Israel Hamas Conflict- Ongoing Operations- Dialogue 2 I Israel Hamas war I NISSMAT I Latest update

What this session covered

The second dialogue in NISSMAT's series on the Israel–Hamas conflict took the form of a conversation between the host and a guest speaker, a retired Army officer serving as a director of the institute. The guest opened with a recap of the historical background, from the first Zionist conference of 1897 and the Balfour Declaration of 1917 to the UN partition plan, before turning to the attack of 7 October, in which he said about 1,400 civilians were killed and about 240 hostages taken. In his assessment the breach reflected a layered intelligence failure: attention had shifted towards internal unrest over proposed judicial changes, technology-based surveillance and border tiers all failed to read Hamas's reconnaissance, rehearsals and movement of earth-moving equipment near the fence, and a warning from a neighbouring country was reportedly not acted upon.

Much of the discussion asked why, despite widespread talk of a ceasefire, the war had continued for more than thirty days. The host argued that retaliation had gone beyond acceptable bounds into collective punishment of civilians, including strikes affecting hospitals and refugee camps, and attributed the absence of a ceasefire chiefly to American equivocation, citing the influence of pro-Israel and arms-manufacturing lobbies, the approaching US election, and Washington's stated determination not to leave Hamas capable of repeating the 7 October attack. He recounted an account by an author who visited the war zone and described being repeatedly questioned about his religion at checkpoints, and contrasted Israeli statements about retaining control of Gaza after the war with American statements deferring such questions until after a ceasefire. The guest added observations on Qatari funding links, on Arab monarchies' wariness of Islamist movements, on Jordan's concerns given its large Palestinian population, and on the opening of a corridor through which civilians moved from northern Gaza to the south.

On where the conflict was heading, the guest expected fighting to continue until Hamas's fighters in Gaza were eliminated, with slow, destructive urban combat in the interim, followed by some form of rehabilitation in which the UN and World Bank might participate; he noted that destroying an ideology is far harder than destroying its foot soldiers. Post-war governance of Gaza was left as an open question, with the possible role of the Palestinian Authority described as uncertain. Both speakers agreed that the UN's inability to carry a ceasefire resolution was seriously diluting its standing, and the session closed with the intention of examining Arab and wider international reactions in a third dialogue.

Key points raised

• The guest attributed the 7 October breach to a layered intelligence failure, with Israeli attention diverted towards internal unrest over proposed judicial changes and warning signs near the border left unanalysed.
• The host argued that the absence of a ceasefire owed much to American equivocation, citing lobby influence, the approaching US election and Washington's stated aim of denying Hamas the capacity to repeat the attack.
• The discussion contrasted Israeli statements about controlling Gaza after the war with American statements deferring governance questions until after a ceasefire, leaving post-war arrangements unresolved.
• Arab states' restraint was linked in the discussion to monarchies' wariness of Islamist movements, with Jordan's large Palestinian population noted as a particular concern.
• Both speakers agreed that the UN's failure to carry a ceasefire resolution was diluting its authority as a conflict-management body.
• The guest expected the war to continue until Hamas's fighters in Gaza were eliminated, while observing that eliminating the underlying ideology would be far harder and slower.