“China's Border Land Laws – Impact on India”
What this session covered
This was an interactive online session in which a single invited speaker, a retired Army general officer with operational experience along the India–China frontier, addressed China's recently enacted land border law and its potential implications for India. Following an introduction from the institute's president and moderation by the session host, the speaker delivered a presentation and then took questions from participants joining from several countries. The format was a single-speaker address followed by audience discussion rather than a debate.
The speaker set out to examine the law — described as enacted on 23 October 2021 and brought into effect on 1 January 2022 — against four criteria: its timing, content, language and intent. Drawing on China's earlier boundary settlements with its neighbours, the speaker outlined what were presented as recurring patterns, including incremental construction and civilian settlement to consolidate claims, the adoption of maximalist opening positions, protracted negotiating timelines, and a tendency to respond to demonstrations of strength. Applying this to the unresolved boundaries with India and Bhutan, the speaker argued that the law provides a legal basis for China's territorial claims, encourages settlement close to the Line of Actual Control, and risks converting boundary disputes into questions of sovereignty — a shift the speaker suggested would narrow the space for any negotiated give-and-take. Concerns were also raised about provisions touching construction near the border, control of water resources, and the authorisation of force against perceived intrusion.
In the discussion that followed, questioners raised India's possible responses, including border infrastructure, surveillance and the settlement of frontier areas, as well as the reported reverse migration of population from some border villages, the renaming of locations in Arunachal Pradesh, the position of Tibetan communities, and the broader geopolitical context including relations among major powers. The speaker repeatedly emphasised the need to build comprehensive national power and to negotiate from a position of strength, while cautioning that tit-for-tat measures could escalate unpredictably; a possible flexibility in India's own negotiating stance was also mentioned. Another participant added observations on the build-up of forces along the frontier and the need for credible surveillance and faster infrastructure development. The session closed with concluding remarks from the president.
Key points raised
- The session examined China's land border law, described as enacted in October 2021 and effective from January 2022, and its potential implications for India's disputed frontiers.
- The speaker proposed assessing the law against its timing, content, language and intent to judge whether it carried a hidden agenda.
- Drawing on China's earlier boundary settlements, the speaker described recurring patterns: incremental construction and settlement, maximalist opening claims, protracted timelines, and responsiveness to strength.
- Particular concern was raised over civilian settlement near the Line of Actual Control and the reframing of territorial disputes as questions of sovereignty, which the speaker argued narrows the scope for negotiation.
- Audience questions addressed India's countermeasures, including border infrastructure, surveillance, reverse migration from frontier villages, and the renaming of locations in Arunachal Pradesh.
- The speaker emphasised building comprehensive national power and negotiating from a position of strength, while cautioning against tit-for-tat escalation.
Session transcript
This transcript is auto-generated from the session recording and lightly edited for punctuation and readability; it may contain transcription errors. The video remains the authoritative record.
Read the full transcript
Hello friends, this is President NISSMAT Cal Singh addressing you. Welcome to all of you and a very good evening for joining us today at the NISSMAT 109 session edition of the webinar. In these webinars minimum two speakers address the webinar. We also have conducted a number of interactive sessions which are addressed by one speaker and then the sessions left open to the delegates to ask questions and interact with the speaker. Today we are having an interactive session on China's borderland laws, impact on India, which shall be addressed by an experienced retired major general who was involved in the operations in that area. I extend a warm and hearty welcome to him, to our eminent speaker and other delegates present here for this interactive session.
Let me introduce NISSMAT in a few words. NISSMAT was established about three decades back and started training courses in the field of private security, safety, applied technology and management. Today NISSMAT has become a think tank and this think tank is constituted of a number of senior eminent scholars who are associated with us. We conduct webinars and interactive sessions and have dissemination of knowledge as gained by our first speakers to the others. NISSMAT has four important wings: the NISSMAT Forum which organizes webinars, seminars, conferences and interactive sessions; NISSMAT Academy which conducts virtual training programs; and NISSMAT Enterprise to undertake audits and studies in various sectors and also to establish partnership and alliances overseas. Then there's an ISIS foundation to undertake welfare and social work programs particularly with reference to security and law and order.
With these words I'll pause and next try to introduce in a few words our chairman. Our chairman, Captain Alwalia, took voluntary retirement from the parachute regiment of the Indian army at a very young age and he jumped into an unknown field at that time to him, an unknown field of business. His warmth is really contagious. He is able to bring out the best in other people. He has an internal sense to find out a silver lining in a worse situation. Has a courage of always been independent and fearless in his voice, particularly in the private security industry. He is a businessman who is not afraid of telling truth. A thoughtful and inspiring leader. He is adept in creating alliances and has created a business group under the name of Alwalia Holdings with offices at multiple locations India and abroad. With continuous perseverance and hard work, he has grown, elevated and achieved today a position of eminence in the business world. Past president and former chairman of association of investigators. He has been awarded welcome award by the association and he will be moderating this session.
