot have any conventional methods of trying to battle with them. Therefore they go on the path of terror, because in terrorism there is no face. You carry out these activities surreptitiously. These are violent, they cause a lot of casualties, they could be of very severe nature, and they create shock and panic amongst the people or the groups against which they are perpetuated. So sometimes these are acts directly focused on authorities who are, you know, dictating things to them or who are oppressing them. Sometimes they are directed at the people, not with the intent of really harming them, but sending a message that if you do not comply to our demands, on our requirements, then this is what is going to happen. So there is an indirect pressure on the governments to try and have a talk with them, to settle and compromise and provide them whatever they need, or not provide them and go for it. So this is a truism and it works in all conditions.

So if you look at the insurgencies and the terrorist activities, let me say that 80 percent of terrorism abounds in Africa and Asia — 80 or more, maybe. If you look at the countries which are affected in Africa, they are mostly the Maghreb, which is the north Africa; the Horn of Africa, which is south of Sahara; it is also the eastern coast. And 80 percent of these countries are poor countries. They are poor countries; the governments may not have the wherewithal, but the problems exist. These are sectarian problems, there are problems based on radicalization, there are problems based on operation, there is poverty, economic poverty, there is lack of education, lack of employment, social problems. So a lot of these countries resort to terrorism to try and seek their rights. Similarly, in Asian countries it is the west Asia basically which is riddled with more terrorism there, but not all countries are poor or weak. The oil rich countries have the money, and the oil-rich countries are supporting some of these other groups in other countries. Therefore you will see that the first hypothesis is almost a truism. As per their data, this hypothesis has 96 percent conviction. In fact 96 percent of people who are in this method, where the country is, they're poorer and they are weaker than the country itself, they resort to terrorism — it is 2 to 96 percent of the time. And terrorism and violence perpetuated by the groups, once they get popular support, may mushroom into a civil war, and those examples also abound in some of these states. There is a civil war, when like you see the occurred in Turkey, or you see the Hamas, the Palestine and Israel — so there is a civil war going on between them. The only differentiation here is that whom do you call a terrorist and whom do you call a freedom fighter. So one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter. So if you take that into account, I suppose this hypothesis has lot of truism in it.

The second hypothesis calls for: rebels facing more capable states will end up with more terrorism. Now this is similar to the first hypothesis. The subtle difference is rebels facing more capable states. Now states may be, in strength, maybe more than the rebels, but when you say more capable states, it means they are more modern, they have more modern implements, they have better intelligence, they have better police forces and security forces. The reason is that such rebels, unless they get a popular support base, are unable to operate against the security forces. So they have no option but to resort to terrorism to show their strength, to make their demands, and to compel the government to do what they wanted. These sort of activities would mushroom into a guerrilla activity if these groups ultimately gain support from their people, are able to establish a base. Take for example the European countries today — all the migrants which have come into Europe, mostly from Africa and some from Asia, they have ghettos, they have areas where their own country police and all can't enter. So when such kind of situation prevails, then the terrorism could mushroom into a guerrilla warfare at a certain stage if their problems are not sorted out.

The third hypothesis which he talks of is that rebels fighting on rough terrain will use less terrorism. Now this is a very funny hypothesis, but the argument is that terrain provides him — he provides him cover, it provides him areas to hide, areas to sneak away, it gives him a better target acquisition, and therefore they could resolve to terrorism. There is not so much of truism in it. What they are saying is that in 55 to 60 percent cases this is what is happening, but in 45 percent case it is not. You look at Afghanistan terrain — now it can't be more rugged and difficult than anyone else, but this is not true for them. Whereas it may be true for our northeast insurgents, who are in jungles, who are in mountains. It may be true for them, because initially when they started becoming an insurgency there, they started going across to Myanmar, they strained there, got weapons, arms, come back, and they started — it was an insurrection, then became insurgency. So they continued to fight this insurgency despite the so-called SOO that the government has with them, suspension of operations, okay.

The fourth hypothesis was that less popular support group enjoys more and it will employ more terrorism. Again it's an adjunct to what I said before, that a group which does not have support, it is on its own. How does it fight the state? It doesn't have any other option but to resort to terrorist activities and violence — a sneak killing here, kidnapping there, an extortion here, and things like that. Again, this is just about 40 to 50 percent states where these things happen. Even sometimes, less popular support and the group is weaker than the government, they really can't even graduate to terrorists — it's very difficult for them — so they indulge in propaganda, the indulgence cyborg and case like this.

