In the recent past the #dynamics of #warfare have changed in a #major way based on the #analysis of the wars #fought between #azerbaijan – #armenia and the ongoing #war #between Russia and #ukraine .The #interest of major #powers have an #overriding factor to abet #confrontation for domination and #economic reasons. The wars are being fought based on #alliances and #one to one war is a #past phe
What this session covered
This session took the form of a conversation between a moderator and a single guest, a retired Army general officer with an artillery background, on the changing dynamics of conventional warfare. Drawing on the Azerbaijan–Armenia conflict and the ongoing Russia–Ukraine war, the speaker argued that while the character of war keeps changing, its principles do not. He traced the origins of the Ukraine conflict to NATO's eastward expansion after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and described a landscape in which major powers avoid direct involvement, preferring proxy wars, alliance-based confrontation and economic sanctions as instruments of conflict, with smaller wars serving as testing grounds for new weaponry such as armed drones.
Turning to the conduct of the war in Ukraine, the speaker attributed Russia's early setbacks to the timing of the launch against the weather, the absence of a decisive opening air campaign, reliance on poorly trained conscripts, weaknesses in senior and junior leadership, and logistics that failed to sustain momentum. The discussion examined the concept of deep operations — strikes throughout the tactical and operational depth against military, logistic and economic targets — and the dependence of such strikes on credible intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. Fighting in built-up areas was treated at length, with the speaker judging that Russian battalion tactical groups lacked the infantry strength such combat demands, and noting that strikes on civilian infrastructure had produced heavy casualties and large refugee outflows.
The latter part of the session covered non-linear and non-contact warfare: cyber operations, which the speaker considered less effective in Ukraine than had been anticipated; media, social media and perception management, including the use of deep fakes; and precision strikes delivered from stand-off distances. Private military companies received extended attention, including their role on both sides of the war, the danger of such forces growing into a parallel military, China's contrasting practice of keeping its overseas security elements unarmed, and the possibility of Nepalese youth being recruited into mercenary forces. The exchange closed with lessons for India: force restructuring built around technology adoption, credible surveillance and reconnaissance systems, drone and anti-drone capability, and the ambition of becoming a significant arms exporter.
Key points raised
- The speaker argued that the character of war changes but its principles do not, using the Azerbaijan-Armenia and Russia-Ukraine conflicts as reference points.
- Russia's early setbacks in Ukraine were attributed by the speaker to poor timing against the weather, reliance on conscripts, leadership weaknesses and logistics that failed to sustain momentum.
- Deep strikes against military, logistic and economic targets were discussed as dependent on credible intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capability.
- Non-linear warfare - sanctions, cyber operations, media and perception management - was described as continuing even when open hostilities do not.
- Private military companies were discussed as a durable feature of modern conflict, with the risk that they grow into parallel military forces if not kept under state control.
- The closing exchange drew lessons for India on technology-led force restructuring, drone and anti-drone capability, and ambitions as an arms exporter.