I will say a few words about the webinar subject. Recently the Republic of China has enacted land border laws which have aroused anxiety and criticism from neighboring countries, particularly India and Bhutan. The new laws unilaterally demarcate the terminal borders and the boundaries of the terminal borders with India and Bhutan. Further, these laws authorize the People's Liberation Army and the People's Armed Police Force in China to take action against any infiltration into the areas demarcated by China and included under the territorial boundaries of China. This sort of military solution by authorizing PLA and armed police force shows the arrogance I think and aggressive posture of China, without caring about the number of treaties, agreements signed between India and China to respect each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty. According to these agreements, peaceful solution to any dispute should be taken.
The authorizing of People's Liberation Army and people police force to address these issues needs multi-dimensional review by India. The earlier agreement of peace and tranquility to be maintained between the two countries seems to have been thrown to the winds. It is very important for us today to deliberate, discuss on this issue as to who will decide as to which country, which particular part is in China or in the bordering area. Disputes had earlier arisen about these boundaries but they were in the eastern Ladakh, in Sikkim and in Arunachal Pradesh, but these treaties and agreements which were there, they were solving these disputes by arriving at certain amicable solutions. The realities, existence on the ground as accepted earlier are required to be kept in view to avoid any confrontation. Today's speaker Major General Ashok Kumar shall throw light on all these issues. Let us listen to him. With these words I pass on the sessions and the proceedings to Captain Alwalia to moderate the session.
Thank you Mr. President. First of all I'd like to acknowledge the presence of participants from the following countries: India, Bhutan, Pakistan, the United Kingdom, Zambia and Spain. We are streaming live on Zoom and YouTube. I'd also like to acknowledge the sponsors of the event today. Premier Consulting and Investigations, which is a consulting and investigations company. Premier Shield Private Limited, a manpower solutions provider. India Skills Private Limited, which is an assessments company which does assessments for the Skill India projects. Tag Scores, which is an assessments platform, and JMD Cargo, a logistics company. During the session I would request you all to remain muted. If you can keep your videos on I'd appreciate that. Please keep your cell phones switched off and have no sight distractions, and please prepare to ask questions on this most important session as it impacts not only us but our future generations. If you have any questions do also let me know on the chat so that I can ask you to ask your question.
A word about our president. Mr. Sepal Singh is a masters in English literature and has served the Indian police service in several senior appointments across the country. He was the person who raised the Rapid Action Force in India and was its first chief. He also raised the Internal Security Academy which is a central police academy at Mount Abu in Rajasthan. During his service, he's been decorated with several medals: President's police medal for distinguished service, the Indian police medal for meritorious service, the police special duty medal with bar, a Sena medal, and a number of other commendations and rewards. Post retirement, he has worked as a consultant with Tisco. He's been the chairman of the technical committee of Quality Control of India which formulated the standards for star rating of the private security agencies. He was involved in developing the curriculum for private security guards training under the security sector and skill development council. Hello. Hello. Hello. He was the head of the committee which designed and worked out national occupation standards for the training of private security guards and the qualification packs and national occupation standards for firefighters. In 2009 post retirement he was awarded the security personality of the year award by the president of India in a ceremony in Vigyan Bhavan. He is also an adviser to the Asian Professional Security Association and is the honorary director general to the central association of private security industry and the association of private detectives and investigators. Mr. Sepal Singh's face is well known in India as a dynamic security professional and he's frequently called to share his views on various subjects connected to homeland security on national news channels.
It is now my distinct honor and privilege to introduce the speaker of the day, Major General Ashok Kumar. He's a decorated soldier and is a veteran of the Kargil war. He has served or been operationally involved on the entire length of the Chinese border on the line of actual control. He's a defense analyst and a western fellow of Centre for Land Warfare Studies. He specializes on neighboring countries with special emphasis and focus on China. He has commanded an infantry brigade with operational responsibility at the line of actual control on China borders, close to the area where in 1962 the Indo-China war began. He headed the ex-serviceman contributory health scheme at the national level including Nepal. Most interesting, he tweets as Chanakya Oracle and you can follow him there. Ladies and gentlemen, I present to you General Ashok Kumar.
Jai Hind to everyone. Let me first thank the team NISSMAT for giving me this opportunity to speak to you all on a very very important subject and I'm also grateful to my viewers who have been kind enough to give their time to listen to this issue. Now before we discuss the China's land border laws, apparently one may get the impression that what is so big if a country passes any constitution for its perceived good. So before we comment on that, I will draw your attention to the current conflict participants, that is Ukraine and Russia. Some of you will note that Ukraine passed a constitutional amendment law on 21st February 2019 to facilitate itself to become member of NATO and European Union. And just 3 years and 3 days, we are having the bloodiest battle after World War II. When China passed its land border law on 23rd October 21 with mandate of getting it implemented from 1st January 22, which already stands implemented, if we don't look at it seriously, the future generation will blame us for not getting warned and getting ready for a conflict escalation which may be knocking our doors.
So let's see a slide which I have put on the view. Few words about China, because since it is talking of the land borders so we have to see where are the land borders. China, a 73 years old republic, has 14 border countries. In fact it is blessed to have one of the largest borders in the world and out of 14 border countries, borders with 12 countries have been resolved, have become tranquil and almost settled. There are only two countries with whom the border negotiations are still to be concluded in amicable manner and they are India and Bhutan, shown in red color at the bottom, and both these countries have Indian stakes. Now when China has negotiated its border with these 12 countries, a pattern emerges and therefore there is a high probability that some of these patterns may fall in place while the border negotiation with India and Bhutan is taken ahead in times to come.