The fifth one is that terrorism is likely in early stages of conflict rather than the lid. Now this is an assumption. If you look at what we have said earlier, the early stages the group was small, it didn't have popular support, it didn't have the wherewithal, but over a period of time it was able to garner support from the people of the state, it managed to get funding and managed to get arms, and there it is. So in early stage they may have resorted to terrorism, but as they got more strengthened, they are now into an insurgency mode. Differences are very subtle. It is not to say that in insurgency they are not carrying out terrorist activities — they are, and our own case is there. What you see happening in Nagaland just the other day — they had ambushed and killed an officer of the family, they ambushed groups in certain areas. Now the terrain facilitates this kind of activity, and it's an insurgency, so it is not something which is dying down. Today I remember being posted as a young officer in Nagaland in 74-75, and that is the time we had intercepted the China bound and China returned gangs. And in 75 the Naga peace accord was signed, and believe you me, we launched many operations to get hold of the Naga general headquarters which was supposedly around Kohima. That time the operations were launched, they were successful, we raided the GHQ, but two people got away whom we could never trace — Swu and Muivah. Thereafter they went into an exiled hal in Netherlands and they raised the NSCN, and the rest is history as you know.

The next hypothesis is that — this is the contrary to the four one — that they are likely to use terrorism more when they are getting defeated. So a group which has been active in insurgency, when it is brought to its knees by the security forces and the police and the state, it could resort to terrorism. Now in all these hypotheses that I have said, the word weak only relates — it's a relative term: weak to the government, weak in its support, weak in its capability to possess arms, ammunition, its mobility, intelligence, etc. So while it is true that a weaker group would tend to use terrorism more, it is not necessary that it should happen that way. Even a strong group will and should use terrorism, whether it is in the initial stages or later stages.

So what I feel — and there is the last one — he says that rebels who control territory are less likely to use terrorism. Again it's a derivative from the one before. If you are controlling territory, you would rather launch a guerrilla war, you would rather launch an insurgency. You may not, but that is not only true, because such incidents, the possibility is just 50 percent. Now these were some of the hypothesis which I had skimmed out from these studies. These are empirical studies. So I made a small sheet for myself, and this is what I see. It's simplistic, but it may be true. It says: weak group, strong state, no popular support — error, so weak is picking up terrorism. Weak group, weak state, with popular support — he goes on to insurgency or guerrilla warfare. A strong group with a weak government and weak support — he could go to terrorism and insurgency both, but he has weak support, he will have to wait to form base. A strong group, a weak government, good support — it's an insurgency situation. And a strong group with a strong government and good support — it's a civil war.

The hypothesis are, I would say, they are more theoretical, but I would not dispel the fact that there is truism in this statement, that a weaker person — today when you see, when a weak chap has to fight a tough chap, he has to employ other methods. That's why terrorism is war by other means. It is a surreptitious war. Only they developed into a political defiance, a political violence, where they start using grenades and bombs and Molotov cocktails, and there were odd people who were armed who would get into the crowd and shoot at the security forces. In retaliation innocent civilians would get killed. Then they would take their bodies and bendy them and rouse the emotions of people, and it mushroomed. That is the time when the sectarian aspect of driving the Pandas out of this place also took place. Despite the presence of a large force there, we were not able to control them fully, and the graph then climbed. The terrorism peaked when Pakistani terrorists started coming personally to fight their battles here. You had the JeM, you had the HM, you had the LeT, and you started having mine casualties, you started having IEDs, you started having suicide bombings in some cases. So this was peaking, and some efforts were made for peace during Vajpayee's time; it seemingly decreased a bit, and Kargil happened in 99. So the graph went down. After Kargil it was stabilizing, but it platitude during Parakram — the incidents were high — and from 2003 onwards, when they declared a ceasefire, it went on a decline.

Who are these people who are carrying out terrorism? And it's a civil war, if you ask me, or an insurgency. In fact we started branding them. What started as a protest rent, as political defiance, became an insurrection when they picked up arms, when they went out for training. It became insurgency, and they came back with weapons along with the others, and when they learned in more violent activities, became terrorism. And there was a phase towards 2010-11, and it was actually slowly moving into the grid of a fourth generation war which was being fought by many other means. And that is where we thought that to be able to contest this and stop this, we started this system of perception management. Perception management was a soft method of dealing with terrorism along with the police and the military, and I could say very convincingly that perception management was an all-encompassing strategy which was dealing with the people and slowly weaning them away from the terrorists. But what happens is that these policies and these strategies, if they are not pursued, they've been off after some time. So today the situation in J&K is that there is reasonable peace there. The 370 has been removed — this has been one of the biggest strategic stroke bias to remove the 370 from there. The funding is choked, the communication is choked, separators have been marginalized, the political leaders who were anti-nationals in many ways have been sidelined. So there is no terrorism there today.

