Indo French Relations

What this session covered

This session took the form of an interview, with a host putting questions to a single guest, a retired Army officer, following short introductory remarks about the institute. The host opened with a chronology of Indian and French contact, running from the seventeenth century through the presence of French soldiers in Indian armies and the service of Indian troops in the defence of France during the World Wars, and then through the sequence of leaders' visits from the strategic agreement of 1998 to the visiting Indian leader's attendance at the Bastille Day celebrations in July 2023.

The speaker set out the partnership as resting on three pillars — defence, space and civil nuclear energy — with trade, climate and cultural ties alongside them. Tracing the post-independence record, the speaker pointed to early French aircraft supplies and atomic cooperation in the 1950s, the absence of French sanctions following India's 1974 nuclear test, and the Mirage purchase of 1982. On 1998 the speaker distinguished two moments: the strategic partnership took root in January of that year, some months before the nuclear tests of May, with the formal agreement signed later in the same year. The relationship was characterised as unusually stable, resting on a shared practice of strategic autonomy, mutual non-interference in domestic affairs and an absence of conditions attached to cooperation. On the maritime dimension, the speaker noted France's overseas territories across three oceans, its large exclusive economic zone, its bases in Djibouti and the UAE, and the shift in French strategic documents from an Asia-Pacific to an Indo-Pacific framing between 2016 and 2018, all of which were presented as grounds for closer naval cooperation with India.

Turning to obstacles, the speaker observed that the reactor programme agreed during the 2009 visit has not progressed, attributing this to the capacity required to absorb the technology, to land acquisition and to domestic political contention. Further challenges identified were France's own engagement with China, its historical defence supplies to Pakistan, and its position outside the Quad and the trilateral submarine arrangement from which it was excluded. Discussing the July visit, the speaker noted that no joint communiqué had followed it, and read this as a degree of flexibility retained by both governments, each of which has a domestic audience to attend to. Comparing recent engine agreements, the speaker argued that the French arrangement carries transfer of technology, co-development, co-production and maintenance provision, whereas the American engine deal does not, and characterised the United States as a more transactional partner whose legislature can reverse course. The speaker also maintained that ties with France are not intended to displace the long-standing defence relationship with Russia. On soft power, the discussion covered the comparatively small Indian diaspora and student population in France, the French language as a constraint on student numbers, the acceptance of India's payments interface in France, and cultural exchanges including book fairs and film events. After the host had drawn the session to a close, the speaker asked to add a further point on the submarine programme, which had not been raised earlier, observing that the relevant deals had yet to be signed and that the detail of the arrangements would only become clear once concluded.

Key points raised

• The session was a single-guest interview on the state of Indo-French relations, prefaced by a historical chronology from the host running from the seventeenth century to the July 2023 Bastille Day visit.
• The speaker described the partnership as resting on three pillars — defence, space and civil nuclear energy — supported by trade, climate and cultural ties.
• On 1998, the speaker separated the partnership taking root in January from the nuclear tests of May, with the formal agreement signed later that year.
• Strategic autonomy, mutual non-interference in domestic affairs and cooperation without attached conditions were presented as the distinguishing features of the relationship.
• The civil nuclear reactor programme agreed in 2009 was described as having stalled, attributed to technology absorption capacity, land acquisition and domestic political contention.
• The speaker argued that the French engine agreement offers transfer of technology, co-development and co-production in a way the parallel American arrangement does not, while maintaining that ties with France are not meant to displace the defence relationship with Russia.