Now what are those inferences from the countries with whom it has already settled the border? Because with this background you'll be able to then understand what is going to be the implication of the current land border law which it has passed. So first inference is that it believes in the philosophy of geographical creep, that is it undertakes construction activities, settles its civilians, uses of you know militias so that its claim gets stated. Second, it always operates from the maximalist position, that is claims more but then it gets settled at a reasonably less portion of the claim. If an average is taken of all the countries with which it has settled borders, out of the claimed areas almost 60% it has left in the favor of the opponent country and 40% it has got back. Of course the percentages are varying from country to country but largely at the end of the settlement it has given more than what it has got.
Second, this country is not in a hurry to settle the borders and therefore India and Bhutan should also not look at as if the border is going to be settled tomorrow or in a year or two year and 3 years time. China has taken 54 years to settle the border with North Korea, 36 years with Kazakhstan, 53 years with Tajikistan, 48 years with Russia and similarly with all other countries. But normally unless it has been compelled by external factors, it has tried to settle the borders on its own terms and has not shown any hurry. Third inference is it respects force to resolve the borders, which happened with Russia in 1969 and Vietnam in 1979. Also it compromises when its internal stability is at stake. At that point of time it gives larger concessions to go into the settlements of the border countries so that its internal dynamics are maintained. Now these trends which I have highlighted, they are also now happening against India and Bhutan. And therefore land boundary law of China has a special significance.
Actually there are four aspects which need to be analyzed before we are sure whether it is a natural law or it has got a hidden agenda. Those four aspects are the timing, the content, the language and the intent. If any law justifies itself on these four counts to be well within its natural aspiration and doesn't affect neighboring country, it's fairly fine. But if on these counts it has certain hidden motives, that is where the problem starts. Since we are now specifically talking about the land border laws of China which has only two countries balance, India and Bhutan, and both had the Indian stakes, so let's broadly quickly see what are the border conflict status between India and China.
The major conflict area is in Aksai Chin area which is currently in physical control of China. The reason of conflict is related to India basing its claim on Johnson line which was drawn in 1865 wherein entire Aksai Chin is part of India, whereas China is basing its claim on Macdonald McCartney line which was drawn in 1893, and current line of actual control in eastern Ladakh is closer to Macdonald line and in the process entire Aksai Chin as claimed by China is already in its physical control. Then there are minor differences in other areas like Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand and Sikkim. But there are no major issues which can cause a major heartburn between both the nations. They are resolvable easily. Then comes Arunachal Pradesh. Now Arunachal Pradesh is with India as its state and India lays its claim based on McMahon line which was agreed in Shimla in 1914. Though Chinese rep was present there and agreed for the content of this agreement, however, the document was not signed by China and China is laying its claim to Arunachal Pradesh as part of its secondary claim since it has already absorbed Tibet and therefore through Tibet it is laying the secondary claim. So now these are the issues of the major conflict.
Now coming to the intent, timing and activities which it is currently involved. Now despite large number of agreements for peace and tranquility, what China did, it altered the ground situation in April 2020 in entire eastern Ladakh in large number of areas and it went so bad that we had Galwan clash when we lost 20 of our valiant soldiers with unknown numbers of casualties on Chinese side. It has already started geographical creep wherein it is constructing 624 model villages or Xiaokang villages on line of actual control or close to line of actual control with intention of settling its civilian population.
Now this law — now just see the timing, when I was highlighting that these are the four issues on which a particular law has to be analyzed. First point was the timing. Now this skirmish between India and China happened in April 2020 and in less than a year's time this law was first proposed in March 21, that is within one year of violating the line of actual control. And then before another year got passed, it was on 23rd October 21 when this law was passed and it was made effective on 1st January 22. When this law was passed, the Ministry of External Affairs of India raised its observations. But as always happens, China discarded it for whatever the reasons best known to itself.
Now let us look at those aspects of Chinese land border law which are having certain serious implications, as outwardly the majority part of this law will appear as if it is any other law which any country has passed. But the closer analysis, wordings, intent will highlight the hidden agenda. Actually, some people argue that what is so big about this law, it is just trying to coordinate the actions of various organs of the central government. But if it is just a coordinating mechanism, there was no need to pass a constitutional law. It could have been done by any government order because all the central government orders, be in India or in China, they are bounded by the government orders as passed, but it shows the constitutional way, and how that you know will affect, that will be known as we go ahead.
So what it is going to do? So this law is going to provide the legal cover to its likely actions in eastern Ladakh, to other areas which are disputed between China and India including Arunachal Pradesh, in Bhutan. Mind you, initially the conflict in Bhutan was related to western Bhutan and central Bhutan. But of late it has now raised the bogey of Sakteng wildlife sanctuary also, and possibly Taiwan. Now national security law — it has already passed a similar law for people of Hong Kong and anyone who is monitoring the situation in Hong Kong and as to how the government agencies are working against people, they will be sure of ample evidence of extraterritoriality of the Hong Kong law passed by China.