The other aspects I want to talk of is that what is the future. Now what does our country see, if you keep this that terrorism is the weapon of the weak, what are the threats that we may have tomorrow if this victim be true? So there has been lot of talk of Taliban coming into our areas and, you know, destabilizing Pakistan, trying to move them out. In the near future I don't think it will ever happen — in the near future, how it goes in Afghanistan. Pakistan themselves are in big trouble because the genie is come home, it is roosting there itself, and they have a problem on their hands. But other than that, one worried area is the left-wing communist bloc, the certain states which have got a high input of foreign earnings, the radicalization of population in some of these states today — they could mushroom into a problem, and if they go into terrorism, then it is something that we need to be worried about. Otherwise I don't see that law nor rabbi and laws seem to be all right.

I want to show you a map which talks of the conflicts globally, and they have some lessons for us. So allow me to show you a map, and just try and see how I can take it out. Okay, just a minute. Yeah, can you see it now? Yes, okay. I'll just keep moving it so that you can see the full screen. Now this talks of the world's ongoing conflicts. The two major aspects of conflicts, the territorial dispute and civil war, take away 80 percent of violence and casualties. So if you look at the territorial disputes, which are in light blue: Russia-Ukraine; this Nagorno-Karabakh, is actually Armenia and Azerbaijan; the Kurdish conflict in Turkey; and the Israel-Palestine conflict. These are the actual conflicts which are actually — this is either happening or verge of happening. Civil wars are raging in all these areas which have been riddled with terrorism for a long time. Afghanistan, we are all aware. The ISIL in Syria, along with some Al-Qaeda cadres — the ISIL has been subdued to an extent, but what has happened is that the Al-Qaeda, when it treated off in 2014 or so, Osama bin Laden was killed, and after that, about 5-10 years after that, the Al-Qaeda leadership which was emerging, it got lost. Zawahiri vanished, Osama also vanished. But they had five distinct Al-Qaeda groups which were operating in other parts of the world, and they were basically in the Maghreb, that is in the northern African region; they were in Iraq, they were in Syria, and they were in Egypt. So these have continued to create problems locally, and there is a condition of civil war of Syria, Iraq, Yemen. Yemen again, the civil war has erupted because the Houthi rebels are very dissatisfied, they have been marginalized by the establishment, and they have been able to get a lot of weapons and equipment and they are contesting. In fact the Saudi Arabians are very intricately involved in this war, and they have been carrying out airstrikes against the Houthi rebels in that place. Libyan civil war continues, Israel doing what it does, and the South Sudanese civil war — Darfur area is also a cause for the Al-Qaeda and some of these availables there.

Interstate conflicts — he's only put US-Iran and India-Pakistan conflict, North Korea-South Korea. Well, there is no conflict, but then there are problems there, and these could mushroom into full-blown conflicts. We have fought many wars with Pakistan. There are problems with China as well, so how it goes is something which we are seeing. Now, as the time passes, we need to see how the Chinese want to now progress from where they are. Political instability is again a cause for terrorism to mushroom, so Lebanon, Egypt, Ethiopia and Democratic Republic of Congo are the most affected by these instabilities, and there is an element of terrorism which is being carried out by the French groups which operate in these areas. Transnational terrorism, of course the Mali war — Mali is again in the western Sahara area, and they have got a serious problem there. The Boko Haram from south — the, would say, the tribal loyalties. Mali is a francophone country, and they have not been able to resolve issues politically, so there is a problem there. And they are very deadly — I think some of the most barbaric terrorist attacks have been carried out by Al-Shabaab in these areas. And as far as Boko Haram militancy in Nigeria is concerned, it's sectarian violence, in central African region as well. Some of the areas of dispute — it shows, which is not connected with our topic today, but it shows the areas of dispute in east and south China sea, and interested here it talks of interstate problems of North Korea, South Korea, and he talks of the sectarian crisis as far as Rohingya is also concerned in Myanmar, but as of now it is fairly under control. There's criminal violence in Mexico and political stability in Venezuela. Now this is one view. It's a little old map, but not much has changed from what I am showing. And this is where I feel that our take on terrorism, as well as our region is concerned and globally is concerned, if we are able to understand, then we can be sure that we can foresee trouble — what troubles, what threats that may manage for us in our region, in the immediate neighborhood and strategic neighborhood both. Okay, with this, can you put me back? All right, with this I'll end here. All right.

