Changing profile of Russia’s Nuclear Doctrine – Takeaways for the World I NISSMAT Podcast I

What this session covered

This session took the form of a conversation between a host and a single guest speaker, opened by a brief welcome from the institute's president. Framing the discussion against the ongoing Russia–Ukraine war and the American decision to permit Ukrainian long-range missile strikes on targets inside Russia, the guest speaker began with a historical survey: the first use of atomic weapons against Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, the Soviet test of 1949, followed by the United Kingdom in 1952, France in 1960 and China in 1964, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty's recognition of those five states as nuclear-weapon powers. He then described the later tests by India (1974 and 1998), Pakistan (1998) and North Korea (2006, after leaving the treaty in 2003), and the ambiguous positions of Israel and Iran. The host added the wider treaty framework, including the test-ban arrangements and the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and both participants noted what they saw as an anomaly in international humanitarian law, which contemplates lawful military use of weapons whose destructiveness cannot in practice be confined to military targets.

The core of the session traced the evolution of Russia's nuclear doctrine. The speaker described a Soviet-era declared policy of no first use; a 1993 revision permitting nuclear use when the security of the Russian Federation was at stake; and a 2000 expansion covering any use of weapons of mass destruction against Russia or its allies, as well as major conventional ground operations against Russia, though still without a preemptive option. He then set out the changes approved in November 2024, which he linked to Western authorisation of long-range strikes into Russian territory: large conventional attacks by missiles, drones or aircraft could now meet the criteria for a nuclear response, lowering the threshold for use; Belarus was explicitly brought under the nuclear umbrella; a preemptive option was introduced where Russia's sovereignty or territorial integrity is judged to be threatened; and Russia signalled readiness to deploy nuclear weapons closer to its borders and on ships in the Baltic in response to Finland and Sweden joining NATO. The host cited a report that more than 1,500 warheads had already been deployed onto missiles and long-range bombers, and observed that such steps would invite counter-measures.

Turning to the Indian context, the guest speaker compared postures: India and China maintain no first use, while Pakistan does not, which in his assessment leaves India at a disadvantage on both fronts. He suggested that one change worth considering would be to qualify India's policy as no first use against non-nuclear states only, and both participants discussed India's position as the fourth country to demonstrate a nuclear triad, with China and Pakistan working towards comparable capability. The session closed with both participants expressing the hope that the revised doctrine remains a deterrent rather than a prelude to actual use, while acknowledging that the escalation matrix has moved markedly since the war began.

Key points raised

• The session traced Russia's nuclear doctrine from a Soviet-era declared no-first-use posture, through revisions in 1993 and 2000, to the changes approved in November 2024.
• The guest speaker said the November 2024 revision lowers the threshold for nuclear use: large conventional attacks by missiles, drones or aircraft could qualify for a nuclear response, Belarus is explicitly covered, and a preemptive option applies where Russia judges its sovereignty or territorial integrity threatened.
• The doctrinal change was presented as a response to Western permission for Ukraine to use long-range missiles against targets inside Russia, with deployments near the Baltic flagged as a response to Finland and Sweden joining NATO.
• The discussion placed the doctrine within the wider history of proliferation: the five NPT-recognised nuclear-weapon states, later tests by India, Pakistan and North Korea, and the ambiguous status of Israel and Iran.
• In the Indian context, the guest speaker argued that no first use disadvantages India against both Pakistan and China, and suggested considering a qualification limiting the pledge to non-nuclear states.
• Both participants closed by expressing the hope that the revised doctrine functions as deterrence rather than a step towards actual use.