Now the salient aspect of this: it makes all territorial claims valid and therefore reduces or eliminates the chances of any give take in future which is basic norm of any negotiated settlement. It will intensify its illegal claim on Arunachal because it works the law in a manner that any area which has the Chinese claim or you know Chinese authority, whether it is physically manifested or not, the military forces, civilians and all government organs are duty bound to take actions to ensure that China's national interest is taken care of. So therefore this law tomorrow can be used as a basis also to further its illegal claim on Arunachal Pradesh and also an attempt to find a valid reason to use military force, military machine to get its aim settled.
It has another disturbing trend wherein it has given the enhanced role of civilians. What it is doing? It is doing the settlements closer to a line of actual control. One has already been reported in Subansiri Valley where it has already constructed a village from 1959 which is in illegal possession of China. Since then more number of Xiaokang villages are being constructed. The Han population from interiors of China are intended to be brought and settled here to change the demographic pattern of Tibet and then these civilians are mandated to ensure the sanctity of Chinese border. So therefore it has adopted to a lawfare for gaining territorial concessions as it is in nature of creating facts on the ground. When I say creating facts on ground, what it did in South China Sea, it created certain artificial islands and by means of that thereafter it claimed those areas, and same thing is likely to happen once more and more villages have a settled population in days to come. It also has a paragraph governing water resources, and all those who are monitoring number of activities which it is doing on Brahmaputra on its own side and other rivers — India being a lower riparian state will be always at the receiving end if these things are implemented.
Now let us see how it impacts India. Now what could be the cause of such a law? Some people may say it is a part of a natural process which you would have brought and we are trying to see number of things because it has happened at a particular time and they may attribute this is a matter of sheer coincidence. But to my knowledge, though of course I will not claim that I know everything about China because no one can know everything about China, but whatever I have heard, known, analyzed, there is nothing in China which happens by mere coincidence. So we should not say that this law has been taken out at this point of time by mere coincidence. It has happened because of its own actions on line of actual control in eastern Ladakh and the prompt counter mobilization which was done by India to checkmate its evil design.
Now second thing, what it is going to do to India is it will now have more significant claim on Indian territory, as against normal conflict between two countries where the claims are fixed and then they try to negotiate a situation which is agreeable to both the sides. China has got a dynamic stance. Even on north bank of Pangong, there was a time when its claim line was passing through finger four. Ours was from finger 8. But now it has shifted its claim to finger three and then to finger two. So Chinese have been shifting its stance of their you know line and authority, and which will create more problem for India as well, and it is going to authorize PLA and the PAP to take action. It is also going to tell them to take armed action against intruders. The issue is who is going to be intruder. Is the intruder one who is going into the Chinese area, or one who is entering in the areas of differing perception, or those who are part of the you know Indian control but part of China's claim? So the vague words have been deliberately selected so that at opportune time China can use to its advantage.
Another thing, law prohibits construction activities near China's borders without permission from Chinese authorities. Again a vague wording has been used. Now this would be interpreted on both sides of Chinese border. Initially it was China who was constructing infrastructure in a big way, actually as well as literally, in terms of road, railways and airports. Now India has also gained momentum in infrastructure development. So can that be created a cause for enhancing the conflict justification? That will be also an interesting take from him.
Enhanced role of civilians, again it's very very important, and this is going to be — some people will understand there are three terms which used for this: the salami, geographical creep, or salami slicing or gajification. So this is the way how it enhances its reach and in the process all the border dispute with India and Bhutan it is trying to convert into the sovereignty dispute, and my worthy listeners will understand this sovereignty is a very very strong term as it promotes nationalistic feelings and polarization and reduces the chances of settlement between two countries. So the moment the territorial dispute moves into the sovereign dispute, any possibility of the issue getting resolved further minimizes. In fact, if you critically look to one of our agreements of 2005, article 7, it says that whenever China and India negotiate for border settlement, they will take a special care to safeguard the due interest of civilian population already settled. So now with this law when China is creating the civil settlements also on the borders, so it will mean that now those people where they have settled, India cannot think of you know negotiating that place, and it is specifically mentioned in article 19 of land boundary law which is relevant to this particular issue.
You'll be surprised to know that between 1993 and 2013, that is in a duration of 20 years, five agreements of you know peace and tranquility were signed between India and China, almost averaging at you know one per four year. But post 2013, after resurgence of ultra nationalism in China and neighboring countries and in the world in general, there have — no repeat no agreements between India and China, except there have been two strategic guidance by the meeting of political heads post 2013. But even these guidance at the apex level have not been able to take care of the evolving situation which is currently ongoing at eastern Ladakh on the line of actual control, as this law, the activities, all that has reduced the resolution space between India and China.
So to my mind, since overall time is less and we will cover more once I come to the questions, what the law does? Law articulates some of the aspects wherein it treats its claimed area as parts of its sovereign area, reduces the space of negotiations and creates a cause for any future conflict should China wish to do so. With that, I shall close my talk. I am now available to you for your questions and hopefully during that we shall be able to cover more important ground.