So thank you very much, General Parnaik, what a wonderful talk you've given. I'd like to ask you two questions before I ask the others to sort of ask their questions. One is that when you were the northern army commander, the Sadbhavana stuff was put into place. Can you just enlighten us as to what did you do and what were the — what was the impact of this program? Is General Parnaik there? Sir, I would surely have a question, sir. I think — generally, please wait for your turn, I will ask you. I apologize. I think KT has gone off. Sanjeev, would you like to take this on? You followed General Parnaik in his chair, and if you could sort of throw some light on the program that was put into place.

I think KT brought this out in his talk, in fact quite elaborately, when he talked about the perception management that was created, and where you wanted to reach out to the people. After all, the lifeline to a terrorist organization and support system comes from the people, and perception management becomes more important. If people realize that what the terrorist is doing is wrong, and what the government and the machinery around is doing is more fair, then their support to the terrorists goes weaker. And to that extent, what was started in General Parnaik's time on a very large scale on this project, wherein we took on areas where the administration couldn't reach — you know, there are areas, after all J&K is a very remote area, and some places are most inaccessible to even basic amenities by the civil administration. So taking into account the aspect of providing basic amenities — for example, there was a place where it required a small bridge over a nallah where they couldn't cross over, and the people had to travel much more before they could reach their, you know, source of requirements. You had a bridge created. Where you felt, in a remote area where there was no health care facility, you had a health center created, using resources, creating resources either from the armed forces or from the local administration combined together, and provided a doorstep or a nearest vicinity healthcare facility. More influential was creation of schools, and, you know, at lower level schools where you felt that children could be weaned away, and since they had no place to go, some basic schooling started. And this basic schooling started in terms of small classes being held, then later developed into proper registered legitimized schools where education was. And all these have been quite successful, because people then started — you know, not only was there a perception management created, a more humane view or face of the army was created, but it also provided an opportunity and a method by which the army could reach out to the people, and therefore a two-way flow of information started coming in, wherein the support system, or the basic support system that the terrorists — the organizations — were actually getting, were actually weakened. So this is generally how the movement actually came into being, and of course then, once they started getting into organized, a lot of the amount of funds getting being released, this became actually a well-thought-out and well planned out strategy in J&K.

General Parnaik, you're in — can you sort of throw light on the subject? Okay. In addition to what Sanjeev has said, I'll just very briefly explain you what we did, which was different from what is generally known. We created a team of officers and we scanned all the hostile websites which were hostile to J&K, hostile to India. We started reading them. We started reading — a lot of it was abuse, lot of it was nonsense. So this team was now given a direction how to respond to this, but in the shade of gray, not a black and white shade that you start abusing them, you know, no. We were trying to bring out the reality which was prevailing in J&K by a soft message, to say this is what is happening here. Then I realized that these messages did not have the desired effect, so we jumped on another very innovative method. He said in all Sadbhavana we'll have one chair with a camera and 10 questions, and he will ask these questions to anybody who was availing facilities — whether it was a medical camp, whether it was education, whether it was sports, whether it was integration tours, wherever they went. And we labeled this exercise as hamari kahane ki zubani. Now whatever was being said for the people, was being said for the army, said for the country, and it was all brought back to the team, and we converted these into five seconds, 10 seconds, 20 seconds, half a minute, two minutes, five minutes clips, to show what your own people are saying. And these went into the social networking sites, and believe you me, there was a 50 to 60 percent reduction in hostility there.

So this was the big — we ran a magazine which was owned by a civilian, but it was actually run by us, called Khabar o Khayalat. Now in that, again, we wrote articles with pseudo names, but articles which brought out the reality of what is happening in Kashmir. I'll give you one more interesting example. We used to have these separatists who used to dish out CDs, propaganda, year after year. Now one such booklet which he issued every year before the tourist season was: welcome here, tourists. It was a booklet with six, seven pages, which had Gilani's photograph on the top, and the first page was magdam — hey, all that, welcome to the heaven on earth, is that renowned — and six pages where rabid, and the India and the army and the everybody. So this was distributed by hand at the airports, at the railway station, bus stops, taxi stands, motors, rickshaws, at the Dal Lake, at the boats. So tourists would take this, they would read the first page and keep it, then they would read the rest, so it had a kind of impact. So my team came and told me — I had known about it — so we said, what do we do? So I asked them, how much should be the publicity of these? So they said, sir, about twenty thousand pamphlets are published — and this information we got. So we adopted a novel method to undo it. We also published these in larger numbers. Some 60,000 booklets were published next season. These booklets had Gilani's photograph, it had the first page, but the six pages belonged to us. Six pages were all about integration, all about development, all about how Indian-ness is all about it, and it of course cursed Pakistan for what it was doing. And it had a small CD which had all these songs, old songs of movies which were shot in Kashmir valley. So the driver would put it in his taxi or bus when he rode, and everybody was happy, and between the songs were very subtle messages. So these were the methods by which we targeted the population. We took them on these integration tours, we had tours for movies, we took them to all the religious places in the country. When they came back there was a subtle change in their attitude. They started understanding why we were doing this, and many such things were implemented. We went on to some psyops also. We had got spots on the FM so that we could also broadcast them across the borders, and that is how things were approached. And I thought it was part of an information warfare, and denial of information became one very big issue which we were able to sort out. So that's about it.