Thank you General Ashok for a very illuminating talk. I begin by asking you the first question. What is India doing to counter the Chinese creation of settlements on the border?
Well sir, if you have noticed the budget of the current financial year, it has laid down certain actions in that particular ground. What problems we are facing? On one hand China is moving closer to the LAC and on the other hand our population is undergoing a reverse migration. You'll be aware that in Uttarakhand there are almost 22% of villages where majority of the population has moved back towards Dehradun, Delhi, NCR and all settled populations, and the upper reaches have been left blank, and so therefore now government is trying to see that what kind of incentive is provided and the landlords are affected so that people can settle there. In Arunachal Pradesh also, though the local population is keen to stay wherever they already have the habitation, but the infrastructure development closer to LAC is still a far cry. So unless the infrastructure is developed and basic facilities in terms of schooling and medical are created, the possibility of we having a response wherein we can also have our settled population forward area is going to be a tough call. However, both in the infrastructure development for highways and road construction and you know a special package to the north state, sufficient funds have been allocated for this purpose to ensure that our people don't now start moving back — firstly to arrest that trend, give them wherewithal and incentive, and then slowly and slowly develop infrastructure as quickly as possible so that they can also be moved towards the line of actual control.
Mr. Raubir Singh, you have raised your hand, please ask your question. I think his audio is not there. Now the new law permits the use of weapons. Would India also have to resort to the use of weapons? Because on one hand we have some agreements which China is not going to honor, and would India honor them or India would change its tactical position of using arms on the border should the need arise?
Yes. Well, sir, you have brought out a very very valid question. As far as China's land border law is concerned, you have rightly picked this thread that it authorizes the armed response to any intrusion which takes place. Whereas as per our bilateral agreement and the methodology to implement that, it is not allowed either on part of China or part of you know India. You'll also agree that any law which is later in time supersedes the previous protocols. So therefore the possibility of Chinese using that cannot be ruled out should they decide. Now it is up to us whether we go in for tit for tat model or we sit down across the table, negotiate and come up with a better model so that we can maintain the peace and tranquility, because it is ultimately the peace which is the resolution of the conflict and not the conflict per se. So I'm sure the people who matter in the government would be taking note of this change which you have just highlighted.
Now, China has assigned new names to 15 places in Arunachal Pradesh. What is the impact of that going to be on India and how would India counter it?
Well, firstly the impact is to my mind pretty serious. Firstly, China has not done it for the first time. This is the second time it has done. Earlier it gave names to six places in Arunachal Pradesh. Now it has selected 15. Now these 15 places are the place names, passes, names of passes, name of rivers, and this has been done by their ministry of civil government, the central department, and these they have given names in the Tibetan language. Firstly, no country has got right despite its claim to name the places in another country till the time the other country is in part of its constitution, and a number of proposals, whether it was in 1960 by Mao or thereafter it was tabled again in 1984-85, they have largely agreed to the alignment of McMahon line in Arunachal Pradesh. So with that background and stance, naming them in Tibetan, it has got two serious connotations. One, firstly they are trying to tell Tibetan people that it is they who are you know caring for their aspirations and their places, because they are claiming Arunachal Pradesh not as part of China but as part of southern Tibet and part of Tibet, because despite all their efforts they are still not been able to integrate the Tibetan population to their nation building in any realistic manner. Secondly, once these names are picked up by the international organizations, by the international flights to refer to their you know the maps or the flight path, then it will become an international phenomena which will be much more difficult situation for India.
So these are the implications, but how should India do? I will restate. The first thing is sit across, talk and try to resolve. However, if that does not happen, some people may say that you also try to name certain portions at least in Aksai Chin area which you claim. You know this situation in Aksai Chin is that you claim and it is in the physical control of this thing. But whether once you start in the tit for tat mode, at what point of time this spirals and goes out of hand is always not controllable. So therefore I think now focus should be the creating the capacity, infrastructure building and take use of the support of some of the international organizations which prohibit such naming, and once we come to a stage where our military power or the national power or comprehensive national power is in a position to respond to China, probably at that time more stronger responses could be thought of.
One more question before I switch on. We have a lot of Tibetans staying in India. Why would we not sort of settle the Tibetans on the Tibetan border?
Well, if you really see sir, the Tibet was not a part of China when China became republic. It has its own flag. It was allowed to attend in the international seminars. It was a country by itself. However, China occupied by its force. Some people including United States of America tried to oppose in some manner but they did not succeed and finally it became part of China. Since our government at that point of time was operating in a high value of ethical sense and you know trying to get the international credibility, we accommodated China. In fact, the kind of accommodation India has done for China is unbelievable in terms of its you know recognition, in terms of Tibetan being accepted as part of China, in terms of you know Hindi Chini bhai bhai, in terms of Panchsheel — you know it is something unbelievable. But right from beginning I think we were pro-Tibet for their concerns and we allowed that the Dalai Lama and large number of Tibetans, we welcome them as refugees in our country and we are providing them all the support. Now had the situation in Tibet would have become normal, there was — it was a perfectly fine decision that these people could have gone back. But the situation which is prevailing in Tibet now, if we send these people back in Tibet, I think it will be you know cannon feeding these people in the hands of Chinese oppression. So I don't think the time is right to do that kind of action. India can accommodate till the time the situation is resolved.
No, my question was why on the border, why don't we settle the Tibetans from the Indian side?
Well sir, if you see the reason of settlement not taking place in border areas is lack of amenities and infrastructure development. In some of the areas, Tibetans like in Tawang and other areas, Tibetans are already settled including those who have come back, but other areas — the suggestion is very nice. We already have number of Tibetan based troops and other effort which is being made to give them sense of achievement, and number of troops of that area participated in the operation of you know Kailash range. So something is being done, but I'm sure once the infrastructure develops, the conditions are conducive and government fits it appropriate, I think then they will take this kind of actions, because the large number of facts which are known to the government and not to us. Therefore it will not be proper to comment beyond this point on this issue.
Sir, may I intervene here, answer this question? The fact is that the villages which General Ashok has brought out which the Chinese are building up along the line of actual control, these villages are actually being occupied by the Hans, not by the Tibetans. The reports which say the large number of people from the mainland, Hans, they have been put into these villages. Secondly, the Tibetans, they are in large numbers along the border area. The large numbers in Sikkim, there are large number in, there are sizable number in west Kameng of Arunachal. But if you go further to the east of Arunachal, there is likely to be — all the people there are tribals. There is likely to be a discordant sort of a relationship between the Tibetans and the tribals which are going to be there. So I think only we have to give the impetus to our own tribals to go up forward and build up the villages.
Mr. Sepal Singh, you wanted to ask a question. Yeah, very elaborately pointed out by the general that it is not a matter of coincidence. He mentioned it. We consider the law has been passed as a matter of coincidence — it is definitely a deliberate attempt, there is no doubt, and in due course of time you have apprehensions that they will start having some construction, infrastructure, again consolidating their position. Under these circumstances various multi-dimensional measures are required to be taken as you said. Now I am of the view that what measures have taken — you know it's about two years, about a year and a half passed when the laws were there, and from 1954 before till 2020 we have been treaties and we have been having a Panchsheel, border peace and tranquility agreement, on military confidence and all etc, protocols — all have been thrown to wind by just making one law by China. Then what is the multi-dimensional approach you would suggest? One is of course that we should start having some construction area, or we should not strengthen our military — what is the multi-dimensional approach? Because it is clearly showing absolutely what is the intention, it is not a coincidence. So what do you suggest? What should be the approach sir?
To my mind, you know it has to be the whole of the nation's approach, because invariably as a military thinkers we look at that issue predominantly, but it will require whole of the nation approach. First of all we have to develop our comprehensive national power including the military strength. We have to be economically not independent in the GDP terms of you know 5 trillion and other things, but we have to be also self capacity created nation where we are not hostages to the imports from China. You will know better than me sir that now at a time when such kind of conflict had taken place, Galwan clash had happened, the whole nation had risen, still the trade between India and China has surpassed all previous records, and as we were discussing before the formal deliberation commenced, that there are large number of areas where our dependence, not only ours, number of other countries in the world, on China is pretty pretty heavy. So therefore on one hand we have to be self dependent in majority of the things, and of course no nation probably can be dependent on itself for anything and everything, but for others there has to be the secondary lines of communications, the logistics, the sourcing available, so that the moment China is not able to exploit us, the moment its market from India shrinks, the moment it finds that we have now grown in the comprehensive national power and the military power and the military alliances, probably its approach towards India will definitely change.
As I highlighted earlier, China always respects strength. When Russia did in 1969, it came to terms to going for the border settlement. For Kazakhstan, when United States launched transatlantic landing of troops in Kazakhstan as part of its exercise, it settled its border with Kazakhstan. In 79 once you know Vietnam responded, when though China claims it had won, but that is not the reality because its aim to overthrow the government in Cambodia didn't materialize in the next one decade. So it always respects strength. So therefore we have to be strengthening ourselves in each and every domain, only then probably we will be negotiating from position of strength. And also I will fail in my duty if I don't bring out that even our approach to the agreement has to be little flexible. We cannot say that we will, you know, if you agree to only this line, only then there'll be settlement. There has to be some respectable give and take from both the sides and probably that kind of settlement will then take place. So that is all at this point of time I wish to say sir.
Sir, I just want to one word — this is all quite long drawn out. Before we become economically as strong as China, before become military as strong as China and all that, is a long drawn out approach. By that they have already — the damage has been done. In this they have damage in the sense they have already got some borderland laws. Tomorrow they'll claim definitely this is our laws, this is in our country. What is the immediate correction? What are the immediate correction method we should take? Because this is now about a year back.