Any other questions? How — what was your source of gathering information, General Parnaik? Many sources. Firstly, we had intelligence agencies which were abounding there. We brought them together. We had a method by which information was gathered and shifted, and real-time intelligence was spoken of. Secondly, I started a system of interacting with prominent public figures, either individually or collectively. I sat with them, spent time, and I heard them out. So they told me what their perception was about what was happening, and in doing so a lot of information came to me which was not coming from my sources. So I assured them that I'm not giving you an interview, but you are welcome to come to me anytime, interact with me, and I will brief you how the armed forces are tackling the situation. So some amount of transparency, some amount of give and take, and I could get to know a lot of things about people from where they were working. The second method was that there were a lot of civilians who had benefited from our activities, whether they were schools or medical or something. We got hold of them and they became other sources of information.

Lastly, the requirement actually was to open up to the universities, to young people. So I started doing this by having a human rights seminar in Nagrota, and we invited boys and girls from these colleges to come and attend — never happened before. And we had eminent speakers on the stage who spoke of various kinds of human rights violations. They even, some of them, criticized the army. So we wanted to see the reaction of these guys, and sure enough, when the second or third speaker was speaking, suddenly some murmurs started, and this murmur then got — they all stood up and they said shame, shame, Indian army, you know, that kind of a thing. So the people who were in charge of looking after, they suddenly got — they wanted to throw these guys out, and he said no. So what I told them was, okay, till they are talking, we'll just clap. So we clapped at them. After some time they sat down. Then I asked the commander, I said, okay, now you go and tell them that this is not the correct way of protesting; there's no way of, you know, conveying what you want to convey. So we give an opportunity to one boy and one girl to come on the stage and speak. Speak what you want to speak, don't be afraid, talk what you want to do. So after some shuffling, one boy came, bismillah, started off with the loud noise and this and that. In two minutes he tweeted out — he didn't know what to say after that. The girl was more sensible. She came, she topped out, but she was very soft. In the sense, can you believe the turnaround — these same people who were mischievous and, you know, who were raising slogans against the army, were taking their autographs at the tea time. So lot of such events were organized where we wanted to show that we are transparent, that we are ready to listen to you. And Sadbhavana became a more operation oriented activity. Sadbhavana had to give me operational space. It was not meant for pampering these people and building stadiums — and the child will come, new commander has come, he'll — but we provided equipment for irrigation, we provided a lot of facilities for their schools. I started distributing computers to the schools, government schools. Soon the people in madrasa came, and they said — so we didn't want to interfere with them, but they created a situation where we could give them books and also computers, with a condition that you people will come and learn here first at our vocational center, then we will give you this and you can teach. A lot of change of heart did take place. Only thing that they were subdued, that they didn't have a voice, and that voice had to come by subduing the offensive element which was at the top.

The case of AFSPA came up — it is even coming up now. I remember meeting a security committee there which comprised the CapSec, the HomeSec and the DevSec, and I told them, I need some time with you before you go in for the unified command meeting, because they are going to discuss this issue and they will come and tell you all kinds of wrong things. When I had my session with him, which lasted 45 minutes, they were thoroughly convinced. I just said three things. I said the chief minister is talking of this because there is a political motive. The seven or eight places from where he wants to remove AFSPA are all NC constituencies. Moment I do that, the PDP will say, why not from here? Separatists will say, why not from the entire Kashmir valley? Secondly, it is not being misused. Thirdly, there is no — disturbance act was not extended in J&K beyond 19, but the AFSPA. So legally, also practically, we convinced them that this cannot go. After that I had given instructions to my people that don't say anything, just say that as a professional force we have given our recommendations to the center and you'll hear from them. The matter got subdued after some time, and AFSPA continues, thankfully, even now.