Sir, immediate things will include the development of axials and laterals on a mission mode all across the line of actual control. Putting forward troops in a manner that their mobilization timing reduces. We have to have the air transportation from one area to other area, because in our area whatever forces we commit in a particular region, that remains largely you know committed to that even if there is a minor position from the other side. So there are challenges at this side, but we have certain strengths like our capacity to fight in high altitude area, the hardened troops, the Indian willpower. So I think that will cumulate, and that is what best can — of course gaining larger capacity in terms of surveillance, the having own military satellites which we are already working, and you know enhancement in nuclear arsenals, more number of ballistic missiles. So number of areas we are already moving, or you know making up the deficiency by the imports. So I think currently what is doable, a majority of things is already being done by the country, and otherwise in due course of time more and more things have to be done and I'm sure government will take note of that.
May I say something here? Sure. You see, if you see the dynamics of the LAC, earlier the Chinese had border divisions which were limited in number. Now what they have done in Ladakh, they have inducted large number of mechanized forces and the fire support elements from the interiors. We have to now to start with, I think we need to have a very credible intelligence or surveillance system, because if they have to do something naughty along the LAC, they have to build up a force level. We have to have a very credible surveillance system. We have to keep a check on those bridges on the Tsangpo, because the crossing places — it is a very major river. We have to keep a very close look on the Tsangpo. We have to have a very close look on the induction pattern, which apparently what happened in Ladakh, I feel very strongly that we did not have adequate surveillance and we did not accept this sort of a force structure to be built in. Secondly, what Ashok has mentioned, that we have to build up a very large — this infrastructure which has been pending for very long, and a very fast pace. Identify those areas along the LAC which are detrimental to our own deployment or our own movement, be it for force or for logistics. That is what we got to start with — build up the infrastructure and build up the capability of surveillance.
The next question goes out to Wing Commander Sharma. Are you there sir? Thank you. Thank you Ashok sir. The changing geopolitical situation these days, with Russia overpowering everything, China supporting it, India is also backing it up — is there a remote possibility that these three powers come together and reduce the hegemony of the US and NATO which had been there in the past, and our relations would also improve?
Sir, you actually have highlighted a very very important issue which is being discussed nowadays, for Russia, India, China axis emerging and that becoming fulcrum of the world and taking out US from the system including the dollar being the predominant currency, and certain actions are already being done in certain quarters. But what you have to understand is that firstly, you see China took out — there was a detailed article which came out in 2013 which gave China's plans for next 50 years and its priorities. It is documented. The first one was integration of Taiwan. Second was capture of East China Sea islands. Third was capture of South China islands. Fourth was taking back Arunachal and resolving the issues with India, and fifth was reclaiming the areas which it had to give as part of settlement to Russia. So while China at this moment of time is appearing to be on the sides of Russia in Russian Ukraine conflict, but that is more so because of the US and Quad you know acting against it in Taiwan issue and the South China issue. However, it is still not closing its option to keep the dialogue going between United States of America, because USA and Euro constitute its bulk economic supporters in terms of the market availability and the kind of funding it gets. So as per its national interest, since it also had a hidden agenda of conflict with Russia, it also had a open conflict with China — so just because of this issue they will have that kind of understanding and they will come together, to my mind I don't think that is going to happen. Of course some steps in that direction may take place, and it will also depend in what form the Russia Ukraine conflict terminates, but it's not a reality given the contradictions in various relations.
Colonel Vaj, I am not going to ask any question to you essentially. Can you hear me? Yes. Yes. Essentially I have a little observation, and it's about the — China is claiming on the Arunachal Pradesh, calling it also calling it extension of Tibet. Is Tibet in any case — not the entire Tibet itself is part of the China, just because the neighboring countries never interfered when they came and occupied Tibet. Tibetans were never part of China before. Is it possible, is it being done, that will India also — like the China is playing spoilsport so far as the Arunachal is concerned — is it possible that India can also do it based on that, that Tibet also is a separate kind of the country? Number one. Number two is about their having made a law about their own borders. Yes, a lot of implications, serious implications. But somehow we seem to be discussing as if we have or the rest of the world has recognized that law. That law is internal to China. It's not true. It's got nothing to do with India. Surely India is already taking some actions like you told, moving people closer to the border and creating more infrastructure. So that's a little observation I had, and it has been said many times by you that the China understand the strength. So therefore I think we need not, as a country we need not even hesitate to call some of their country's names into Tibetan or other, the maybe Kashmiri names or something, just because it might snowball or something. So you can't be get yourself in the position of strength without taking some risks.
Sir, if you allow, just three quick comments. One is that when you do the defensive deployment of troops on the borders — so unless, let's say suppose if a minefield you lay down but you don't cover it by fire, that laying of minefield doesn't actually give you the real advantage. Similarly we can take names and do anything to the China, but we have to have that covering strength to respond should a situation thereafter going to the escalation. So I think even you know any action has got a time connect. Probably now the time of this kind of situation has not come and we can wait a little bit on that point. Second, as far as the first point is concerned about the Tibetan independence, again the same thing goes. There is no embargo on we recognizing you know Tibet as independent country. In fact USA did allow lot of concession when the succession of Dalai Lama was under debate and a lot of movement was happening that you know people recognize. Maybe at some point of time if India can persuade some larger powers to do that, maybe India can join the bandwagon, but currently India lacks that strength to declare Tibet as an independent state to my mind. But it is a very very doable action in times to come.