Babasa, you have a question to ask, sir? I really apologize to intervene when the senior most of the seniors in the country were speaking — apologies for that. But then, yes, I do have a very genuine question, sir. I was born and brought up in the country of Bhutan, my father being the chief doctor for the king of Bhutan, then Jigme Khesar Wangchuck — me singing currently his son and his father. I have seen enough number of terrorism there in Bhutan as an adolescent. Being studying in West Bengal I have seen a lot of terrorism activities happening, and a lot of murders happening, a lot of my objective is acting happening that side. But then as I grew up, as I was in my 20s, I suddenly saw a sudden decline, because yes, of course, Indian army was inside Bhutan, a lot of things changed. I would always appreciate Indian army and I always salute them, because Bhutan has an army of 7,000 people and they can't do anything about it, and being a small country which could not be, you know, taken over by China because of the terrain, unlike Tibet. But then what I would just — I have a very simple and open question, sir. Bhutan is a country which is not the size of the seven sisters that side in our northeast. Why cannot the same thing — wherein this country today has been proclaimed as the happiest country in the world — why cannot that be done in smaller states which are in the northeast, the seven sisters? That is the only question that I asked, and it is very difficult, I completely understand, being a civilian. But then, sir, if a country can be taken care of, why can't small states in India be taken care of, sir? I mean, still Gorkhaland issue is going on, people are getting killed every day. I have seen killing even recently when I was there, and nobody does anything about it. Political power is there, but eventually the army comes — prophesied your question so that the general cannot say yes. Sir, when the army comes, everybody stops. Till the time it is with the local civilian police and everything, it goes on. The moment army comes, it stops. So why cannot army involve in the beginning, sir? I mean, is there any restriction from the central government or anything? Army doesn't require anybody's permissions — it is already prevalent there.

I understand the purport of your questions, and I'm very happy to know that you have brought up in Bhutan. I had two tenures in Bhutan. I was coming down to — went there myself. And let me tell you, it's a very friendly country. You rightly said about the trouble Bhutanese faced around the early, I would say, 70s, 80s, up to late 80s or so. These came from the Bhutanese Nepalese — the Nepalese Bhutanese — who had come into Bhutan and settled there, became these citizens, and they were mostly working as laborers. Then they graduated to, you know, they became property owners, and then they created problems. But this was tackled very well by the king there, and with the help of Indian army and also the establishment, the formation which is on the borders, they were taken care of. A very interesting thing happened during the coronation of the fifth king, Jigme Singh, who's now the king. I happened to be there in the most historic year of Bhutan, that is 2008 — 100 years of monarchy, coronation of king, and the first ever elections in Bhutan. So I saw that all, and one of my biggest tasks was to ensure that no terrorist activity or insecurity or violence took place during that time. Indian army didn't do anything in Bhutan — it was the Bhutanese army which was doing — but we were providing intelligence, we were providing support, and we ensured that not a single incident took place there.

As far as gross national happiness is concerned, it is true. Bhutan is a poor country, they are happy people, and I think it is more to do with the manner in which the monarchy has led them over these years. And I would specially mention the third king. When he was put on the throne early, when he was barely 19 years, then his father died in France. He understood the people, he understood the condition, he understood the environment. He's a very very short person, but what he brought into his country was lot of love and affection, transparency. He had four wives — the stairs and four chalice. He had tasked each of his wife to travel through the country and bring back feedback to him. He gave them powers to distribute land, money and resources. So he was, he is or has been, a, you know, people's monarch, and even when they transited to a democratic country, they maintain that. As far as their forces is concerned, India trains, equips, arms, pays and pensions the Bhutanese army. The bondage between the Bhutanese and the Indian army is something which is incomparable. So what you said is true.

I'll come to the problem that you have said — why can't other states be happy. I think you need to yourself see what is happening in our country vis-a-vis what is happening in Bhutan. Look at the political situation. Look at the way the security is being violated in a democratic setup. Look at the privileges and freedoms that people take for doing anything that they want — freedom of speech, freedom of this, freedom of that. There is load, there is asana, there are blockages, there are bandhs, there are sectarian violences, there are religious world engines. Can you stop them today? The effort of the central government is to try and bring peace, to try and bring a sense of people, but that is not happening. That is why you can't bring it there. And army's role in these states — army is only called out for assisting the civil as a last resort, and generally all these administrative and other jobs are meant for the administration, for the political and the bureaucratic people. If they don't perform and the government goes down, but if the situation gets out of hand and there is a security problem, the army is called. Army on its own does not go there and propagate in it. That is not part of our charter, and we cannot interfere and, you know, divert from our main aim of looking after these borders and security. That's the reason.

John, sir, unmute yourself. John, please. Thank you so much, sir. Sir, General, I must compliment you for such a well researched talk, sir. In fact it is because of people like you that we as a country should be proud that we have handled insurgency and terrorism very well. I have a small little question from the other side of the table. The terrorists, you know, they define terrorism as a force multiplier. And secondly, there is another thing — the Israelis say one of the strategies is terrorize the terrorists, and the committee ate the — Munich Olympics revenge are all policies of the state of Israel. What are your comments on this?

Yeah, you're right. Israel is a small state in between Arab lands. Israel has survived some of the biggest holocaust when the Jews were exterminated. They are a race which has been brought up after so many hardships and challenges. So as a country they have grown up with lot of self-pride, they have grown with sort of self-determination, and that is why today they survive in a hostile environment all around them. They have fought two, three wars — with Egypt, with Syria, and with Palestine of course is an ongoing issue. There is conscription in Israel. Everybody is made to serve in the armed forces for some period, so they imbibe those values when they get into the civilian walk of life, and they carry those features into their business, into their corporates, everywhere. It's a small country — Israel is smaller than Kerala, okay, sir. A small country does have the ability to manage itself, because its size is small, population is small, but they have done wonders for whatever they do.

Now when you say terrorists for terrorists — so we have something which is called the counter terrorist organization and operations, and counterterrorism is a very big issue on our national security agenda. We have had international seminars in the last five, six years. I have attended a couple of them, I've spoken at those, and believe you me that today the world and the best of the people are learning from us as far as how to deal with terrorism and how to counter terrorists. So you're right, as a soldier we have operated in these areas. We have dealt with the Pakistani terrorist soldiers, or Pakistani terrorists who come in the form of, you know, jihadis, and they do all kinds of things. You'll be surprised at the number of out-of-box methods we have to deal with them. Should I tell you one of them? Yeah, sure. Okay.

It's a transparent world, and I'm a retired man, I can touch on something. We are posted on LC, line of control. The infiltration takes place across the line of control. Now by and large, in so many years, we know from where infiltration takes place. So when I was a brigadier in Tanda, I told my troops that we need to become unpredictable, because you patrol at the same place at the same time every day, and they see you — they are easily bypassing you by 50 yards and you work. So you must change your tactics. Now once you change, they are little suspicious whether we are there or we are not. Secondly, we put a lot of obstacles in place which warn you — we are not mining it, but they warn you that there is a movement from here. There is electronic surveillance. Now what happens is that a group is coming from that side, we have early detection. The tendency is to open fire with everybody and everywhere, and movement you do, they run away. They go back, because they haven't really crossed LC. So you layer them. You say, okay, we are monitoring them coming here; when they are just about to cross, we use snipers. Now sniper is very effective at what, about 7-800 meters, is very effective. So the instruction is, just put one chap down, okay, just kill one. Don't start firing everywhere. One bullet fired in mountains and jungles, nobody knows from where it has come. So the Pakis go mad, they start firing water. You sit quietly. Now you have night vision devices, so the orders are: these terrorists will come to fetch the body of that chap. Wait for that. When they come at night, knock another chap. Don't let them remove the bodies for at least 72 hours or maybe more. I am not holding that body, I am not responsible — it is lying on his side. But mentally, morally, he is defeated in not allowing him to retrieve his own colleague there. So what happens? The terrorists change that route and they come somewhere else. Now there is something else waiting for them.

So the fact is that when you start understanding their operating processes — they get guides from the POK, who are locals, who bring them here. We bribed the guy. He said, we'll give you double the money, and you bring the group, let them pass from here. He's lulching. He put this group in a cave and told our chaps they are there. That was the end of that group. But he was to come back with recruits from here to go that side, so we told them, you will not — the orders were given that the utility of this guide is over. Next time when you tell him, he will not give you this return. So the guide was also released. So what you are doing in effect is that those people who are indulging in terrorism, you are teaching them their own lesson. You are getting hold of them in a manner that they don't know and understand, and it puts a fear back in their mind. But terrorist is, you know, he is drugged, he is with opium. It doesn't matter for Pakistan — these are criminals, they are wasted people from poor sections of societies who can be sacrificed. And you'll be surprised as to how many terrorists who have been killed have not been claimed, have been buried in these areas. There are many other ways — I don't have time to narrate those — but believe you me that our armed forces have made sure that they have methods to deal with these terrorists in their own methods.