If there's any question from anyone, please could you ask the question now, otherwise I'd hand it over back to the — Is it? Yes. Sir, you have put all these perspective in a very beautiful way, because I have worked in our Arunachal Pradesh for a long period so I am aware. I have distilled all the places which are along the borders, whether it is Taksing in district, whether it is Bumla, Khinzemane, Gelling, Kibithu — all these places I have visited, all these things. Now since the China has said that they are going to acquire this our Arunachal Pradesh, but at the time when China annexed the Tibet, these places were part of India only. How can China say that we will help the Tibetan by enacting Subansiri and all — these are our — further, there is a visit by the foreign minister of China today in India. What do you suggest to the government to do and talk to them about this one? Thank you sir.
I could not get your question sir. If you could repeat the operative part of your question. About this, there is a visit by the China's foreign minister today to India — whether India should raise this particular issue of this passing of bill and annexing of Arunachal Pradesh and all those things which they have put in the bill, whether India should take this issue with them.
I don't think in today's visit it can be and it should be brought, because you must know the context in which foreign minister of China is moving. Both the countries have been tight lipped on his visit. China has been thinking it should be an invitation of India, India was thinking that it should be China, because India in any case was not inviting, and it was preceded by the participation of foreign minister of China in the OIC conference in Pakistan. Now if Chinese foreign minister attends OIC conference, it is duty bound because of their you know relationship to give statements which are pro to them, and since the meeting was on Kashmir, so that becomes against India. In the background of that, and already situation on LAC, when he's coming for a short time, and especially his visit maybe probably would have baggage of the Russia conflict and some talk related to that, you know this issue is not relevant at this point of time. It could be done you know little later or when kind of the you know structural engagement commences. In fact if you have noticed the statements which came after the meeting between external affairs minister of China with our EAM as well as Mr. — all, it was you know a kind of very very you know cold shouldered response which you know happened in this. In fact I was under the impression that when the last 15th corps commander conference took place, there was a high hope that the issue will get resolved, the PP15, and some impressions also came that you know it was agreed but it was not deliberately announced, probably that will be given a political overture, and once Mr. external affairs minister of China comes to India, that is time this will announce and some certain other concession, maybe even rolling back to the pre April 2020 situation — though of course it was too much being optimistic, but those kind of talks were going in various you know corridors. But nothing of those kind of happened, and the visit which could have taken up the relationship some notches ahead, I don't think it has happened that way. In fact it has you know taken it few notches backwards. Thank you.
Oh, thank you very much General Ashok for a very illuminating talk and excellent answers to the questions asked by everyone. I now take the opportunity to hand over the proceedings back to the president. Thank you very much.
The concluding remarks I would like to say — the speaker has very clearly brought out the apprehensions and likely consequences if we do not take adequate actions at this stage. The borderland laws were introduced on 23rd October 2021, just about 6 months back, and it has been absolutely a unilateral delineation and demarcation of territorial boundaries without consulting the neighboring country. In due course of time the Chinese may start building certain infrastructure also. So I am of the view sir that probably we have — it has brought up now in an interactive session — there may have been some talk between India and China, and I do not doubt that our foreign policy people who are dealing in foreign policy must have done something, but when they brought it out openly, there's nothing openly, condemnation or something. Second point I want to say, that once they have named these areas or included some of these areas — although there's no appendix attached with the laws, but in any case they have named some of the areas or they have marked some of the areas under China — I do not know whether the international law we can go in and protest at least that these are our country, there are areas, how they are delineating under them. So I am of the view sir that there has to be something in terms of, as we call it in army terminology, for a larger immediate action. Subsequently what is to be done of course is a long drawn out method — that as general pointed, we should improve our surveillance, in due course of time we will improve our infrastructure behind these areas, in due course of time we'll bring it forth to world forum that they are trying to infiltrate into our areas. These are all well said sir. These things are long-term thing which will continue. No immediate confrontation is possible for us because of our own weaknesses vis-a-vis China. But I am sure that the government will take some action and lodge protest very vehemently that these areas belong to us, and simultaneously we will also ensure to take up some immediate action, not necessarily in terms of going there and fighting, but we can also build some infrastructure. We can also start doing something. We should show them that yes, these are our areas.
With these words I thank the speaker for very elaborate, very reasoned out and scintillating talk. It has evoked lot of interest. I'm sure we have learned a lot, and probably because it is an interactive session which is going on YouTube and streamed live, the powers will also probably move somewhere. We'll keep following of such things. With these words I would like to ask my team to put up the banner for the next interactive session which is due on 8th April. Banner please. Hello, banner — there's something wrong, it's not coming up. So anyway, even if it's not coming up, I'd like to tell the delegates that on the 8th of April we have an interactive session, same time, and that is by another general, Lt General PS Sandhu, and he's going to talk the transformation from middle level to higher level, transition from middle level to higher level — here it is, high level leadership — and this again, understood, interactive session, 8th April, 6 p.m., and speaker Lt General BS Sandhu. Please make a note in your diaries and be with us to listen to the eminent general on 8th April, and I thank once again all the delegates as well as the eminent speaker for being with us this evening. Thank you very much. Thank you sir. Thank you. Thank you so much and goodbye.