Thank you, General. I think it's been a very illuminating one and a half hours. Now I'll hand the meeting back to the president to conclude the session. Thank you.

Thank you very much. Am I honorable? Yes, you are. Thank you very much. Definition of shielding, also definition of terrorism, till you dealt with a practical counter-terrorist TV — you covered everything in your talk in a very minimum time. Was there hardly 40 minutes, you could not cover every aspect, yet you have covered everything. Now since the definition is not there — any definition of a terrorist is still not there, from you know — so one, as you rightly said, somebody may terrorist for one country but he may be a freedom fighter. So this variable is very important, whether the weapon of weak or weapon of the strong. Second, which is very important, that every country, according to what your nuances and all of various countries, every country may need to dwell a separate counter-terrorism doctrine. On that separate counter-terrorism doctrine, our armed forces — because the question of weak are not weak — with the armed forces, they will develop their own strategy. Sometimes the current concepts may have been taken into consideration at the time of drawing strategy, sometimes they may not have. Breakthrough like a relationship between weakness and terrorist action are based on various variables. As you rightly say, terrorists — a terrorism may develop into insurgency, terrorism may develop into guerrilla warfare. Terrorists of the radicals has been perpetuated because of the deprivation they feel. Hence the variables are there. On the basis of these variables of terrorism, then the strategy has to be developed — a counter-terrorist strategy or counter-terrorism strategy has to be developed by the armed forces or the persons who are asked to do this.

I feel that there's need to analyze these facts, plus whether terrorism is intense in the early stages of conflict or later stage of conflict in a particular place, whether terrorism is more likely to be practiced by groups that are at the verge of extinction, the other way around. But then there is a version of sincere the perpetual terrorism to a greater extent, and whether it is based on the idea of territorial control, as you mentioned, or a particular place. So depending upon about variable, the concept of terrorism being the weapon of the weak could change. Though I feel that by a lot we are able to deal with terrorism, developing our strategy at a particular time, as but very nicely provided by perspective management, but by a lot these variables are always before us, before the armed forces, and hence we are not able to have total, as you say, end game of terrorism in a particular place. Except one or two states, we have not been, in India, I have end the game, entire end game of terrorism. So with these words I once again thank General Parnaik and other delegates who put very incessant questions, and also our moderator — without becoming absolutely flapped, he was not, I will never get flabby, but it just goes on in his own tone almost, and beautifully he has managed to cover the entire subject, my question answer, within a period which was stipulated. Further, with these words I thank everyone, all the delegates, all the people who are sitting here on the panel, and particularly of course our learned speaker, General Parnaik. Thank you very much. Mr Banner, please, banner next. Yes.

Now our next webinar is again a very interesting webinar. That is: citizens as eyes and ears against building corruption in the society. This is a — we trust everyone in the society, and this is due on 11th February, Friday. We are getting two very eminent speakers of this, I must tell you. One is a person who has dealt with this subject as enforcement director — he was director of enforcement, and he is also coming to discuss on the subject. Second will be a very prominent advocate we are trying to have, so that he knows what our citizens feeling about the crusher. So it will be very interesting — these are very interesting deliberation. I request all the delegates present here as well all the other who have registered with us to come there and enjoy this particular webinar. I also want to submit that kindly do give us a feedback by your comments when you attend the webinar, so that if we feel there are certain things to be more chiseled, to be more brought out, if we are failed in something, we like to go with your comments, and we'd like to also respond to your — ultimately I intend to compile all your contents and put it on the necessary website and also inform our learned scholars so that we tune ourselves with your ideas. With these words I again once again thank everyone who has come today of this webinar, despite very cold in India at this point recorded in India in certain areas. Thank you very much indeed.

And thank you for the — I'd just like to make a comment here. The lawyer that you mentioned, who has been the president of the Supreme Court Bar Council three consecutive terms — so he's going to be speaking on citizens as eyes and ears against prevailing corruption. And when I spoke with him three days back, he said, what do I talk in a society that has become so corrupt? The subject is very relevant. Society has become — it is so relevant, he says, but the society in our country needs radical reform, which is not easy to come by. So anyway, so we look forward to our next webinar and the insights of the speakers, and thank you very much. One will be the advocate, and enforcement director — you'll enjoy it. Thank you. And KT, thank you very much once again. Okay, thank you very much, everyone. Thank you very much for being here. Bye. Thank you very much. Thank you, sir. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you, sir. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you, sir. Thank you, sir.